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Abstract 
 My topic for this study addresses the inter-relationships between two 
complex phenomena fundamental to human understanding: emotion and analogical 
reasoning (Hume, 1777/2007). In the context of secondary school science a 
relationship between these two phenomena has been barely considered as an area of 
research interest. This is reflected in a paucity of literature on the combined topics of 
emotion and analogy.  
 Analogical reasoning in science education is represented in the literature 
predominately as a cognitive process with considerable influence from the theory of 
structure mapping (Gentner, 1983; Glynn 1994a). The dominant cognitive 
perspective of analogical reasoning was embedded into the field of science education 
by the extensive work of Shawn Glynn (1994a), with a pedagogical model called the 
Teaching-with-Analogies (TWA) model. The TWA model is underpinned by the 
theory of structure mapping that together, portray analogical reasoning from an 
expert perspective, where analogy and its constituent concepts tend to be treated as 
fixed objects. Knowledge of these objects is viewed as transferable from expert to 
novice via the cognitive process of analogical reasoning. Importantly, this cognitive 
theoretical perspective does not treat emotion as a relevant factor in understanding 
analogical reasoning.  
 In contrast, my study treated knowledge about objects as emergent within 
localized classroom situations, and contingent upon constituent practices of social 
interaction. I sourced data from small group interactions during science inquiry 
lessons involving analogical reasoning. I described data via a methodological 
orientation informed by Garfinkel’s (1967) ethnomethodology, and analyzed data 
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using a theoretical framework informed by Collins’s (2004) conceptualization of 
emotional energy, underpinned by the microsociology of Durkheim (1912/1915).   
  This study makes important contributions to science education with the 
development of key theoretical and methodological outcomes. The methodological 
innovations in this study build on notions of undramatic emotional energy (Collins, 
2004) that I have demonstrated to be accessible in science education research via the 
use of an ethnomethodological orientation to inform my methodology. The 
development of this notion of undramatic emotional energy has implications for 
future research and theory development in the fields of science education and the 
sociology of emotion. 
 My key theoretical innovation in this study is the outline of a foundation for a 
sociological theory of analogical reasoning I have describe as enacted analogical 
reasoning. My dissertation outlines detailed descriptions and analyses of micro-
social practices that have enabled the definition of key ideas as constituents of the 
fundamental human phenomenon I call enacted analogical reasoning.  These ideas, 
including the involvement of undramatic emotional energy, form a basis for future 
research, and the development of a coherent theory of enacted analogical reasoning. 
By outlining this theoretical foundation, my study points to future impacts on science 
teacher education and teaching practice that may address the limitations of cognitive 
approaches to analogical reasoning in school science contexts.  
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Glossary 
 
Account (section 3.1.3)  
Any version of social reality that group members construct and make reference to during 
social interaction. Also referred to as a formal account by Garfinkel (1967; 1996). 
 
Concept 
An idea enacted in a semantic/lexical format. 
 
Conceptual entrainment (sections 3.2.2.1, 5.2 & 6.3.2) 
A form of undramatic emotional energy observable through physical and speech gestures 
such as silence, pauses, stillness, eye contact, glances, smiles and taken-for-granted, 
unremarkable continuity of interactions that are productive of scientific concepts. 
(Developed as an outcome of this study) 
 
Conceptual landmark (sections 5.2.1.2 & 6.3.2) 
Ideas or concepts that are treated as familiar objects via their use as a point of reference to 
construct shared understanding of new unfamiliar objects.  
 
Conceptual locality (sections 3.1.4.2, 5.1, 5.2.1, 6.2.1 & 6.3.2) 
The conceptual understanding of a group member at any moment in an interaction.  
 
Contiguity (sections 5.3.4, 5.4.2.1, 5.5.2 & 6.2.4.1) 
The notion that one object occupying an unfamiliar space may be positioned beside another 
object occupying a familiar space. A pre-condition for transference of emotional energy (cf. 
Durkheim, 1912/1915). 
 
Disjuncture (section 3.1.3.3) 
Disruption in the flow of social interaction.  
 
Emotional Energy (section 3.2.2.1) 
Defined by Collins (2004), emotional energy is the lived experience of emotion that binds 
society, unifying group members around shared objects, ideas or concepts and observable 
through coordinated speech and physical gestures. In this dissertation I refined the definition 
of undramatic emotional energy as being identifiable via the coordinated enactment of 
ethnomethods that are productive of scientific concepts, ideas or vague ideas in school 
science contexts. 
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Enactment  
The performance of an ethnomethod (physical or speech gestures). 
 
Episode (section 4.4.1) 
A series of data extracted from a situation that is used to illustrate particular setting features. 
 
Ethnomethods (section 3.1.2) 
In face-to-face situations, the taken for granted physical gestures and speech gestures that 
accomplish the construction of social reality (Garfinkel, 1967). They are identified as the 
micro-social sounds and motions interpreted by others in social situations (Durkheim, 
1912/1915). More broadly ethnomethods may be observable as technique, and embedded in 
technology such as the structure of a document, as distinct from its content (cf. Garfinkel, 
1967). 
 
Familiar Space (section 5.2.2.3) 
Physical space and/or a moment in time occupied by physical or conceptual objects and 
accepted by group members into a situated interaction.  
 
Family (sections 2.3.6, 3.2.3.2, 5.4, 5.5 & 6.2.2) 
Family is the sense of belonging to a group that involves an emotional experience of comfort 
and dependence associated with solidarity. Durkheim (1912/1915) developed this idea 
around the notion of kinship that included not just people, but physical objects and strongly 
established shared ideas that may be described as sacred objects or conventional wisdom.  
Glynn (1994a) also used the phrases family of concepts and family resemblance to describe 
relations of similarity between analogical objects.  
 
Feelings (sections 3.2.2.3 & 3.2.2.4) 
The perceptual experience of bodily movements as the intersection between the phenomenon 
of perception and the internal biochemical experience of the body. Feelings are treated 
without a label as they are pre-conceptual. Shared feelings are a presumption by others that 
the feelings they perceive themselves are a shared reality (cf. 3.1.3.3). As feelings are treated 
with meaning they contribute to the formation of emotional energy. 
 
Finding-each-other (sections 5.1 & 6.2.1)  
Finding-each-other is a collection of enacted practices experienced by members of a group 
to define a starting point for analogical reasoning. A notion developed from the analysis of 
data in this study. 
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Fragment (sections 3.1.3.2 & 4.4)  
A sub-section of an episode of data, used as part of the analytical reduction of data. 
 
Gesture (3.1.2, 3.1.3.4 & 4.4.2) 
Embodied motions (physical actions) and sounds (speech). Gesture is treated as the 
enactment of thought itself (Merleau-Ponty, 1962/2012). 
 
Ideas (3.2.2) 
Ideas and shared ideas are the meaning around which emotions are focused. Ideas derive 
from whole pulses of emotional experience as internal feelings and bodily movements.  They 
are observable through physical and speech gestures.  Ideas may be vague or more 
developed, through to becoming identifiable as a scientific concept. (cf. Collins, 2003; 
Dewey, 1894; 1895; Durkheim, 1912/1915) 
 
Moment  
A point in time during an occasion of an actual lived experience. 
 
Objectivity (sections 5.3 & 6.3.1) 
The way students and teachers treat objects in school science contexts in an endeavour to 
understand the nature of objects. Objectivity involves practices such as speculation-free 
observation, physical distancing and use of particular language (Carrier, 2013; Chalmers, 
1982; Daston & Galison, 2010). An innovation from this study explores the undramatic 
emotional energy evident within practices of objectivity during school science inquiry 
involving analogical reasoning. 
 
Objects  
Physical things, vague ideas, ideas or concepts treated by group members as part of the 
reality of a situation, thereby occupying a familiar or unfamiliar space in an interaction. 
 
Objectification (section 5.1) 
To think of a physical thing or phenomenon as an object, evident in my study through 
physical and speech gestures. 
 
Practices  
Collections of ethnomethods that may be identified in a thematic way based on what they are 
accomplishing.  For example, practices of observation in science accomplish objectification 
and objective knowledge of things. Practices of observation may be viewed as a collection of 
18 
 
other practices such as language practices and practices of distancing. Language practices 
may then be identified as a collection of ethnomethods. 
 
Situation  
An occasion of an actual lived experience, comprised of multiple moments. In this study 
situations are documented in episodes of data. 
 
Sounds and motions 
The phrase sounds and motions is used in this study in reference to embodied physical and 
speech gestures derived from the microsociology of Durkheim (1912/1915). In conversation 
analysis, associated with ethnomethodology, sounds and motions would be referred to as talk 
and action. I use the phrase sounds and motions to acknowledge coherence between 
ethnomethodology and the micro-sociological framework derived from Durkheim’s 
(1912/1915) work.  
 
Speech gesture (sections 3.1.2, 4.4.2.2 & 4.4.2.3) 
An act of speech.  My view on speech gesture is consistent with Merleau-Ponty (1962/2012) 
who described speech as a form of gesture.  Importantly he also treated gesture, including 
speech gesture, as the enactment of thought itself.  
 
Superimposed (sections 5.2.2, 5.3.4.3, 5.5.2 & 6.2.4.2) 
An analytical device to describe the notion that one object occupying an unfamiliar space 
may be laid over another object occupying a familiar space. This is a hierarchical form of 
contiguity. 
 
Transference (sections 2.3.6, 3.2.3.3, 5.3.4, 5.5.2 & 6.2.4.3) 
The spread of emotional energy between objects and between people and objects. First 
defined by Durkheim (1912/1915) as contagion. Olitsky (2007) referred briefly to 
transference of emotional energy in a science classroom, and Glynn (1994a) considered 
analogical reasoning to involve transference of understanding between analogue and target 
concepts. 
 
Unfamiliar Space (section 5.2.2.3) 
Physical space and/or a moment in time occupied by physical or conceptual objects that are 
newly enacted and not yet accepted by group members into a situated interaction.  
 
  
19 
 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.0 The Importance of Analogical Reasoning in School Science 
 Analogical reasoning is fundamental to human understanding of our everyday 
world (Gentner & Holyoak, 1997; Hume, 1777/2007). For this reason it forms an 
important part of learning in school science. Analogy is common in everyday life as 
we search our historical experiences for similar events, when trying to relate to 
present situations (Garfinkel, 1967). In everyday mathematical applications we 
classify, categorize and compare objects with simple mathematical models as a form 
of analogical reasoning (Davis, 2013a; Fluellen, 2007; Richland, Holyoak & Stigler, 
2004). Scientists use analogy in their everyday practice as a central strategy to 
scientific thinking (Dunbar, 2001; Glynn, 1997). Analogy is used by scientists when 
reasoning about new ideas (Clement, 1993, 1998), generating hypotheses, designing 
experiments, interpreting data or explaining science to other people (Dunbar, 2001). 
In school science, teachers use analogy in their everyday practice (Glynn, 2007), 
whether spontaneously or pre-planned.  
 The science education literature provides evidence of a substantial body of 
research about analogical reasoning, accumulated over many years (Aubusson, 
Fogwill, Barr & Perkovic, 1997; Duit, 1991; Gentner, 1980; Haglund & Jeppsson, 
2012; Zeitoun, 1984). Research has established notions of analogical reasoning 
around psychological constructs of individual cognition, and internalized neuro-
anatomical pathways (Lakoff, 2014; Vendetti, Whitaker, Wendelken & Bunge, 
2015). These notions of analogical reasoning are dominant in the science education 
literature with direct links between the cognitive sciences discipline and 
contemporary pedagogical strategies (Glynn, 1994a; Harrison & Coll, 2008; 
Treagust, Harrison & Venville, 1998). This enduring effort to understand analogical 
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reasoning in science education provides evidence of its importance in the context of 
school science. Through studying the emotional essence of analogical reasoning, my 
study continues this enduring effort by adding something more to what we know 
about this phenomenon that science educators call analogical reasoning. 
1.1 Background 
1.1.1 Theory and practice of analogical reasoning. 
Using analogies in science classrooms is an emotional experience for students 
and teachers. Practical teaching experience suggests students can become excited, 
interested and engaged when analogies are used (Harrison & Coll, 2008). Emotion 
when using analogy is also important when students misunderstand a science 
concept. For example, having used an analogy a teacher may be, “…surprised by the 
quizzical looks on the students’ faces”, suggesting an emotional experience of 
confusion or misunderstanding (Harrison & Coll, 2008, p. 1). Given this everyday 
acknowledgement of emotional experiences in teaching and learning science, we 
might expect pedagogical strategies for teaching with analogies to account for, or 
have some explanatory power, in relation to these emotional experiences. But in 
relation to analogical reasoning our contemporary pedagogical theory is almost silent 
on the topic of emotion.  
This silence may be due to our pedagogical theory being grounded in 
objective, rational scientific theory, through disciplines such as the cognitive 
sciences. This is evident in the content of the dominant theories about analogical 
reasoning that objectify cognition while excluding emotion (cf. Gentner, 1983). 
These dominant theories of analogical reasoning in science education tend to draw 
from the cognitive sciences theory of structure mapping (Gentner, 1983).  This 
cognitive theory is important in defining our notions of analogical reasoning in 
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science pedagogy. It forms the theoretical foundation for the extensive work by 
Glynn (Glynn, 1994a, 1994b, 1995, 1996a, 1996b, 1997, 2007; Glynn, 
Taasoobshirazi & Fowler, 2007; Glynn & Takahashi, 1998) in his development of 
the Teaching-with-Analogies (TWA) model, which is central to the dominant 
perspective of analogical reasoning in science education. This is further reflected in 
the formation of the Focus-Action-Reflection (FAR) guide that builds on the TWA 
model and the theory of structure mapping (cf. Harrison & Treagust, 1993; Treagust 
et al., 1998). 
These pedagogical theories (TWA and FAR) reflect the cognitive dimension 
of analogical reasoning by reference to the theory of structure mapping (cf. Gentner, 
1983; Glynn, 1994a; Treagust et al., 1998). That theory (Gentner, 1983, p. 156) 
defines analogy as “An assertion that a relational structure that normally applies in 
one domain can be applied in another domain.” For example, analogy is defined by 
mapping from a base domain (B), sourced from prior knowledge, to a target domain 
(T) where improved understanding is desired. In this general example, mapping may 
be illustrated in a simple analogy that T is like B. The likenesses between T and B are 
not defined in terms of similarity of superficial or physical features, but by the 
similarity of relationships or relational structure (Gentner, 1983; Gentner & Medina, 
1998; Markman & Gentner, 2000; Sagi, Gentner & Lovett, 2012).  
In defining analogical reasoning Gentner (1983) made a distinction between 
superficial physical features referred to as attributes and more generalizable 
relationships referred to as relational structures. As a specific example of a relational 
structure, we might state an analogy as; an atom is like the solar system. A relational 
structure may be identified in terms of the nucleus in the atom being similar to the 
sun in the solar system, because both objects (nucleus and sun) are at the centre of 
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their respective analogical objects. Central locality of the nucleus and the sun would 
be the relational structure in this example. Referring back to the general example of 
analogy, the attributes of objects T and B may be discarded, while the relational 
structures between analogical objects are preserved to form the analogy.  
In my study I focus on the TWA model and its theoretical foundation (the 
theory of structure mapping) because these areas of literature represent a dominant 
perspective on analogy in the science education literature that is informed by 
cognitive psychology. I refer to these cognitive perspectives of analogy, collectively 
in my study, as cognitive analogical reasoning (CAR). Treating this perspective as 
cognitive analogical reasoning is important because I re-define analogical reasoning 
at different points in this dissertation; in chapter 3, I define it as a fundamental 
human phenomenon; and in chapters 6 and 7, I propose a sociological re-theorization 
of analogical reasoning. 
 1.1.2 Limitations of contemporary theory. 
At the outset of this study I explore the limitations of cognitive analogical 
reasoning. These limitations include the treatment of concepts as fixed and existing, 
and the inability of CAR to explain analogy in practical situations and everyday 
teaching practice. These limitations of CAR are evident in the language used to 
describe contemporary theory and pedagogical strategies. In Chapter 2, I outline how 
the language used to explain CAR in the literature suggests an a priori ontological 
presumption. In this context I use the term ontology to refer to the origin of existence 
of concepts and analogy as constituents of the mental schemata of analogical 
reasoning in structure mapping theory (i.e. Gentner, 1983; Glynn, 1994a).  
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1.1.2.1  Treating concepts as fixed and existing. 
The a priori ontological presumption evident in the language of CAR leads to 
the treatment of concepts and analogy as fixed and already in existence before 
analogical reasoning takes place. To explain this presumption evident in the 
literature, Duit, Roth, Komorek and Wilbers (2001) suggested the authors of this 
literature on analogies portrayed a high degree of intersubjective (mutual) 
understanding about analogy. That is, they focused on the mapping of analogical 
reasoning and did not consider the origin of concepts within analogy as problematic. 
Regardless of the cause, the literature relating to the theory of structure mapping 
(Gentner, 1983) and the TWA model (Glynn, 1994a) exhibits evidence of an a priori 
ontological presumption. This presumption is evident in the literature that describes 
the existence of concepts and analogy as fixed objects, which may be discovered 
through analogical reasoning. Furthermore, the cognitive description of the 
individual mind suggests the existence of an innate capacity for analogical reasoning.   
For example, Gentner (1983, p. 155) asserts that “theory of analogy must 
describe how the meaning of an analogy is derived from the meaning of its parts.” 
This assertion suggests an a priori ontology as the theory relies on pre-existing 
component parts of the analogy, to describe the derivation of meaning from the 
analogy. Another way of describing this a priori presumption is to think of the 
science education and cognitive sciences literature only from an expert’s perspective. 
Because an expert has experience with particular knowledge, things such as science 
concepts and analogy tend to be treated as already existing, before any student 
experience of the phenomena, these ideas are seeking to apprehend.   
The problem with this a priori presumption about concepts becomes evident 
when we consider the locality where these a priori concepts might exist. At a 
24 
 
neurological level, analogical reasoning using visual stimuli was recently associated 
with the left anterior ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, a brain region usually associated 
with semantic memory retrieval (Vendetti, et al., 2015). Vendetti et al. (2015) sought 
to understand better, analogical reasoning as explicitly defined by Gentner (1983), by 
studying the site of activation in the brain during semantic tasks involving cognitive 
analogical reasoning. By linking to Gentner’s (1983) work, Vendetti et al. (2015) 
specify an anatomical location where the enacted and experienced biochemistry of a 
semantic dimension to cognitive analogical reasoning may take place.  
Most importantly, the images by Vendetti et al. (2015) did not identify the 
resting place of concepts. Their study shows that biochemistry must be enacted 
before, or as, a concept may be experienced. The perceptual experience of a concept 
involves a feeling or an idea, which may be observable as a speech gesture, and 
represented after the experience, by magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) of 
biochemical action in that study (Vendetti, et al., 2015). The challenge to treating 
concepts as fixed and pre-existing is that they are the meaning attributable to specific 
occasions of perceptual experiences. The inability to physically locate pre-existing 
concepts means the a priori presumption about the existence of concepts, and the 
mind itself, is an important limitation to the cognitive perspective of analogical 
reasoning.  
1.1.2.2  Analogies in practical situations. 
A further limitation to the cognitive perspective is the difference between 
what the theory explains as analogical reasoning, and how analogy is experienced in 
practical situations. For instance, numerous examples of embodied reasoning and 
emotional experiences in analogy can be identified in Harrison and Coll’s (2008) 
practice-based-textbook on analogy. Despite this, embodied reasoning and emotional 
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experiences remain unexplained by the theories cited by Harrison and Coll (cf. 
Gentner, 1983; Glynn, 1994a; Treagust et al., 1998). Further examples were 
discussed in a reflective paper on similarity where Gentner & Markman (1997) 
highlighted limitations of structure mapping when explaining analogy through 
embodied imitation, everyday conversation, and situations involving empathy 
(emotion). In addition to these limitations (Gentner & Markman, 1997), the science 
pedagogy literature cites many examples of everyday analogies on the basis of their 
emotional appeal in terms of excitement and student interest (Aubusson et al., 1997; 
Harrison, 2006; Harrison & Coll, 2008). In this study I use a sociological 
methodology to explore these practice-based anomalies unexplained by 
contemporary theory.  
1.1.2.3  Analogies in Teaching Practice. 
The TWA model and the FAR guide are pedagogical models for application 
in science teaching practice. In studies of practice situations, the psychological 
constructs underlying these pedagogical models are analysed through the everyday 
conversation of the classroom. For example, Glynn (2007, p.53) illustrates the TWA 
model with conversational data such as: 
“Listen carefully, because this is very important,” Karen says. “Lego bricks 
are like your cells, but they’re not the same as your cells. How are Lego 
bricks and your cells different?” 
“Lego bricks are bigger than my cells because I can see the Lego bricks,” said 
Juan. “That’s right, …” replied Karen. 
 While the psychology based theoretical framework embedded in the TWA 
model may be used to interpret the content of this conversation, the features of this 
conversation are taken-for-granted as possible factors in understanding analogy. For 
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example, how is the student’s understanding of the analogy influenced by the 
situation created by the teacher’s utterances, such as “Listen carefully”, or her use of 
an open-ended question. It is these fine-grained aspects of social interaction within 
teaching practice that are not included in the understanding of cognitive analogical 
reasoning, and for this reason they define a limitation to the cognitive perspective.  
The limitations of the TWA model and the FAR guide also became obvious 
in my own reflective teaching practices prior to commencing the present study. In a 
reflective study I conducted before the present study (Davis, 2013), I noted how the 
planning and reflection aspects of the FAR guide benefited my teaching practice 
using analogies, but the innate conceptual features of scientific objects were not an 
important part to achieving student understanding. The central element of my success 
in teaching with analogies was in the critical discussion of analogical models that my 
teaching practice elicited (Davis, 2013).  That is, it was the social interaction with 
and between my students that was evident in the successful use of analogies.  These 
social interactions, like the interactional elements from Glynn’s (2007) data shown 
above, are excluded from being important in understanding scientific phenomena 
from the cognitive perspective of analogical reasoning. I address these teaching 
practice issues in my study by challenging the cognitive theoretical perspective 
underlying pedagogical strategies, and exploring social perspectives. I will return to 
the topic of teaching practice in chapter 7 (section 7.3.3).  
1.2 Overview 
1.2.1 Study context and teacher research. 
This investigation was conducted as a researcher/teacher/participant study in 
my Year 9 and 10 science classes in a rural high school. Video and audio data were 
collected over four school terms and analysed using a sociological methodology and 
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theoretical framework. My final analysis reported in this dissertation focused on 
three situations of group interaction. These situations were identified as instances of 
analogical reasoning. By studying these situations I was able to analyse analogical 
reasoning that involved embodied imitation, everyday conversation and other 
features such as use of diagrams. The examples I studied addressed some of the 
limitations noted in section 1.1.2 above.  
An important feature of my study was its fundamental design grounded in 
teacher research (Stenhouse, 1975). Common approaches to teacher research tend to 
focus on innovations in practical knowledge via methodologies such as action 
research (Alticher, Kemmis, McTafgart & Zuber-Skerritt, 2002) or practitioner 
inquiry (Cochran-Smith & Lytle, 1999). These forms of teacher research are 
commonly associated with teacher professional development aimed at critical 
reflection and localized improvements in teaching practice (Roulston, Leggete, 
Deloach & Buckhalter Pitman, 2005). Unlike these common approaches to teacher 
research, my study focuses on innovations in theory and research methodology by 
drawing from the context of teaching practice as a data source. This study impacted 
on my own teaching practice, but its major contribution to teaching practice is 
through my contribution to theory and methodology in the field of science education.  
Critique of teacher research documented in the literature, highlights potential 
inadequacies related to a lack of objectivity, atheoretical outcomes, clarity of 
methodology or limited self-criticism (McWilliam, 2004; Roulston et al., 2005; 
Zeichner & Noffke, 2002). These common sources of critique may be related to the 
contextualised, interpretative research approaches that tend to characterize teacher 
research. However, the interpretative approaches to teacher research tend to define its 
strengths, rather than its limitations. As suggested by Roth (2007a), when he 
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considered education research from quantitative perspectives the context of learning 
was treated as error variance in statistical terms, and removed from analysis. Roth 
(2007a) come to recognize that the contextual noise excluded through quantitative 
analysis was the key phenomena that he needed to study, if he was to understand 
teaching and learning in science classrooms.  
To make research interpretations in context, and to understand the 
particularities of teaching and learning in a science classroom it is imperative that the 
researcher get close to the data in order make naturalistic generalizations (Simons, 
2015), grounded in authentic data (Guba & Lincoln, 1989).  As a teacher-researcher 
my prolonged immersion in the study context contributes to the quality of my 
interpretation (section 4.5) as it enhances familiarity with the context. This 
contextual familiarity was important for my methodological orientation informed by 
ethnomethodology, which specifically requires the researcher to be competent in the 
methods of social interaction indigenous to particular study contexts (section 3.1). 
On this basis conducting teacher research as a way of understanding the fine-grained 
qualities of phenomena as part of the study context is an important foundation for my 
methodological orientation and theoretical framework.  
1.2.2 Methodology and theoretical framework. 
Zembylas (2005) suggests exploratory studies of cognition and emotion in 
science education may be best approached using methodologies drawn from socio-
constructivist or post-structuralist perspectives. My study framework reflects 
contemporary approaches in science education that emphasize multi-method, multi-
theoretical and multi-level approaches to data production and analysis (Tobin & 
Ritchie, 2012). My multiple methods involved the reduction of video and audio data 
to understand these data through conversation analysis, prosody (speech rate and 
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intonation), and frame-by-frame alignment of physical gestures and speech gestures. 
In addition to these methods, I treated part of the literature as data, in the way I 
analysed the article Glynn (1994a) (sections 3.1.4.3, 5.4.2.1 & 6.2). In chapter 3, I 
outline my methodological orientation that is informed by Garfinkel’s 
ethnomethodology as a means for describing phenomena in localized situations. The 
interpretative aspect of my study involves a micro-sociological, theoretical 
framework drawn from the complimentary works of Collins (2004) and Durkheim 
(1912/1915).  By defining this methodological and theoretical framework I establish 
a clear boundary between my investigation and previous work around analogical 
reasoning in science education that is informed by psychological perspectives (cf. 
Glynn, 1994a; Treagust et al., 1998). In addition, my ethnomethodological approach 
in science classrooms is a distinctively different approach to the applications of 
semiotics, discourse analysis or psychology in previous science education research 
into classroom interaction, including emotions (cf. Kelly, 2014; Lemke, 1982; 1987; 
1990; Vieira & Kelly, 2014).  
1.2.2.1  Methodological orientation. 
In my study I developed a methodology informed by ethnomethodology 
(Garfinkel, 1967) which enabled me to shift my unit of analysis from a focus on the 
cognitive analogical mind, to study episodes of the lived experiences of social 
interaction involving analogical reasoning. By adopting this methodology, I 
approached social interaction in the science classroom as the basis for enacting 
shared understanding or localized knowledge about concepts. Shared understanding 
does not mean absolute congruence in inter-subjective understanding. It refers to a 
commonality of ideas, as a consensus of shared knowledge. This approach enables 
me to explore how concepts and analogy are co-constructed in lived, localized 
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situations in the science classroom. In effect, I develop an understanding about 
analogical reasoning as a co-constructed collection of practices via social interaction. 
These social practices were identified in my study as ethnomethods. At their 
most fundamental level of existence, ethnomethods may be described as the 
embodied sounds and motions we interpret from each other in localized social 
interactions (cf. Garfinkel, 1967). Ethnomethods may also include the way we 
interact with technologies and materials (Garfinkel, 1967; Livingston, 2006; Lynch, 
1993; Pollner 1987). This fundamental definition is consistent with Durkheim’s 
description of elementary social practices involving experiences of religious ritual 
(Durkheim, 1912/1915; 1912/2008; Rawls, 2004; 2011).  
Ethnomethodology is the study of ethnomethods. The people’s methods (i.e., 
my students’, and my methods of analogical reasoning) become the focus of my 
study as a way of understanding how science concepts and analogical reasoning may 
be knowable in the context of school science learning situations. Via 
ethnomethodology, research participants are referred to as members because they are 
participants in the localized group situation. Members are treated as experts in their 
localized, insider (within the group) ethnomethods, as they use these methods to 
make sense of their shared reality (Garfinkel, 1967). More importantly, members are 
generally unaware of their ethnomethods because they focus upon the meaning of the 
situation being co-constructed, rather than the methods of their embodied interactions 
that serve to create the shared meanings (Garfinkel, 1967).  
For example, my student Pete and I are in a conversation, and Pete is seeking 
my agreement on some issue. Following Pete’s request for agreement I move my 
head vertically in the sagittal plane without any verbal response. This action we may 
call nodding (Darwin, 1872/1965; Stivers, 2008). At that moment Pete would be 
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making sense of my nodding, probably as a form of agreement (Lambertz, 2011). In 
that situation Pete is focused on the achievement of shared agreement. It is highly 
unlikely Pete would find my nodding strange, meaning he would not question it. At 
the same time he is not ignoring the nodding of my head, as he is using my nod as a 
way of achieving a sense of agreement. Pete takes the act of nodding for granted, but 
he uses it to construct meaning around the agreement he seeks. This is evident in his 
actions and utterances that do not serve to question the nod and instead suggest that 
the nod was received as agreement for this particular interaction. In this way insider 
ethnomethods (such as my nod and Pete’s follow-up actions) are taken-for-granted, 
but routinely used by participants as an analytical resource to achieve shared 
understanding or situated meaning. For the member, nodding is the resource for 
understanding the topic of agreement. From an ethnomethodology researcher 
perspective, nodding is used as an analytical resource, and how nodding displays 
agreement is the topic of concern. This is the fundamental ethnomethodological 
approach to my study as defined in chapter 3, and analyzed throughout chapter 5. 
1.2.2.2  A Theoretical Framework Defining Emotional Energy.  
The theoretical framework in this study provides an operational definition of 
emotional energy that draws from micro-sociological perspectives (Collins, 2004; 
Durkheim, 1912/1915). A micro-sociological framework is adopted in this study 
because of the limitations of experimental and quantitative research approaches that 
inform the dominant psychological perspectives of emotion (Pekrun and 
Linnenbrink-Garcia, 2014; Bellocchi, 2015). The purpose of my micro-sociological 
framework is to extend emotions research beyond the boundaries of psychological 
perspectives. The distinction between sociological-psychological perspectives 
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becomes more apparent as I highlight the limitations of psychological approaches to 
understanding analogical reasoning in school science.   
As indicated above (section 1.1.2.2) emotion is anecdotally acknowledged in 
everyday practices of analogical reasoning, but there is currently no specific 
theoretical basis to explain emotion as part of analogical reasoning. In this study I 
start with a basic operational definition of emotional energy, treating emotion as an 
individual-collective social phenomenon (Collins, 2004). My definition of emotional 
energy as a lived experience is defined in section 3.2 and draws on the work of 
Collins (2004), Dewey (1894; 1895), Durkheim (1912/1915) and Garfinkel (1967).  
In my study I identify lived experiences of emotional energy by looking for 
evidence of shared ideas, shared feelings and coordinated gesture. This evidence 
becomes available by studying the enacted, embodied sounds and motions 
constituting ethnomethods. As I explain my theoretical framework for emotional 
energy in section 3.2, I introduce phenomena described by Durkheim (1912/1915) 
such as respect, moral force, kinship and contagion.  While Durkheim (1912/1915) 
recognized these phenomena may become psychologically internalized through lived 
experiences of them, they originate as empirical phenomena observable through the 
embodied sounds and motions I define as ethnomethods in this study (chapter 3). For 
this reason I do not study innate, invisible constructs, because emotional energy, 
respect, moral force, kinship and contagion become evident in my data through 
enacted practices of social interaction. 
In simple terms, lived experiences of emotional energy become evident 
through the coordination of ethnomethods. This approach to understanding lived 
experiences of emotional energy means that emotional energy becomes a resource 
for explaining how particular concepts and situations of analogical reasoning may be 
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achieved as shared understanding. This approach impacts on the way I frame my 
research questions, which do not include emotion as part of the topic. 
1.2.3 Aim and research questions. 
The aim of this dissertation is to present a study of the emotional essence of 
analogical reasoning in secondary school science. My study is focused around the 
following research questions: 
1. How is shared understanding about concepts achieved in localized 
situations between students, and students and teacher? 
2. How are conceptual networks in the form of a family of concepts, 
hierarchy, and transference of shared understanding about concepts 
achieved in localized situations of analogical reasoning? 
3. How are conceptual networks in the form of a family of concepts, 
hierarchy, and transference of shared understanding about concepts 
related to the achievement of difference and similarity in localized 
situations of analogical reasoning? 
1.2.4 Categories in my research questions. 
My research questions were developed after my early data analysis and a 
review of Glynn (1994a) as a document-in-use, evident via sections 2.3.6, 3.2.3.3, 
5.4.2.1, and 6.2. In this way, the key categories of a family of concepts, hierarchy, 
and transference of shared understanding reflect the emergent and contingent quality 
of my analyses throughout this study. I then used these categories to structure the 
presentation of my analysis in this dissertation.  
In relation to my research questions, I re-define analogical reasoning in my 
theoretical framework (section 3.2.1), after my literature review (that is presented in 
Chapter 2). This re-definition of analogical reasoning was essential, because I aimed 
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to understand something more about analogical reasoning beyond the current 
cognitive theory (section 1.1.1). For this reason I drew upon the work of Hume 
(1777/2007) and Durkheim (1912/1915) to state a fundamental definition of 
analogical reasoning as any localized social situation where knowledge, in the form 
of shared understanding, was being co-constructed through the establishment of 
similarity and difference (cf. section 3.2.1). This was the initial definition I used to 
select data for analysis (cf. section 4.3).  As my analysis unfolded I came to 
understand analogical reasoning differently and from chapter 6 onward, I refer to my 
new understanding as enacted analogical reasoning. The evolving nature of this 
understanding is consistent with the emergent and contingent process of my analysis. 
Within my research questions I also use the categories of a family of 
concepts, hierarchy, and transference of understanding. These categories I derived 
from my review of the article cited as Glynn (1994a), after my initial data analysis 
(chapter 5). To understand these categories I analyzed Glynn (1994a) as a document-
in-use (cf. section 3.1.4.3); as a way of understanding language and structures Glynn 
used to direct me as a reader. This brought me to a realization about how these 
categories used by Glynn, but not explicitly defined by him, may be considered 
fundamental to the social co-construction of knowledge. My interpretation was 
supported by the use of family, hierarchy and transference of understanding as 
fundamental ideas explicitly used by Durkheim (1912/1915) in understanding social 
interaction, and the origins of knowledge within society. For this reason I used these 
categories in my research questions as a way of guiding the presentation of my 
analysis and discussion (chapters 5 & 6). 
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1.2.5 Study outline. 
This dissertation presents the outcome of my understanding of the emotional 
essence of analogical reasoning in secondary school science as developed through 
this study. Chapter 2 presents my literature review of emotion and analogical 
reasoning. This review was re-drafted after my data analysis, and for this reason the 
approach to the literature reflects my post-analysis interpretation of the literature 
consistent with an ethnomethodological approach to inquiry. In chapter 3, I explain 
my methodological orientation by providing practical definitions of ethnomethods 
and ethnomethodology. I also define my theoretical framework in terms of my 
fundamental definition of analogical reasoning and my approach to identifying 
emotional energy. My research design and procedures are outlined in chapter 4. This 
includes samples of how I structured my data using the work of Garfinkel, Lynch and 
Livingston (1981) as an example. In chapter 5, I present my data analysis of 
ethnomethods used by members to co-construct shared understanding of concepts 
and enact analogical reasoning. I also include a brief section where I analyze Glynn 
(1994a) as a document-in-use (cf. Garfinkel, 1967). The analysis extends beyond 
ethnomethodological description, with interpretation using a theoretical framework 
to define emotional energy in micro-sociological contexts (Collins, 2004; Durkheim, 
1912/1915). My discussion in chapter 6 is entitled Understanding Emotion and 
Analogical Reasoning. Chapter 6 begins with an overview of this study’s 
contribution to science education before outlining the emotional essence of enacted 
analogical reasoning, as a foundation for a future sociological re-theorization of 
analogy in school science contexts. I then discuss methodological innovations in my 
study concerning undramatic emotional energy, before summarising my study 
outcomes and recommendations in Chapter 7.   
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1.3 Significance of the Research 
 The significance of this study may be found in its explication of the 
emotional essence of analogical reasoning in school science situations. This 
contribution proposes a foundation for the re-theorization of analogical reasoning in 
science education contexts. By presenting this sociological perspective of analogical 
reasoning my study also contributes to the development of methodological 
approaches for future investigation of emotional energy in science education 
research. The most important methodological contribution of this study relates to my 
empirical analysis of undramatic emotional energy, theoretically postulated by 
Collins (2004).  Collins (2004) suggested how emotional energy was most often an 
undramatic phenomenon, and evident in the unremarkable and ordinary situations of 
everyday life. He cited Garfinkel’s (1967) ethnomethodology as a suitable way to 
study emotional energy in its undramatic form, but Collins (2004) did not explicitly 
demonstrate this with live data, or in the context of school science. My study has 
further developed Collins’s (2004) notion of undramatic emotional energy by 
describing it with ethnomethodology, and analysing its different forms and features 
using micro-sociological tools (Durkheim, 1912/1915).  
 This study has established a sociological perspective of analogy for school 
science contexts that I have called enacted analogical reasoning. The concepts 
developed from this study and the identification of analogical practices imbued with 
emotional energy, establish a foundation for a re-theorization of analogical reasoning 
in school science contexts (section 6.2).  This foundational sociological perspective 
is important, because a pedagogical theory of analogical reasoning generated from 
science classrooms is more likely to involve higher levels of ecological validity and 
explanatory power, compared with cognitive theory (above). 
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 The methodological and theoretical outcomes of this study have the potential 
to impact on teaching practice in future science classrooms (section 7.3.3). This is 
evident in the teaching practices I planned and enacted as a teacher/researcher in this 
study.  As I have indicated above, teachers and education researchers tend to take-
for-granted the influence of social interaction on learning about scientific concepts. 
My study provides a detailed analysis of the social perspective that contributes 
innovation in understanding the connections between micro-social interaction, 
emotional experience and the cognitive element of emotion in the form of shared 
ideas as scientific concepts. 
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Chapter 2 
Emotion and Analogy in Science Education 
2.0 Introduction 
Understanding emotion is essential to understanding people (cf. Turner, 
2007). Unfortunately, in the field of science education there is a tendency to focus on 
the science, and to forget, as educators, that we are teaching people. This is evident 
in the science education analogy literature where there is a paucity of research on the 
topic of emotion, because research tends to focus on the science concepts as 
problematic. Topics of research in the field of science education tend to be 
investigated from cognitive perspectives (Alsop & Watts, 2003; Fortus, 2014), and 
analogical reasoning is a prime example. This could partly explain why emotion in 
science education has not been widely investigated as a topic of interest more 
generally in the past, and specifically in relation to analogy.  
Contributing to my approach to the study of emotion and analogical 
reasoning, this version of my literature review was written after my data analysis. 
This was because my methodological orientation (chapter 3) foregrounds my data as 
a way of describing phenomena such as emotion or analogical reasoning. The 
literature I found most important initially, was later analyzed as data from a reader’s 
perspective, which is a common practice in sociological research (cf. Garfinkel, 
1967). For this reason, parts of the literature become more important in Chapter 6. 
In this chapter, the diverse perspectives of emotion (psychological and 
sociological) reflected in the field of general education were outlined in terms of the 
key features of emotion defined in that literature (section 2.1.1). I then reviewed 
emotion in the science education analogy literature, showing evidence of emotion 
being present, but taken-for-granted as part of the background context of science 
analogy (section 2.1.2).  In my final sections on emotion, I reviewed the literature in 
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science education on the emergent topics of emotional energy (section 2.1.3) and 
emotional climate (section 2.1.4). The ideas in these sections (2.1.3 and 2.1.4) 
connect with my theoretical framework (section 3.2), where I refine an operational 
definition for lived experiences of emotional energy as a starting point for my 
analysis. 
In relation to analogical reasoning I focus on the dominant pedagogical 
strategies (section 2.2.1) and the cognitive theoretical foundations (section 2.2.2) 
underlying these strategies. I refer to these dominant perspectives throughout this 
study, collectively, as cognitive analogical reasoning. This is because in later 
chapters, I establish a fundamental definition of analogical reasoning (section 3.2.1) 
to guide my analysis (chapter 5), and from my analysis, I propose a notion of enacted 
analogical reasoning (chapter 6).  
After reviewing the literature on cognitive analogical reasoning (section 2.2), 
I then draw on this same body of literature to highlight the boundaries and limitations 
of this cognitive perspective (section 2.3). This presents possibilities for exploration 
of notions such as; mundane, everyday analogy; social interaction and discovery; 
conversational analogy; analogy between emotional experiences; embodied 
cognition; and the social concepts implicit in Glynn’s (1994a) TWA model. These 
are unconventional ideas about analogical reasoning, all invoked from the authors of 
the contemporary conventional wisdom that I call cognitive analogical reasoning. 
My acknowledgement of these unconventional possibilities forms the basis for my 
re-definition of analogical reasoning at particular points in this study.     
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2.1 Emotion in Education 
2.1.1 Key features of emotion in the education literature. 
My approach to understanding emotion in this study is focused on emotion as 
a lived experience, consistent with my sociological methodology presented in chapter 
3. In the general education literature about emotion, theoretical and methodological 
frameworks are heavily influenced by psychological perspectives. Psychological 
frameworks have historically involved studies in laboratory settings with an 
emphasis on experimental designs to understand emotion (Bellocchi, 2015). As 
emotions have become increasingly associated with complex learning situations, 
academic performance, and creative problem solving, research designs have shifted 
toward exploratory, qualitative, non-experimental approaches (Pekrun & 
Linnenbrink-Garcia, 2014). For this reason, my study did not focus on psychological 
frameworks for understanding emotion. Instead my study addresses Pekrun and 
Linnenbrink-Garcia’s (2014) concern for alternative approaches by adopting a 
sociological perspective on emotion (Bellocchi, 2015), within the context of science 
education where multi-method, multi-theoretical and multi-level research is 
increasingly important (Tobin & Ritchie, 2012). As an overview of emotions in the 
general education literature I explore the key features of emotion in this section. This 
brief overview presents these key features in terms of the language of emotion 
(section 2.4.1), recognition of emotion as an expression (section 2.4.2), levels of 
emotion (section 2.4.3), and intensity and duration of emotion (section 2.4.4).  
2.1.1.1  Language of emotion. 
Language forms an act of description constituting conceptualizations of 
emotion used in everyday contexts (Crossman, 2007). For example, Davitz (1969) 
published a “Dictionary of Emotional Meaning” by studying everyday language and 
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defining common words and phrases.  Further, Turner (2007) reviewed literature 
from 1960 to 1992 to define a matrix of emotional terms. Words such as excitement, 
joy, shame, pride, anger, guilt, contempt, fear or surprise are typical of this language 
(Turner, 2007). 
The use of words to describe emotion, only derive meaning if language can 
be related to the experience of emotion. The experience of emotion may also involve 
non-verbal, non-written expressions interpreted in social contexts (Russell & Fehr, 
1987). To understand this non-verbal emotional language, the means for recognizing 
emotion in everyday communications need to be examined. 
2.1.1.2  Recognition of emotion as an expression.  
The capacity to recognise emotional expression in everyday communication 
was observed to be a fundamental biological phenomenon common to humans and 
animals (Darwin, 1872/1965). Darwin’s (1872/1965) work on “The Expression of 
Emotions in Man and Animals” records detailed observation explaining body 
language and facial movement as expressions of emotion. This work revealed a 
longstanding acceptance of emotion as a dimension of communication, between 
humans, and between different species (Bell, 1844; Darwin, 1872/1965). Expression 
and recognition of emotion across species is fundamental to survival, as it provides a 
form of rapid, non-verbal communication requiring no higher order thinking, in order 
to elicit a response (Turner, 2007). 
This fundamental recognition of emotion from body gestures, vocalizations 
and facial expression was more recently framed in the literature as the recognition of 
somatic markers (Collins, 2004; Eynde, De Corte & Verschaffel, 2006; Turner, 
2007). Eynde et al., (2006) adopted somatic markers in a study of mathematics 
students by video recording facial expression and body movements. In another study, 
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Milne and Otieno (2007) used somatic markers such as concurrent eye gaze and body 
orientation of multiple students to demonstrate mutual focus and a shared mood in a 
science classroom. A further study used a method informed by a Facial Action 
Coding System (Ekman & Rosenberg, 2005) to recognize student emotion during a 
series of biology classes (Tomas & Ritchie, 2012). 
Another approach to the recognition of emotional expression was self-report. 
Self-report of emotion was reported in studies using interviews and surveys (Eynde 
et al., 2006; Tomas & Ritchie, 2012). For example, in the study by Tomas & Ritchie 
(2012) students reported their experiences of emotions on a modified version of the 
Positive Affect Negative Affect (PANAS) Scale, originally developed by Watson, 
Clark & Telligent (1988). Emotion diaries were another method for generating self-
report of emotion in science education research (Ritchie et al., 2014). In other areas 
of education, emotion diaries were reported in a longitudinal study of a teacher 
(Zembylas, 2004), the study of students learning online (Zembylas, Theodora & 
Pavlakis, 2008), students in a year 7 mathematics class (Ahmed, Minnaert, van der 
Werf & Kuyper, 2010), and students taking part in an inter-cultural education tour of 
India (Scoffman & Barnes, 2009). 
2.1.1.3  Levels of emotion. 
Levels of emotion refer to the hierarchy of language used to describe 
emotion. One example of a common hierarchy is the use of positive and negative 
dimensions of emotion used to describe broad emotion types or terminology related 
to mood (Watson et al., 1988). For example, Eynde et al. (2006) identified negative 
emotions experienced by students when they experienced difficulty solving 
mathematical problems, and Tomas and Ritchie (2012) studied positive emotions of 
biology students in a classroom context. 
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A different approach to levels of emotion was described by Turner (2007) via 
his theory of human emotion. Turner (2007) started with primary emotions, 
considered to be “hard-wired in human neuroanatomy” (Turner, 2007, p.2) and 
identified these as anger, fear, sadness and happiness. Turner (2007) identified more 
specific emotions as first-order and second-order elaborations of primary emotions. 
These were described as a mixing of primary emotions, probably in uneven 
quantities to generate new groups of first order primary elaborations (Turner, 2007). 
This model produces groupings of words to describe patterns of emotion, visualized 
by Turner (2007) as not just defining an emotion, but also indicating a level of 
emotional intensity. 
A further sociological perspective of emotion is an individual-collective 
dialectic (Roth, 2007b). This perspective defined emotions at an individual level and 
a collective level where both levels were interdependent. Individual emotions were 
defined as reflecting relationships between motive and anticipated success. These 
emotions were related to the biological dimension of the individual within the 
context of practical activities (Roth, 2007b). Collective emotions were perceived as 
interacting with individual emotions and were conventionally defined in terms such 
as the mood of a group (Roth, 2007b).  
2.1.1.4  Intensity and duration of emotion. 
In defining a terminology for the levels of emotion, the literature also defines 
emotion in terms of intensity and duration. A nominal scale of low, moderate and 
high intensity was used to classify descriptive terms related to each of the primary 
emotions defined by Turner (2007). For example the terms to describe happiness 
may include content-cheerful-joy in order of increasing intensity. Other researchers 
have identified different levels of intensity in the language used by students, and it 
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was suggested further research was required to determine possible links between 
emotion, intensity and learning (King, Ritchie, Sandhu & Henderson, 2015; Moore & 
Kuol, 2007). 
In science education the PANAS scale (Watson et al., 1988) was used to 
measure emotional intensity by Tomas and Ritchie (2012), in a study of emotions in 
a biology class during hybridized writing. The PANAS scale relies on self-report of 
perceptions of emotional experience.  Other studies involving self-report of 
emotional intensity included Bellocchi and Ritchie (2015) using emotion diaries 
cross referenced to video-audio data in a science classroom, and Bellocchi, Ritchie, 
Tobin, Sandhu and Sandhu (2013) and Bellocchi et al. (2014), using electronic 
clickers to collect data during teaching of pre-service science teachers. These studies 
aimed to establish an association between micro-social processes of interaction with 
different levels of self-reported emotional intensity. The need to determine this 
association is due to the different constructs of emotion being measured via self-
report compared with measures such as observation of micro-social interaction.  I 
will return to these studies later, but I note them here to highlight the difference 
between emotion as a lived experience, and emotion as a reflective account of a lived 
experience.  
Some measures of intensity do not require the study participant to be aware of 
their emotions. For example Roth and Hsu (2010) described a range of studies where 
prosody was applied to measure emotional intensity. Prosody measures the style of 
speech such as volume and pitch. A further study used subjective assessment by the 
researcher to measure intensity on an ordinal scale during a study of emotional 
climate (Tobin, Ritchie, Oakley, Mergard & Hudson, 2013). These measures of 
intensity will be discussed further in chapter 6. 
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Associated with intensity, the durability of emotion is also measured in 
different ways in emotions research. In the psychology literature there is a tendency 
to define state and trait emotions to distinguish durability (Watson et al., 1988). The 
idea of an emotion as a state of being is a way of defining a condition of emotion at a 
point in time. In this sense emotion is treated as an object described as a bodily 
action, labelled linguistically and measured quantitatively in terms of intensity. 
Emotion as a state in psychological terms is considered to exist for a short duration, 
such as a fleeting moment (Watson et al., 1988). For this reason state emotions are 
viewed as unstable. Trait emotions incorporate state emotions, but represent longer-
term states with more stable fluctuations (Frosh, 2011).  
2.1.2 Emotion in the science education analogy literature.   
Studies of emotion specifically in relation to analogy in the science education 
literature are almost non-existent. One explicit study of emotion as part of analogical 
reasoning involved a retrospective analysis of students in a physics classroom 
(Harrison, 2006). In that study, interest in the topic was observed during the use of 
analogy (Harrison, 2006). Although this study highlighted awareness of emotion as a 
possible factor in analogical reasoning in school science, the study was limited by its 
retrospective design. 
Further examples of an emotive dimension to analogical reasoning appeared 
in a textbook edited by Harrison and Coll (2008) aimed at applying the FAR guide to 
classroom situations. The practical focus of this work instructed teachers in “using 
analogies to increase student interest in science,” with the use of analogies, including 
“exciting events” (Taylor & Coll, 2008, p. 32). Numerous examples of analogy 
involving emotion with embodied imitation, references to everyday experiences, 
stories and emotion-laden activities can be identified in this book. The textbook uses 
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emotion-laden references in collaboration with the FAR guide to make teaching with 
analogies interesting for students. In every sense it presents analogical reasoning in 
the science classroom as a social, embodied learning experience imbued with 
emotion. The limitation of these practical explanations of emotion in analogy and 
analogical reasoning was the lack of theoretical understanding, or explanation as to 
the role of emotion in analogical reasoning. Despite anecdotal description, the 
theoretical foundations indicated no substantiated link between emotion and analogy. 
One study indicating an implicit link between emotion and analogy in school 
science explored embodied learning using role play as analogy (Aubusson et al., 
1997). The interpretative design of that study revealed important elements of 
emotion also identified in my study, but not analyzed specifically as emotion by 
Aubusson et al. (1997). For example, one student by the pseudonym Kate was 
previously withdrawn in science lessons but during role play she was observed to 
have “not only participated as a moving electron but also coordinated the movement 
of other students” (Aubusson et al., 1997, p. 575). This observation is important from 
the perspective of understanding emotions, as it provides evidence of two of the 
operational constructs used in my study to identify emotion. I refer here to the idea 
of a moving electron and the coordinated movement of students as the enactment of 
that idea. As I will explain in chapter 3, both of these (i.e., ideas and coordinated 
movement) are operational constructs I use latter to identify the lived experience of 
emotion in science classrooms. Another construct important to identifying the lived 
experience of emotion is the internal feeling of the experience. Feelings are more 
challenging to identify, but Aubusson et al. (1997) indicated the experience of 
feelings through self-report by Kate when she stated "that was really cool, I loved it" 
(Aubusson et al., 1997, p. 575). Although this incident was not studied explicitly as 
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emotion, this example of Kate’s experience is important as it provides evidence of 
emotions being experienced in role play analogy. These examples from a study of 
role play based analogy (Aubusson et al., 1997), illustrate the possibility for studying 
an emotional essence of analogical reasoning.  
Another example of the implicit acknowledgement of emotion in analogical 
reasoning within the context of school science was a study of physics students by 
Duit, et al. (2001). In that study the researchers’ language described evidence of 
emotion during analogical reasoning. For example, the researchers’ metaphorically 
gave life to an idea or concept by suggesting the concept proposed by the students 
had “died… because of lack of support” (Duit et al., 2001, p. 299). This metaphor of 
a concept as a living thing implied disappointment or deflated excitement when the 
concept died. This death was enacted by the teachers’ “cool reception” of the concept 
(Duit et al., 2001; p. 299). How the researchers recognized this cool reception was 
not explained. One interpretation may be that the non-verbal emotive response by the 
teacher, to the students’ idea, indicated disapproval, and this cooled or curbed the 
students’ excitement.  
The importance of the teachers’ coolness appeared to be a reference to an 
emotionally delivered rebuff by the teacher rather than a cognitive argument based 
on formal logic. And it was this emotional rebuff that killed the students’ idea, not 
some rational, logical argument. The language used in that study implied the 
researchers could recognize the expression of emotion by participants throughout 
their interaction involving analogical reasoning. However, the researchers’ primary 
focus was on the cognitive, rather than emotive dimensions of analogical reasoning. 
This was evident by the lack of specific analysis and the implied nature of the 
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researchers’ textual expression suggesting this emotion was taken-for-granted as part 
of the background context of analogical reasoning. 
2.1.3 Emotional energy and school science. 
 An emerging area of research addressing emotion in science education 
involves the treatment of emotion not just as a conceptual object, but as a lived 
experience within classroom situations (Milne & Otieno, 2007; Olitsky, 2007). This 
form of emotion has been operationally defined as emotional energy (Collins, 2004). 
Emotional energy involves a collective form of emotion experienced by people 
providing a sense of solidarity, or togetherness, within social groups. The idea of 
emotional energy has its origins in the notion of collective effervescence observed by 
Durkheim (1912/1915) in practices of religious ritual. My operational definition of 
emotional energy will be explained in detail as part of my methodology in chapter 3 
(cf. Collins, 2004; Dewey, 1894; 1895; Durkheim, 1912/1915; Garfinkel, 1967).  
Milne & Otieno (2007) illustrated the effect of science demonstrations on the 
experience of emotional energy in a classroom situation. Emotional energy became 
observable through coordinated social interactions such as gestural and 
conversational entrainment. For example, Milne and Otieno (2007) demonstrated the 
eye gaze and body alignment of students around a science demonstration, as 
evidence of mutual focus. Mutual focus is defined by Collins (2004) as an indicator 
of emotional energy. Conversational entrainment was also made evident via 
conversation analysis showing entrainment between students and shared focus on the 
science being discussed. This conversational entrainment provided further evidence 
of emotional energy (Collins, 2004). 
Olitsky (2007) identified emotional energy as source of engagement in an 
eighth grade science class. The study analyzed both teacher-student and student-
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student social interactions. Relevant to the context of my study, Olitsky’s (2007) 
work provided important insights into the operation of emotional energy in the 
science classroom. For example, in a class situation where students tended to be 
disconnected with science, activities generating interaction showed evidence of 
emotional energy (Olitsky, 2007) and increased science engagement. Emotional 
energy generated during activities was also observed to be transferable from the 
activity, leading to discussion of concepts using scientific language (Olitsky, 2007). 
This notion of transference, briefly mentioned by Olitsky (2007), becomes important 
in chapters 5 and 6. 
 A further point from my reading of Olitsky’s (2007) study involved 
situations where students appeared to be experiencing low intensity emotional 
energy, yet they remained involved in the activity. This was not reported in detail in 
that study, but it is consistent with Olitsky’s (2007) consideration of the possibility 
that emotional energy in science classrooms may not always be obvious. On this 
point, reference was made to Collins’s (2004) explanation of emotional energy as 
being an experience of undramatic emotion. This notion of undramatic emotional 
energy is explored further in my methodology (Chapter 3). 
2.1.4 Emotional climate and science education. 
A final observation of emotional energy in science education is its application 
to the study of emotional climate. Emotional climate may be considered an 
aggregated form of emotional energy observable at the classroom level of social 
interaction. It is analysed at a meso-social level of analysis, as distinct from the 
micro-social analysis in my study. This idea of emotional climate as a meso-social 
phenomenon illustrates an important methodological divergence between 
microsociology and ethnomethodology. Studies in ethnomethodology tend to remain 
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focused on the localized occasions of social interaction as a basis for the production 
of social reality (Garfinkel, 1967).  In contrast, studies in microsociology tend to 
accept the aggregation of micro interactions as a way of understanding meso-social 
and macro-social structures (Collins, 2004). Micro-sociologists, such as Collins 
(2004), tend to accept such aggregation as a way of explaining social structures. An 
example of a meso-social structure may include the teaching interactions within a 
classroom, which were identified by Tobin et al., (2013) as being associated with 
class-wide emotional climate. 
In a school science context, emotional climate was analyzed in relation to 
different teaching practices and rituals (Tobin et al., 2013).  Researchers in that study 
used a subjective ordinal scale to measure their own evaluation of intensity in 
emotional climate using an array of methods including conversation analysis, 
prosody and non-verbal actions. It was reported that humour and theatrical 
interactions, in the study context, were important for establishing emotional climate. 
Most importantly, Tobin et al. (2013) emphasised the pioneering nature of their 
study and encouraged further research to understand fully the relationship between 
teaching practices and emotional climate in different classroom contexts.  
In a subsequent study, Bellocchi et al. (2013) investigated emotional climate 
in higher education and considered the differences between formal and informal 
interaction rituals as an influence on the production of positive or negative emotional 
climate. The study suggested informal interaction rituals were more productive of 
higher intensity, positive emotional climate, compared with formal interaction 
rituals. Olitsky (2013) reviewed the study by Bellocchi et al. (2013) and indicated an 
array of opportunities for further research into emotional climate. She emphasised 
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the links between the experiences of pre-service science teachers and their capacity 
to transfer positive emotional climates to their own classrooms. 
2.2 Cognitive Analogical Reasoning and Science Education 
Analogy in science education is formally accounted for as a complex of 
cognitive theory overlayed with theories of pedagogical strategy. My study from a 
science education perspective situates my literature review toward illustrating the 
ontological presumptions within dominant pedagogical strategies such as the TWA 
model and FAR guide. My reference to ontological presumptions concerns the taken-
for-granted existential treatment of analogical objects in terms of attributes and 
relational structures, as fixed and discoverable. To achieve this illustration I review 
the pedagogical strategies and the dominant cognitive theory embedded within them 
in section 2.2.1. I explore the limitations of cognitive analogical reasoning by 
relating to the practical issues of school science classrooms as noted in chapter 1.  
2.2.1 Features of the dominant pedagogical strategies. 
 My reference to pedagogical strategy refers to adaptations of theoretical 
constructs of analogical reasoning within science education research and practice. 
The most prominent of these strategies are the Teaching with Analogies (TWA) 
model (Glynn, 1994a; 1994b), and the Focus-Action-Reflection (FAR) guide 
(Treagust, et al., 1998). The dominance of these strategies is evident through the 
proliferation of literature presenting and discussing these approaches (Davis, 2013b; 
Glynn, 1994a, 1994b, 1995, 1996a, 1996b, 1997, 2007; Glynn, Taasoobshirazi & 
Fowler, 2007; Glynn & Takahashi, 1998; Harrison & Coll, 2008; Treagust et al., 
1998).  
The TWA model was the first of these strategies to be firmly established as a 
guide for teachers to construct “analogies systematically” (Glynn, 1994a, p. 4). It 
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was developed via a task analysis of science textbooks followed by a task analysis of 
lessons conducted by ten science teachers, defined as exemplary or expert teachers. 
The study involved videotaping and interviewing teachers to gain an understanding 
of the decisions they made during the use of analogies for instruction. The study was 
conducted in public middle schools in the United States, with class sizes of 18 to 25 
students, drawn from multi-cultural backgrounds. The TWA model may be 
summarised by the six steps Glynn (1994a, p.13) indicated as essential.  These were: 
• Step 1: introduce the target concept. 
• Step 2: cue retrieval of analogue concept. 
• Step 3: identify relevant features of target and analogue. 
• Step 4: map similarities between target and analogue. 
• Step 5: indicate where analogue breaks down. 
• Step 6: draw conclusions.  
These steps encapsulate the ontological features of the TWA model. For 
example, the first step of “introduce the target concept” presumes the existence of the 
target concept before the analogy is developed. To be able to introduce the target 
concept, there is a presumption it exists somewhere prior to its introduction into the 
classroom. In this way, Glynn is treating science concepts (i.e. target concepts) as 
real entities. This view is evidenced by Glynn’s description of exemplary teachers 
and the presumed ontological origin of concepts implicit in his description of 
analogical reasoning. For example, Glynn (1994a) explicitly states that exemplary 
teachers “are experts… …because their knowledge exists in the form of interrelated 
networks” (Glynn, 1994a, p. 3). At this point Glynn not only explicitly states that 
knowledge exists, he claims it exists as a network of short and long term memory 
within the exemplary teacher. Glynn (1994a) continues by explaining, “the relations 
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in and among conceptual networks are of many kinds, including hierarchical, 
exemplifying, attribute, causal, correlational, temporal, additive and adversative” 
(Glynn, 1994a, p. 3). This statement is important for illustrating the taken-for-
granted ontological foundations of Glynn’s work. Glynn claims to be describing the 
cognitive structures of the exemplary teacher, presumed to exist as a conceptual 
network with many complex features in the teacher’s mind. This cognitive network is 
considered by Glynn to be a “high performance… information processing system” 
(Glynn, 1994a, p. 3). Finally Glynn states that a teacher can “help to develop a 
student’s information-processing system” (Glynn, 1994a, p. 4) so that they too 
become experts. This final statement indicates Glynn’s view of analogical reasoning, 
where concepts are sitting, waiting and concealed within the anatomy of the teacher 
and student. Furthermore, it reveals an assumption that the network is either initially 
absent in a student, or at least somehow less perfect than that of the expert teacher. 
From this perspective the pedagogy about analogical reasoning is situated as a 
cognitive process within the exemplary teacher. It may be transferable through 
teaching, by retrieving and displaying analogical concepts concealed within the 
conceptual network of the student’s or teacher’s analogical mental schemata. It also 
implies that others may gain a more perfect or effective network, like an expert, by 
following or learning a definitive map of certain cognitive processes. 
By stating that experts possess a particular cognitive network helping them to 
think like experts, Glynn has established the possibility of an a priori ontology. 
According to Glynn people possess an innate ability for analogical reasoning. This 
ability arises from the very nature of a person’s existence as a human being, to 
enable analogical reasoning. Glynn then proceeds to affirm this a priori ontological 
presumption by stating that expert teachers can develop the information processing 
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system of students, so that they too can become experts. This presumption has 
significant pedagogical implications. It implies that pedagogy is a process of simply 
unlocking innate cognitive capacity by stimulating memory and introducing new 
concepts to the cognitive network. According to Glynn’s TWA model, by unlocking 
this innate capacity of their students, teachers are awakening innate conceptual 
networks. This enables students to understand the presumed objective (external), 
reality existing around them. 
In the second step of the TWA model (above), the expert teacher calls up the 
pre-existing analogue concepts presumed to exist within the student. The analogue 
concept is cued and retrieved as though it were sitting and waiting to be called 
forward. Once cued, retrieved and introduced, the features of these concepts are 
identified. Again these features are presumed to exist as fixed, knowable objects, as 
the component parts of each concept (Duit et al., 2001). By identifying these 
features, similarities and differences are analysed in step four. Finally, sources of 
failure in the analogy are identified in step five. 
These steps of the TWA model define a strategy wherein the teacher cues 
pre-existing concepts within students, and brings these concepts together with pre-
existing concepts concealed within the teacher. Once revealed the features of the 
concepts are then compared so students can better understand the target concept, 
internalize it, and file it away as part of their network of scientific concepts. 
Understanding is then confirmed by the student’s ability to recall and apply the 
concept at a later time. 
Building on the features of the TWA model, Harrison and Treagust (1993) 
conducted a classroom based study that established a modified TWA model. This 
modified model led to the Focus-Action-Reflection (FAR) guide (Treagust et al., 
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1998). The FAR guide evolved through an interpretive research methodology by 
evaluating the TWA model in science classrooms (Treagust et al., 1998). In-class 
observations, post lesson teacher interviews and post lesson student interviews 
provided data indicating the TWA model could be improved by better supporting 
lesson planning and post lesson reflection. The FAR guide is implemented with the 
focus stage in pre-lesson planning where the teacher makes an appreciation of the 
concept, and the students pre-existing knowledge and familiarity with the analogue. 
The action stage involves in class action where students engage with the 
identification of likes and dislikes between the analogue and target, with a 
summarization of the analogy’s outcomes. The reflection stage involves the teacher’s 
post-lesson reflection, encouraging teachers to improve their future presentation of 
analogies. I illustrated these stages in my use of the FAR guide in a Year 10 science 
class as part of my preparation for the present study (Davis, 2013b). 
The FAR guide made modifications to the TWA model in the way it guided 
teacher planning and reflection. These were pragmatic changes that enhanced the 
strategy, but did not address the ontological foundations. Both the FAR guide and the 
TWA model share the same ontological foundations as a consequence of their shared 
theoretical origins. These theoretical origins are strongly linked to the theory of 
structure mapping (Gentner, 1983). This shared theoretical foundation is an 
important feature of both strategies, and for this reason I review this theory in the 
section below. 
2.2.2 Cognitive theoretical foundations of analogical reasoning. 
The theory of structure mapping epitomises the ontological concepts implicit 
within the dominant analogical pedagogical strategies. Evidence of this was found 
within the TWA model, the FAR guide and a lesser known strategy called the 
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General Model of Analogy Teaching (GMAT) (Zeitoun, 1984). Within each of these 
strategies, Gentner’s work (1980; 1983; 1989) is cited. The language used to describe 
analogical reasoning in each strategy is consistent with structure mapping and 
associated concepts from the cognitive sciences (cf. section 2.2.1). 
The dependence of pedagogical strategies upon the cognitive sciences, and 
the theory of structure mapping, is reflected in the inter-domain definition of analogy 
in that theory. The theory of structure mapping narrowly defines analogy in its 
cognitive sciences context as a set of “implicit rules for mapping knowledge about a 
base domain into a target domain” (Gentner, 1983, p. 155). These rules are identified 
as operating on language used as the representation of knowledge and concepts by 
mapping the higher-order relations that appear similar, between base and target 
domains (Gentner, 1983). By operating on language as the representation of 
knowledge, the structural features of objects become visible. 
By viewing language as a representation of knowledge an analogy may be 
defined by mapping from a base domain (B) sourced from prior knowledge to a 
target domain (T) where improved understanding is desired. This mapping is called 
inter-domain analogy where T and B are from different knowledge domains and may 
be illustrated in a simple analogy that ‘T is like B’. The likenesses between T and B 
are not defined in terms of similarity of superficial attributes, but by the similarity of 
relationships or relational structure (Gentner, 1983; Gentner & Medina, 1998; 
Markman & Gentner, 2000; Sagi, Gentner & Lovett, 2012). According to the theory 
of structure mapping, the attributes of objects T and B may be discarded and the 
relations between objects are preserved. 
This theory of structure mapping is an attractive theory for science education. 
The theory is simple, it originates from a field of science, and it fits within the 
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conventional wisdom of science as a cognitive, rational discipline (Alsop & Watts, 
2003; Fricker, 1991; Ingold, 2011). Unfortunately the application of this theory to 
science education is not completely adequate. I base this assertion on three important 
issues arising from my analysis of the theory of structure mapping. These issues 
relate to the theory’s ecological validity (section 2.2.2.1), a priori ontology (section 
2.2.2.2), and the lack of explanatory power for analogical reasoning in everyday 
contexts (section 2.2.2.3), including school science. 
2.2.2.1  Ecological validity.  
The issue of ecological validity arises in the application of the theory of 
structure mapping to studies of analogy in school science contexts. At this point I am 
referring to the application of this theory as a model for informing research into the 
TWA model and subsequently the FAR guide. The research foundations of these 
pedagogical strategies have both drawn heavily on the theory of structure mapping as 
a way of understanding analogical reasoning in school science. 
 My challenge to accepting this foundation is that the theory of structure 
mapping is a highly specific theory. It was developed in a particular context for 
understanding particular types of analogies, by people with particular analytical 
skills. Gentner’s original work on this theory emerged through a project for the 
Office of Naval Research in the United States (Gentner, 1980). It was drawn from 
theoretical research and supported by limited empirical research conducted in 
psychology laboratory settings (Gentner, 1983). 
In addition to Gentner (1983), Glynn (1994a) drew further theoretical 
foundations from another project funded by the Office of Naval Research in the 
United States (i.e., Chi, Feltovich and Glaser, 1981). That study concerned the 
representation of physics problems and compared the cognitive structure of advanced 
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PhD candidates in the field of physics, with physics undergraduate students (Chi, et 
al., 1981, p. 122). The works of Gentner (1980; 1983) and Chi et al., (1981) are 
grounded in contexts far removed from school science. These foundational studies 
rely on an a priori presumption that most humans share almost identical cognitive 
structures, as analogical minds, and this presumption forms an important element in 
being able to generalize the theory to school science classrooms. Yet there is no 
empirical foundation to support this presumption. While humans may have similar 
neurological structures, these are sites for biochemical processes, not the sites where 
concepts are stored or mental schemata exist. To make a generalization about the 
general cognitive structures of physicists as a way of understanding school science 
teachers and school children requires the a priori ontological presumption to hold 
true, in the absence of school-based empirical data. On this basis I question the 
ecological validity of the theory of structure mapping in the context of school 
science. 
2.2.2.2  An ‘a priori’ ontology.  
The application of this cognitive sciences theory to school science learning 
situations is heavily reliant upon its ontological presumption that all humans possess 
a common, innate, conceptual network by virtue of their existence as humans. 
Without this presumption, this cognitive science theory lacks generalizability to 
school science contexts. To illustrate this problem, I reviewed the application of the 
TWA model to exemplary or expert teachers. Glynn (1994a) developed the TWA 
model originally by studying science textbooks and exemplary teachers. In a 
different study by Harrison & Treagust (1993) the TWA model was evaluated using 
an exemplary teacher, chosen because she was experienced, frequently used 
analogies and was “teaching in her area of expertise” (Harrison & Treagust, 1993, p. 
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1294). In the context of their evaluation of the TWA model, Harrison & Treagust 
(1993) reported how the exemplary teacher at the center of their study was trained in 
the use of the TWA model at the commencement of the study.  
This necessity to train the exemplary teacher is indicative of a lack of 
confidence in the a priori assumption that expert teachers already know how to 
reason analogically by virtue of their nature. If the theory of structure mapping is 
generalizable from Gentner’s (1980) context to a school context, by virtue of innate 
mental schemata, then why was it necessary to train the exemplary teacher? This 
situation highlights an important anomaly in the way the theory of structure mapping 
has been applied as a deductive model of a presumed reality, in school science 
learning experiences. 
2.2.2.3  Lack of explanatory power.  
My argument about ecological validity and generalizability of structure 
mapping to school science situations is further supported by limitations of the theory 
evident in practical situations where analogies are used. These limitations were 
highlighted from within the cognitive sciences literature via a consideration of 
similarity by Gentner and Markman (1997), and Holyoak and Thagard (1997). These 
authors considered practical situations where similarity was evident in reasoning, but 
reasoning involved experiences such as embodied imitation, everyday conversation 
and emotion. In these situations the theory of structure mapping, at the core of 
cognitive analogical reasoning, was identified as being inadequate for explaining 
these practical forms of analogical reasoning.  
These types of practical situations where similarity is evident in reasoning, 
define the boundaries of cognitive analogical reasoning. The recognition of these 
boundaries was evident in a study reported by Wilbers and Duit (2001) where 
61 
 
science students were generating inter-domain analogies. Their study identified many 
of the weaknesses of cognitive analogical reasoning I discuss in this chapter, but 
they addressed situational factors as an undefined body of context.  
This undefined body of context was evident in their description of a heuristic 
model of analogical reasoning developed via a study of twelve teaching experiments 
with forty eight students (Wilbers & Duit, 2001). Wilbers & Duit (2001) suggested 
context was an important dimension of analogical reasoning, remaining unaccounted 
for in science education theories. The proposed heuristic model explicitly stated 
analogical reasoning should be treated as being embedded within localized context, 
but did not explore any specific dimensions of possible contexts. In the following 
section I explore the issue of school science context by extracting possibilities for 
understanding analogical reasoning beyond current theoretical boundaries.   
2.3 Beyond the Boundaries of Cognitive Analogical Reasoning 
In the earlier sections I indicated areas of interest where the cognitive 
perspective of analogical reasoning limited the application of theory in school 
science contexts. By exploring beyond the boundaries of cognitive analogical 
reasoning I aim to highlight the possibilities for knowing something more about 
analogical reasoning as a fundamental human phenomenon.  In the following 
sections I review the literature further, to consider issues such as mundane, everyday 
analogy (section 2.3.1), social interaction and discovery (section 2.3.2), conversation 
(section 2.3.3), emotion (section 2.3.4), embodied cognition (section 2.3.5), and the 
social constructs implicit in Glynn’s (1994a) TWA model (section 2.3.6).  
2.3.1 Mundane, everyday analogy. 
The notion of mundane, everyday analogy emerges from reflections on the 
theory of structure mapping from within the cognitive sciences literature. For 
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example, Gentner and Markman (1997, p. 54) cited “mundane examples” of 
similarity being treated as possible analogies. They acknowledged everyday 
analogies as being so common “we often take analogy for granted” (Gentner & 
Markman, 1997, p. 53). Yet the examples they cited are explicitly excluded from 
being defined as analogical reasoning if we apply the theory of structure mapping 
(Gentner, 1983) or the TWA model (Glynn, 1994a) as formal definitions. While 
Gentner and Markman (1997) speculated about the possible application of the theory 
of structure mapping, they could not fully apply this theory to mundane, everyday 
analogy that they categorised as similarity. 
For example, Gentner and Markman (1997) cited Holyoak and Thagard’s 
(1997) discussion of a two year-old boy observing some ducks during feeding. After 
watching the ducks, the boy was observed holding his arms to his side and beginning 
to bend his body up and down, as an imitation of the duck’s actions. Finally, the boy 
announced to his mother “have no hands” (Gentner & Markman, 1997, p. 48). In this 
situation the boy used his own body to enact an imitative performance of the 
observed phenomenon (a duck feeding). In structure mapping terms, his body was an 
object within the analogy. He experienced the analogy and analogical reasoning 
through his embodied action, before he syntactically verbalized aspects of the 
analogy. It could be argued the boy was reasoning analogically, but this would not be 
possible within the boundaries of the structure mapping definition because that 
definition relied on specific rules to operate on language as the sole representation of 
knowledge and concepts.   
Beyond a cognitive sciences perspective, this example shows how the 
reasoning of the child originated in an observational experience and a situated 
perception of that experience. The analogical reasoning was enacted through the 
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gestures via an embodied imitation of the observed phenomenon. At this point I will 
not interpret this situation any further, except to note this form of reasoning warrants 
further inquiry in the context of school science analogies. Such an inquiry should be 
exploratory and free of a priori presumptions of cognitive structures and knowledge 
networks. In this way alternative perspectives of analogical reasoning may be 
developed with greater ecologically validity for school science classrooms. 
Further examples of everyday analogy include studies of physics and 
chemistry lecturers (Hwang & Roth, 2011; 2013) where analogical reasoning as a 
lived embodied experience was illustrated. In a study of a physics lecturer, the 
embodied actions of the lecturer were interpreted as contributing meaning to 
synchronous, face-to-face lecturing (Hwang & Roth, 2011). During the lesson, the 
lecturer generated a gesture while explaining “isothermal compression”, interpreted 
as an “analogous structure” (Hwang & Roth, 2011, p. 469). That study was not 
focused specifically on analogical reasoning, but it did identify an acceptance, in an 
emergent area of science education, that embodied imitation may be treated as some 
form of analogical reasoning. 
In a subsequent study, Hwang and Roth (2013) explicitly analyzed embodied 
gestures as the production of analogy within communication. These authors pointed 
to the lived situation of the gestures making an analogy available to the students 
through communication, rather than simply transferring concepts “from one mind to 
another mind” (Hwang & Roth, 2013, p. 699). This was an emerging perspective on 
analogy beyond the cognitive definitions outlined above.  
2.3.2   Social interaction and discovery. 
Although the work of Hwang & Roth (2013) provides an emergent 
perspective, the recognition of social interaction was previously considered part of 
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the context of cognitive analogical reasoning as evidenced by the work of Clements 
(1993). Clements’s (1993) bridging analogies approach is different from the 
dominant strategies discussed earlier in that Clements focused on social interaction in 
the classroom. In addition Clements (1993) appeared to interpret analogy in 
classroom situations more broadly than the theory of structure mapping or TWA 
models. Clements (1993) also showed how students tended to create smaller 
analogical steps, thus creating bridges between analogical concepts from very 
different domains. 
A further important dimension to the work by Clements (1993) was the 
possibility of using analogy for discovery. That is, rather than defining analogy as a 
way to explain an a priori target concept, Clements considered the possibility of new 
target concepts being discoverable from the student perspective. This may be 
consistent with the abovementioned child who discovered duck feeding techniques, 
and understood them via an embodied analogy (section 2.3.1).  
A further study using an interpretative methodology studied groups of 
students in junior secondary science classrooms using role play as analogy 
(Aubusson et al, 1997). While this study cited Glynn’s TWA model via the work of 
Harrison & Treagust (1994), the study adopted an inductive approach to the analysis, 
by presenting data to, “Give the reader a sense of being there” (Aubusson et al., 
1997, p. 568). That study observed the role of social interaction, and identified 
differences in student start points and levels of learning. More importantly Aubusson 
et al. (1997) found that social interaction in role play enabled students to develop 
new understandings through the study of embodied experiences of analogous 
structures. Issues such as students making anthropomorphic attributions to imitate 
phenomena were also important. From a sociological perspective, references to 
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everyday embodied experiences may be considered indicative of society being the 
reference point for knowledge, as shared understanding (cf. Durkheim, 1912/1915). 
The study by Aubusson et al. (1997) raises important differences with cognitive 
perspectives of analogical reasoning to be addressed in greater detail throughout my 
study.  
2.3.3 Conversation and contextualized meaning. 
 A further example of new possibilities for understanding analogical reasoning 
was an instance of analogy through the contextualized meaning of conversation 
(Gentner & Markman, 1997).  This example is presented below:  
 “Shelley: I’m going to pay for my beer now. 
 Tim: Me, too [Tim had a coke.]”   
(Gentner & Markman, 1997, p. 53) 
In this example, Gentner & Markman (1997) suggested the conversation illustrated a 
cognitive relational link between the beer and the coke. This link was not in terms of 
physical similarity, but via relational similarities in that they were both drinks. The 
conversation as transcribed provides a purely syntactic representation. But if we were 
to consider the mundane everyday context where this conversation may arise, there 
may have been something more happening than just two dis-embodied mental 
schemata engaging in cognitive processes about drinks. 
Within the context of this situation, the conversation may be interpreted as a 
social interaction, and in social interaction words are not always treated in terms of 
their literal meaning. For example, when people pay for their drinks in a restaurant or 
bar, they are generally doing so because they are leaving the establishment to go 
somewhere else. Shelley’s statement may therefore possess more meaning than 
literally paying for a drink. I’m going to pay for my beer now could also be a 
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statement meaning Shelley is leaving. This has implications for Tim’s statement, 
since me, too may mean Tim is paying for his coke, or he is leaving as well to go off 
in his own direction, or he is leaving to accompany Shelley. The social context 
therefore has an important bearing on meaning and therefore the structure of 
reasoning, be it analogical or some other form of reasoning. This situation, 
highlighted by Gentner and Markman (1997), illustrates the challenge of social 
context when conceiving of analogical reasoning from a cognitive sciences 
perspective. 
 2.3.4 Analogy between emotional experiences. 
A common theme of the above anomalous examples was the way that 
analogical reasoning was not only conceptualized, but how it was also experienced 
within each context. In the following example, described by Holyoak & Thagard 
(1997), the analogy was presented as a boy relating his own previous experience of 
pain, with his mother’s experience of pain at a later point in time. In this situation the 
boy had become accustomed to his mother kissing him whenever he injured himself. 
On this particular occasion, the mother bruised her hand and the boy offered to kiss 
her hand better in order to alleviate the pain. The proposed analogy was that the boy 
related his own previous pain and the soothing effect of his mother’s kiss to the 
mother’s present experience of pain and the possibility he could provide a kiss to 
sooth her pain. 
This example contributes new possibilities via the context of social 
interaction, the subjective sensation of pain, and the notion of empathy as an 
emotional experience. It illustrates the presence of emotion, cognition, embodied 
actions and conversation, as social interaction, all of which contribute to the process 
of analogical reasoning. Importantly, if interpreted through the lens of the TWA 
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model and/or the theory of structure mapping, all of these contextual features of the 
analogical situation would be rendered invisible. This is because they are beyond the 
boundaries of cognitive analogical reasoning. 
2.3.5 Embodied cognition, conceptual metaphor and analogy. 
Recognition of the possibility for knowing something more about analogical 
reasoning from both cognitive sciences and science education perspectives is further 
evident in recent research around embodied cognition (cf. Amin, 2015; Niebert & 
Gropengiesser, 2015; Wilson, 2002). While retaining a belief in an innate cognitive 
architecture (cf. Gentner, 1983), embodied cognition suggests credibility in the idea 
that the mind should be understood in the context of the physical body and an 
external world (Wilson, 2002). This innovative area of science education research 
indicates dissatisfaction with the conventional approaches to phenomena such as 
analogical reasoning and conceptual change. Presently this research raises more 
questions than it resolves, supporting my view about a need for new perspectives.   
My analyses of embodied cognition reveals limitations, by retaining the same 
cognitive science presumptions discussed earlier in relation to the theory of structure 
mapping. For example, it attributes cognition primarily to our bio-evolutionary 
dimension of being (Neibert & Gropengeisser, 2015) thereby retaining cognitive 
processes as innate. In contrast with the theory of structure mapping, the field of 
embodied cognition proposes a possibility for extending the notion of the mind 
beyond being an individual cognitive structure. This field proposes at least one 
emergent perspective recognizing that the mind alone is not a useful unit of analysis 
for understanding cognition in the context of the body and its external environment 
(Wilson, 2002). This perspective suggests a need to consider the environment as part 
of a system of cognition.  For my study this is an important perspective as my 
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approach to analogical reasoning uses social interaction as the unit of analysis, 
thereby incorporating mind and social environment as interdependent (cf. Durkheim, 
1912/1915). I explain my approach in greater detail in chapter 3. 
2.3.6 Social concepts implicit in Glynn’s TWA model. 
On the topic of a possible social perspective to understanding analogical 
reasoning, my reflection as a reader engaging with the literature improved my 
understanding of the TWA model. In attempting to explain how analogical reasoning 
operates, Glynn (1994a) draws on some important conceptual resources, indicative of 
an implicit social foundation to analogical reasoning. These conceptual resources 
included notions of conceptual networks in the form of a family of concepts, 
hierarchy and transference of understanding.  
For example, Glynn (1994a, p. 8) refers to analogy as involving “…an entire 
family of concepts, with concepts varying in degree of family resemblance they share 
among themselves”. It may be possible to disregard this statement as a mere 
metaphorical expression, but this explanation by Glynn is central to understanding 
how analogical reasoning may occur in school science. The use of this terminology is 
central to Glynn’s explanation and this becomes evident in my treatment of Glynn 
(1994a) as an object of analysis, later, in section 5.4.2.1. 
By interpreting Glynn’s language from a micro-sociological perspective, the 
family, clan or localized social group is considered the fundamental unit of social 
structure (Durkheim, 1912/1915). For this reason Glynn’s use of the category of 
family is an important feature of his explanation of analogical reasoning. It may be 
interpreted as a reflection of a taken-for-granted, social origin of reasoning as the 
foundation for his explanation of analogical reasoning that is purely based on 
psychological constructs.  
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Associated with the use of family, Glynn (1994a) also uses the notions of 
relations of conceptual networks involving hierarchy. For example, Glynn (1994, p. 
5) provides a figurative representation of a particular family of concepts as a 
“representation of an analogy showing the relation of the superordinate concept to 
the analogue and target and relation of the analogue and target to the features.” 
Glynn illustrates the analogy as a family within a hierarchical network of relations. 
Like family, hierarchy is considered a fundamental form of knowledge as a way of 
knowing things in relation to one another. Durkheim (1912/1915) attributes people’s 
notions of hierarchy to their social experiences as members of social groups, where 
the clan or family is the basic unit of social grouping. As people are born into a 
family they tend to be born into a hierarchy of social order, and it is this original 
experience of hierarchy that influences human thought about other objects and 
concepts.  It is on this basis, I suggest Glynn has used hierarchy and networks as 
fundamental social concepts to describe analogy as a family of concepts.  
The final social concept identified in Glynn’s (1994a) explanation of analogy 
is the idea of transference of understanding. Glynn (1994a, p. 9) explained how 
analogy “helps students transfer their existing knowledge to the understanding, 
organizing, and visualizing of new knowledge.” He describes this transference of 
understanding as the fitting together or connecting of concepts, including the 
establishment of hierarchy with superordinate concepts as a form of generalization. 
Further, he identifies transference of understanding between concepts as a 
fundamental notion to explain how similarity and difference becomes known through 
analogy. Like family and hierarchy, the notion of transference of understanding with 
respect to similarity may be attributed to a social origin (cf. Durkheim, 1912/1915). I 
further explore the notion of transference in sections 3.2.3.3 and 5.3.4, in relation to 
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Durkheim’s conceptualization of contagion (transference) in micro-sociology 
(Durkheim, 1912/1915).  
Importantly, the notions of family, hierarchy and transference of 
understanding were used by Glynn (1994a) to explain how analogical reasoning 
operated. However Glynn (1994a) used these notions without explaining their origin. 
To understand better analogical reasoning and the relevance of these categories I 
have used family, hierarchy, and transference to form the categories within my 
research questions.   
2.4  Summary 
The science education literature has provided some important insights into 
some possibilities for my study of the emotional essence of analogical reasoning in 
secondary school science classrooms. The evidence from the literature suggests that 
analogy is ubiquitous in everyday life and particularly in school science. It is not 
only observable in the format of language structures as recognized by the theory of 
structure mapping, but also through embodied actions and everyday conversation 
(Gentner & Markman, 1997; Hwang & Roth, 2011; 2013). In the specific contexts of 
school science classrooms a variety of approaches to analogical reasoning were 
acknowledged including role play (Harrison & Coll, 2008; Aubusson et al., 1997). 
While these contexts involved the acknowledgement of social interaction and 
dimensions of emotion, these were not explained at a theoretical level. In the case of 
Harrison & Coll (2008), the theoretical foundation of analogy was cited as the theory 
of structure mapping (Gentner, 1983).  In the case of Aubusson et al. (1997) the 
TWA was referred to as a theoretical foundation and some suggestions were made 
for modification of the TWA model to account for social dimensions of analogical 
reasoning. Together, these studies highlight deficiencies in the explanatory power of 
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the theory of structure mapping and the TWA model in relation to classroom 
experiences of analogical reasoning.  
To summarize, analogical reasoning is recognised by many authors in science 
education and the cognitive sciences as a form of cognitive, inter-domain reasoning. 
In contrast to their own dominant views, they also recognize contextual limitations to 
this theoretical understanding of analogical reasoning. Various authors highlight 
these limitations in terms of embodied reasoning, embodied cognition, emotion, 
social interaction and student perspectives (Amin, 2015; Aubusson et al., 1997; Duit 
et. al. 2001; Harrison, 2006; Harrison & Coll, 2008, Hwang & Roth, 2011; 2013; 
Niebert & Gropengiesser, 2015; Wilson, 2002). These limitations are indicative of 
the possibility for innovative understandings beyond the current boundaries of 
cognitive analogical reasoning, and I investigated some of these as part of my study 
of the emotional essence of analogical reasoning.  
2.5 Research Questions 
The essential purpose of this study is to explore the emotional essence of 
analogical reasoning in secondary school science. On the basis of needing to explore 
beyond the boundaries of cognitive perspectives I have adopted a sociological 
methodology informed by ethnomethodology as detailed in chapter 3. This 
methodology positions my exploratory questions in terms of how analogical 
reasoning may be enacted and experienced in social situations. Given the micro-
social concepts implicit in Glynn’s explanation of the TWA model I structured my 
how type questions to retain a link with the current literature while exploring beyond 
the boundaries of the cognitive perspective.  
 
 
72 
 
My research questions are:  
1. How is shared understanding about concepts achieved in localized 
situations between students, and students and teacher? 
2. How are conceptual networks in the form of a family of concepts, 
hierarchy, and transference of shared understanding about concepts 
achieved in localized situations of analogical reasoning? 
3. How are conceptual networks in the form of a family of concepts, 
hierarchy, and transference of shared understanding about concepts 
related to the achievement of difference and similarity in localized 
situations of analogical reasoning? 
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Chapter 3  
Methodological Orientation and Theoretical Framework 
3.0 Introduction  
As noted in chapter 1, I have adopted a multi-method, multi-theoretical 
approach to this study to analyse the multi-level qualities of my data (Tobin & 
Ritchie, 2012). My methodological orientation is informed by Garfinkel’s (1967) 
ethnomethodology to derive a descriptive approach to the data. I then extend beyond 
description to interpret data through a theoretical framework informed by Collins’s 
(2004) micro-sociological approaches to emotional energy and the micro-sociology 
of Durkheim (1912/1915) that underpins the work of Collins (2004). 
My methodological approach to social inquiry in this study is informed by 
ethnomethodology. In the context of science education, ethnomethodology offers a 
way of describing how shared understanding may be achieved between people via 
embodied sounds and motions (i.e., ethnomethods) during everyday social 
interaction. This approach to studies of social interaction recognises the existence of 
an objective (external) social reality, visible in the way people enact their 
understandings of that reality. Simultaneous with these accounts of social reality, 
studies in ethnomethodology focus on the essence of the lived experience of enacting 
the sounds and motions of interaction. This involves the study of how the underlying 
meaning of enacted sounds and motions constitute understanding of the objective 
social reality. That is, a study of how people co-construct their knowledge of an 
objective (external) social reality through the lived experiences of social interaction 
(Garfinkel, 1967; 1996).  
For science education researchers, an ethnomethodological description may 
provide a different perspective on the complexities of analogical reasoning in school 
science. But to substantially improve understanding in science education, this study 
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must add something more than understanding the essence of lived experiences. That 
is, the ethnomethodological understandings of lived experiences must relate to the 
objective reality of analogical reasoning in science education. For this reason I 
explicitly defined a theoretical framework informed by Collins’s (2004) that is 
underpinned by the micro-sociological work of Durkheim (1912/1915).   
In this chapter, I outline the influence of my methodological orientation by 
defining ethnomethods and ethnomethodology in section 3.1. This outline includes 
an introduction to ethnomethodological studies of maps and mapping (Garfinkel, 
1996; Liberman, 2013), which is relevant to understanding current representations of 
analogical reasoning in the science education literature. In section 3.2, I detail a 
theoretical framework that includes a fundamental definition of analogical reasoning 
(section 3.2.1), emotional energy (section 3.2.2) and the idea of respect as a form of 
emotional energy (section 3.2.3).  
3.1 Methodological Orientation 
  3.1.1 Study of everyday reasoning in social interaction.  
 Ethnomethodology focuses on localized practices (sounds and motions) of 
social interaction, which people use to develop shared understanding of social reality 
as localized knowledge (Garfinkel, 1967). In this sense ethnomethodology 
contributes to epistemological understandings of social reality, as localized practices 
become the co-constructive or constitutive source for defining localized knowledge 
of social reality. These localized practices within social interaction consist of the 
embodied sounds and motions people make available for interpretation by others. 
Through ongoing interpretation and re-interpretation, shared understanding is co-
constructed (Rawls, 2011). From Garfinkel’s (1967) perspective ethnomethodology 
is not about building new theory or reconstructing a new reality. It is about 
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understanding how knowledge of reality is constructed in particular occasions of 
lived experience. To explain this approach in more detail, I provide next a practical 
definition of ethnomethods and ethnomethodology by presenting the key concepts 
and presumptions of this approach to sociological inquiry.  
3.1.2 A practical definition of ethnomethods. 
Ethnomethods may be recognized as the embodied motions and sounds, made 
meaningful by people in localized social interaction within a culture sharing group. 
As a member of a culture sharing group, an individual is able to participate in a 
social interaction without the need for an explicit explanation of each motion or 
sound used by another individual. This is because each member of the group is 
competent in the group’s social practices as part of their membership of the shared 
culture (Garfinkel, 1967). Competence involves ongoing interactional work by 
members, evaluating their own social practices in relation to each other. This 
evaluative quality of interaction situates member competence as the source of social 
agency, as members make choices during interaction on what to do next.  
Ethnomethods are detectable as a broad range of interactional techniques. 
These may include combinations of conversation, physical gestures or silence. For 
example, the ethnomethods of conversation include the techniques for how words are 
spoken, in addition to what words are spoken (Garfinkel, 1967; 1996). For this 
reason, conversational ethnomethods were detectable throughout my study in many 
different forms, including the rate and/or pitch of speech, the elongation of words, 
pauses, use of particular sounds with established cultural meaning, or speech 
overlaps. Simultaneous with conversational ethnomethods, physical gestures such as 
eye contact, hand movements, facial gestures or body alignment added further 
meaning to localized interactions in my study. Gaps in conversation such as silence 
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or a change of topic were further techniques contributing to mutual interpretation and 
the making of meaning or shared understanding about each situation.  
To illustrate ethnomethods, a typical situation from one of my own classroom 
experiences is described below. 
Ethnomethods of the Teacher Response 
A student answers a question in class. While facing in her direction, I tighten 
my lips, move my head slightly to one side, make a ‘hmm’ sound, and then 
remain silent for three seconds.  
As I briefly interpret and explain the situation in this example, it is 
important to note there are several examples of ethnomethods above, each 
contributing to the possibility of shared understanding being achieved between the 
student and me.  Firstly, in response to the student’s answer my embodied sounds 
and motions, in the form of the hmm sound, my gaze, the facial expression, and the 
silence at the end, may be recognized as ethnomethods. As ethnomethods my 
response shows that on the topic of whether the student was correct or incorrect I was 
not committing to a firm answer. My physical gesture of lip tightening adds further 
to the ethnomethod of non-commitment. My head movement to the side and the 
‘hmm’ sound then follow. This combination of gestures may be interpreted as 
uncertainty about the student’s answer. It suggests an expectation that something else 
could be added to the student’s answer, making it more correct or acceptable.  
As a researcher I could determine these are reasonable possibilities because 
of the silence following these gestures. The three seconds of silence at the end are an 
important ethnomethod as there are more than two people involved in this 
interaction. Other students in the class are witnesses, and reflexive participants to 
these sounds and motions. Through their co-presence they are involved, and this 
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involvement becomes more explicit as I leave a silence at the end of my response. 
This silence may have afforded an invitation for others to contribute further to the 
first student’s answer. This could be confirmed by analyzing subsequent interaction.   
 The interactional techniques forming ethnomethods detailed above may be 
considered resources for sense making from both participant and researcher 
perspectives. For participants or group members in particular situations these 
resources often appear spontaneously and tend to be taken-for-granted in everyday 
situations. In contrast, from the researcher’s perspective these ethnomethods provide 
a means for analytical reduction of the situation, to enable an understanding of how 
situations are co-constructed through these sounds and motions.  In the following 
section I outline the key concepts and presumptions of ethnomethodology from the 
researcher perspective.  
3.1.3 A practical definition of ethnomethodology. 
By studying ethnomethods, ethnomethodology takes a different approach to 
understanding social reality, compared with formal accounts of social reality. In 
localized situations of social interaction, shared understanding constitutes social 
reality as it unfolds in-the-moment. Shared understanding becomes evident in the 
way group members account for their understanding.  These accounts are referred to 
as formal accounts in ethnomethodology. A formal account is the definition of the 
meaning produced within situations of interaction. According to Garfinkel (1967), 
group members co-construct formal accounts through the enactment of 
ethnomethods. For this reason I refer to the shared meaning co-constructed through 
ethnomethods as the achievement of particular interactional situations throughout my 
study (cf. Garfinkel, 1967). 
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Despite using ethnomethods to achieve meaning, group members are 
generally unaware of the full range of embodied sounds and motions they are using.  
What group members are generally aware of is the meaning that is co-constructed 
through the interaction. This meaning is evident from observing interaction and is 
confirmed in non-ethnomethodological research contexts using member checks to 
confirm the researcher’s interpretation of meaning. If a researcher were to ask a 
group member what happened in a particular episode of interaction, the researcher 
would typically receive a formal account of the shared meaning. This member check 
would be a new formal account of the earlier formal account in the observed 
moments of interaction. For example, in the Teacher Response example outlined 
above (3.2.1), I described the situation from a researcher perspective by noting the 
ethnomethods evident in the situation. In contrast, if I provide an account of the same 
situation from the teacher perspective, as a group member, it may look something 
like the following:  
Formal Account of the Teacher Response 
After the student gave an answer, I paused a bit because I wasn’t happy with 
the answer.  I wanted a more complete answer from the class, so I gave them 
a bit more time to think about it. 
This example would be typical of a formal account of what happened in this situation 
if the teacher was interviewed, and asked to explain the situation. This type of 
account is more typical than the ethnomethodological account I illustrated in 3.1.2, 
because as a member of the shared culture the teacher is an insider to the interaction. 
As insiders to localized situations group members tend to look through the sounds 
and motions of interaction in search of shared meaning. This is where the idea of the 
formal account comes from, because members see, hear and experience embodied 
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sounds and motions, but account for their ethnomethods in a way that makes sense. 
For this reason members tend to gloss over the enacted sounds and motions, to report 
what happened in terms of the shared meaning they achieve.  
By studying the embodied sounds and motions instead of the gloss, an 
ethnomethodological observer seeks to understand how the meaning of the situation 
was produced. That is, how is it that the formal observer could arrive at a particular 
formal account? For example, my research questions presented in chapter 2, section 
2.5, all relate to how shared understanding, concepts, and relationships between 
concepts are achieved in localized situations of science classrooms. By asking how 
type questions, studies in ethnomethodology use embodied sounds and motions as an 
analytical resource to understand how a particular topic is produced through localized 
social interaction. To explain ethnomethodology further I outline below some of the 
key concepts and presumptions of ethnomethodological analyses.  
3.1.3.1  Time and reflexivity.  
Contrary to formal accounts of knowledge in the science or science education 
literature, science concepts do not exist as fixed or discoverable units of knowledge, 
from an ethnomethodology perspective. They only exist as co-constructed objects 
across moments of synchronous or asynchronous social interaction. From this 
perspective concepts are re-enacted or re-produced as an achievement of embodied 
sounds and motions over the duration of episodes of social interaction. At the start of 
any duration of interaction a concept may be nothing more than a vague idea 
embodied in sounds and gestures. Over time, shared understanding is co-constructed 
and clearer knowledge about an idea may be achieved through the interaction 
(Rawls, 2005). This time-dependent shared understanding may give rise to shared 
confidence in an idea as conceptual knowledge.    
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The temporality of re-enacting or reproducing ideas and concepts is further 
complicated by the nature of reflexivity through social interaction. In situations of 
interaction, each momentary interpretation elicits a response, which is also 
interpreted. These actions, observations and enacted responses take place over time 
and are recognized as reflexivity in social inquiry.  
Reflexivity may be further complicated when ethnomethods involve silence 
or a change of topic in a conversation. In these situations the co-construction of 
shared understanding about a particular concept may be paused while the interaction 
takes a different direction.  Sense making about an earlier concept may be completed 
in a later moment of interaction via subsequent ethnomethods.  In this way, sense 
making may be non-sequential.  The meaning created through a particular 
ethnomethod in the present moment may not be fully understood until some other 
embodied sound or motion occurs at a later point in time.  
This has implications for understanding social interaction in science 
classrooms. By adopting this social perspective, understanding a scientific concept 
involves the enactment of the concept using localized reflexive ethnomethods, which 
may be cumulative and non-sequential. By analyzing a single moment of interaction 
or a continuous sequence of moments it may be unlikely for shared understanding of 
a concept to be evident. The analytical implication of time imposes a need to search 
for patterns of interaction contributing to the accumulation of shared conceptual 
understanding over a series of moments occurring sequentially and/or non-
sequentially. In planning to analyze ethnomethods of groups in science classrooms 
time becomes an important consideration in determining how episodes of interaction 
will be methodically collated and studied. This implication will be considered further 
in my methods in chapter 4. 
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 3.1.3.2  Whole episodes and reduction.  
 Episodes of interaction are important to my study because of the way shared 
understanding is co-constructed through reflexive embodied sounds and motions 
over variable durations of time. To capture data about the sounds and motions 
constituting the achievement of shared understanding, episodes of data must be 
analysed as whole units of meaning. As units of meaning, episodes of interaction 
form my unit-of-analysis for this study.  
 To understand fully an episode of interaction it is also necessary to reduce 
detailed aspects of sounds and motions within each episode for closer analysis. This 
requires a changing frame of reference throughout my analyses. For example, the 
science classes I studied were my own classes and I was a participant member within 
the groups I studied. At the most holistic level I experienced the lived phenomena of 
the embodied sounds and motions, viewed as a member of the classroom. By 
experiencing the phenomena as a member I understood the ethnomethods from the 
insider perspective as a whole lived experience, evident in my contributions to the 
gloss of the formal accounts being produced. This experience was the holistic, 
insider lived experience of ethnomethods. I only became aware of the ethnomethods, 
as ethnomethods, when I later adopted the role of researcher. 
 As a researcher, I reduced this whole insider lived experience into observable 
data using video and audio recordings. These data were further reduced into 
transcripts using conventions of Conversation Analysis (CA), as outlined in chapter 
4. Further reduction of data was performed by analyzing specific moments within the 
transcript and video data. For instance, at a particular moment, the word okay may 
have been used. Within the episode of interaction my analysis may be reduced to 
understanding this particular word, okay, in a particular moment by referring to prior 
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studies of conversation analysis as an analytical resource (cf. Beach, 1995). Hence, 
changing my frame of reference throughout the analysis allows me to investigate 
episodes of interaction in great detail. Importantly however, it is the whole meaning 
of episodes I am interested in, rather than the individual divisions of each episode. 
For this reason I use aspects of CA or other areas of sociology (cf. Collins, 2004; 
Durkheim, 1912/1915) as resources to support my understanding of the 
ethnomethods in each episode. 
 3.1.3.3  The presumption of an objective social reality.  
The notion of shared understanding about concepts becomes possible because 
people tend to presume the existence of an objective social reality. This presumption 
is observable through people’s everyday interactions in the way they treat their own 
ethnomethods (Garfinkel, 1967). By enacting the sound and motion of an 
ethnomethod, people presume others will share the meaning of their sounds and 
motions. Through reflexivity they look to the responses of others to analyze the 
received meaning of their sounds and motions. When shared meaning is confirmed 
by the other’s response their presumption of a shared reality is confirmed and social 
interaction proceeds smoothly. When shared meaning is not confirmed, the 
presumption of a shared reality is challenged, disjuncture or disruption is 
experienced in the social interaction and a need arises to re-establish the presumption 
of an objective social reality held by members. This re-establishment of the 
presumption may be achieved as repair work during social interaction. 
To illustrate the existence of this presumption of a shared reality, Garfinkel 
(1967) deployed his students to conduct experiments on unsuspecting people at home 
and in workplaces. In these experiments the student would respond to everyday 
situations by questioning the sounds and motions of others by pretending to 
83 
 
misunderstand the situation. As an example I adapted one of Garfinkel’s (1967) 
breaching studies below, where Jo is the student and Sam is the unsuspecting work 
colleague:  
Breaching the Presumption of a Shared Reality 
Sam and Jo are co-workers, passing one another in the corridor of a work 
place, as the following interaction takes place: 
Sam: How are you? 
Jo: How am I in regard to what? My health, my finances, my work, my peace 
of mind…?  
Sam: ((Red in the face and suddenly out of control)) Look! I was just trying 
to be polite. 
     Adapted from Garfinkel (1967, p. 44) 
This example is typical of the many instances used by Garfinkel (1967) to 
illustrate how people in everyday situations tend to presume that other people share 
the same sense of reality. Sam’s question how are you is offered as an 
acknowledgement of Jo’s presence with an expectation of a simple reply as they 
continue to walk past one another. In asking the question how are you, Sam has 
presumed his expectation of a non-eventful passing was shared by Jo. The response 
by Jo of how am I in regard to what, breached Sam’s presumption about Jo’s 
understanding.  This caused interruption or disjuncture in the flow of interaction, 
making Sam’s presumption about a shared reality, observable.   
In the context of ethnomethodology the presumption of a shared objective 
reality is inherent within the enactment of ethnomethods. This presumption gives 
people the confidence to make the motions and sounds of ethnomethods without the 
need to justify them explicitly on every occasion. By enacting an ethnomethod 
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people are also looking for a response in order to confirm the sharing of their 
presumed reality. In situations where the presumption is confirmed, shared 
understanding is quickly established. In contrast, where the presumption is breached, 
the interaction breaks down, unless group members respond to resolve the 
disjuncture.  By enacting further ethnomethods to resolve the disjuncture a new 
shared understanding may be established.  This will become more evident, later in 
my analyses where breached presumptions, disjuncture and repair of disjuncture 
become observable in the co-construction of shared understanding in the science 
classroom (chapter 5). 
 3.1.3.4  Ethnomethods are taken-for-granted.  
 An important feature of ethnomethods is the way people enact, analyze and 
respond to them, while taking them for granted. In the above example between Sam 
and Jo, it is not just Sam’s presumption about a shared reality that was taken-for-
granted. The actual sounds and motions observable as the words how are you are 
also, typically taken-for-granted.   
 Much of what people enact in social interaction is done spontaneously, within 
a particular context. Actions are rarely questioned, until a moment of disjuncture 
arises. If Jo had responded to Sam with I’m fine, how are you, it is likely that Sam 
and Jo would have found their interaction mundane and unremarkable.  
 This taken-for-granted treatment of ethnomethods is important for me as a 
researcher, in defining my research methods and procedures. To ask questions would 
make visible, the taken-for-granted ethnomethods, and the presumption of a shared 
reality. To most people questioning ethnomethods is considered strange, impolite or 
unacceptable, as Garfinkel (1967) and his students illustrated with their breaching 
experiments. To understand participant intention, or why particular sounds and 
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motions were used, my analyses must focus on what it is that particular episodes of 
interaction are achieving. This becomes possible by observing particular sounds and 
motions within the context of whole episodes, constituting a particular meaning. 
 For this reason, the taken-for-granted status of ethnomethods impacts on my 
data quality evaluation, in relation to member checks as discussed in section 4.5. The 
taken-for-granted status of ethnomethods rules out the possibility for member checks 
as a data quality method. In ethnomethodology, this issue is addressed by the 
researcher becoming familiar with the localized sounds and motions of group 
members primarily as a participant/researcher. This is referred to as the researcher 
being a competent member of the group being studied. The concept of member 
competence is addressed in the following section. 
 3.1.3.5  Competence and indifference.  
 As ethnomethods, the embodied sounds and motions of localized interactional 
situations are particular to members as insiders to the situation. These ethnomethods 
form the observable work of social interaction as lived experiences and lead to the 
achievement of shared understanding about the ideas, concepts or objects at the focus 
of the interaction. Because of this insider status, participants are considered to be 
competent in the use of their ethnomethods in particular situations. This means a 
member’s ethnomethods cannot be judged by the researcher as being incorrect or 
incompetently enacted. The enacted sounds and motions are simply the 
ethnomethods particular to the situation. Some sounds and motions achieve 
mundane, unremarkable interactions, some achieve new shared understandings, and 
some achieve situations of disjuncture or many other achievements. For this reason 
the competence of members in their situated insider ethnomethods is considered a 
foundational presumption about the people’s methods.   
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 As a researcher, competence in the localized ethnomethods of groups is also 
important for enhancing understanding of what the group is achieving with particular 
sounds and motions. This issue was addressed in my study by drawing data from my 
own science classes. That is, as a participant/researcher I was situated as a competent 
member of particular group interactions. 
 Another important consideration about member competence from a 
researcher perspective is the need to treat ethnomethods with indifference. This 
means remaining disinterested by treating ethnomethods without judgment about 
their effectiveness or appropriateness in any particular situation. By remaining 
indifferent to embodied sounds and motions, the researcher is only interested in what 
each ethnomethod achieves throughout a particular episode of interaction.    
  3.1.3.6 Topic and resource.  
 By treating ethnomethods with indifference it becomes possible to study the 
essence of social phenomena (Garfinkel, 1967) without making value judgements 
about the ethnomethods. This enables ethnomethods to be treated as a resource for 
understanding how group members co-construct or achieve shared understanding 
about their topic (Zimmerman & Pollner, 1971). For example, the ethnomethods 
described in section 3.2.1 (teacher response) may be treated as a resource to 
construct a situation that may be understood by group members as the teacher 
pausing or waiting for a further response. This understanding that the teacher was 
pausing would be treated as the topic and tends to be represented as the formal 
account as indicated in section 3.2.2 (teacher response). 
 From a researcher perspective, ethnomethods are treated as a resource for 
investigating how members create shared meaning (Pollner & Emerson, 2002).  In 
this way, the researcher uses the same resource for his or her research, as group 
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members do in their interaction. The difference is that the topic of the researcher is 
how the member’s topic is co-constructed, but the topic of group members is the 
formal account they are achieving through their ethnomethods. The researcher-
centric topic-resource relationship is reflected in my research questions, by 
addressing questions about how various constituent practices of analogical reasoning 
are enacted to achieve shared understanding about ideas/concepts in the science 
classroom.   
  My study takes a similar approach to understanding experiences of emotion. I 
treat emotional experiences as existing simultaneously with the embodied sounds and 
motions of the situation. For this reason I use ethnomethods to understand the 
emotional experiences associated with particular situations. I aim to be indifferent to 
ethnomethods and to use them as a resource, whether in relation to social practices or 
the lived emotional experience of those practices. This approach maintains a 
distinction between ethnomethods as my resource, and the topic of how particular 
ethnomethods achieve analogical reasoning for the group members.  
3.1.4 Ethnomethodology and the mapping of analogy. 
Ethnomethodology contributes to understanding society by adopting a 
different approach to social inquiry compared with approaches that rely on formal 
accounts such as interviews, to understand their topic of inquiry (Garfinkel, 1967; 
1996; Silverman, 1998). Earlier in sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 I illustrated both a formal 
account (FA) and an ethnomethodological (EM) approach to understanding a 
situation called the teacher’s response. This approach to presenting two perspectives 
of a situation was framed by Garfinkel (1996) as a collection of FA/EM pairs. In 
discussing ethnomethodology’s program, Garfinkel (1996) provided a variety of 
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examples of FA/EM pairs to illustrate the two different ways of understanding social 
situations. 
One of Garfinkel’s (1996) examples of FA/EM pairs related to the study of 
maps. Rather than studying a map or the process of mapping as a representation of 
reality, the ethnomethodological approach involved studying maps and mapping 
through enacted social interaction. This involved the study of embodied sounds and 
motions enacted during the use of a map. In this way ethnomethodology provides an 
understanding of how knowledge of a map and its related terrain are co-constructed 
through the lived experiences of the map-in-use.    
If we are to treat the formal accounts of analogical reasoning in the dominant 
literature as a structure map of relational features, then the pre-determined analogies 
found in the literature may also be treated as representational maps of analogical 
reasoning (cf. Harrison & Coll, 2008). To approach analogical reasoning from an 
ethnomethodological perspective, I treated analogies and analogical reasoning in my 
study as maps-in-use.  To provide an example of how Garfinkel applied this 
methodology I review a study involving the use of sketch maps. 
3.1.4.1  Following sketched maps as a map-in-use. 
With this FA/EM pairing in mind, a particular ethnomethodological study of 
maps to influence my thinking was a pedagogical activity originally developed by 
Garfinkel (1977) and further elaborated by Liberman (2013). That study, simply 
entitled following sketched maps (Liberman, 2013), involved the deployment of 
sociology students on journeys across a city using a hand-sketched map to reach their 
destination. Maps were sketched by the lecturer and provided to students in groups. 
The groups comprised of a driver, two map readers and a video operator. The 
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experiences of the students, recorded on video, were subsequently analyzed by the 
students and their lecturers. 
By studying the embodied sounds and motions within the lived experiences 
of using a map, the map, and the terrain it is related to, become known through a 
coherent collection of practices.  Instead of the map being a static representation of 
structural relations, the map and its related terrain became known differently on each 
occasion of use. From an ethnomethodology perspective, the map became knowable 
as a map-in-use through the practices of the particular group members using the map 
on a particular occasion. In this sense the map-in-use was re-enacted on each 
occasion via the embodied sounds and motions of each group. Thus, the phrase map-
in-use refers to the phenomenon of coherent, co-constructed social practices in 
action, observable as embodied sounds and motions (ethnomethods).  
3.1.4.2  Analogical reasoning as a map-in-use. 
I applied Liberman’s (2013) notion of a map-in-use in my study by treating 
the enacted practices of analogical reasoning as a lived experience of a map-in-use 
journey. My analysis in Chapter 5 is structured to illustrate this approach in the 
context of a spontaneous analogy involving the co-construction of a sketch-map-like 
diagram. As my analysis proceeds, I develop a more abstract version of the map-in-
use as a way of understanding analogical reasoning from an ethnomethodological 
perspective. For example, I develop the notion of conceptual locality, as defining the 
conceptual understanding of particular group members, defined in terms of their 
mutual understanding of each other. The idea of reaching a shared understanding 
indicates a shared conceptual locality. Most importantly, my notion of conceptual 
locality for any individual exists as an ongoing experience over time, where 
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understanding is constantly emergent and contingent upon ongoing interaction and 
reflexivity.   
This map-in-use approach for my study enables me to address the notion of 
knowledge being co-constructed over time, through moments of non-chronological 
reasoning, uncertainty and ambiguity. As a map-in-use, situations involving 
similarity and difference may become observable through the enacted, embodied 
sounds and motions of social interaction.  How that map-in-use is enacted and how I 
come to know analogy through the map-in-use will inform the outcomes of this 
study.  
3.1.4.3  Glynn (1994a) as a document-in-use. 
In the same way I have treated analogy as a map-in-use, there are sections in 
my analysis and discussion where I treat the journal article cited as Glynn (1994a) as 
a document-in-use. I explained previously (chapter 2), how influential this article 
(Glynn, 1994a) has been for science education research on analogy. For this reason it 
was chosen for the present analysis and discussion. My approach to Glynn (1994a) 
highlights another FA/EM pairing applied to the study of documents where the 
analysis looks beyond the content of a document to understand better how a user of 
the document enacts its use (Garfinkel, 1967). By approaching Glynn (1994a) as a 
document-in-use, I became aware of his paper from my perspective as a reader of 
this document. In this capacity I no longer viewed his paper as an inanimate 
representation of objective knowledge, but rather, I became aware of his paper as a 
technological remnant of his ethnomethods. More importantly, I became aware of 
how this paper influenced my ethnomethods by directing my attentiveness as a 
reader. I came to understand how Glynn’s use of particular words and particular 
structures were deliberately laid out by Glynn to guide me as a reader, to a shared 
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understanding with him. My analysis of Glynn (1994a) as a document-in-use is 
included in my analysis at section 5.4.2.1.  
3.2 Theoretical Framework 
 My theoretical framework is grounded in micro-sociology (Collins, 2004; 
Durkheim, 1912/1915) and contributes to my study by linking the 
ethnomethodological descriptions of my analysis to a fundamental phenomenon of 
analogical reasoning and lived experiences of emotional energy. In section 3.2.1, I 
provide an operational definition of analogical reasoning as a fundamental human 
phenomenon. The phenomenon I refer to as analogical reasoning, pre-dates 
psychology and the cognitive sciences discipline drawn upon by scholars in the field 
of science education. The fundamental definition of analogical reasoning is 
underpinned by a sociological ontology (Durkheim, 1912/1915), and evidence of a 
longstanding awareness of analogical reasoning as a human phenomenon (Hume, 
1777/2007).  
The operational definition of emotional energy in this study draws from the 
work of Collins (2004), which has its origins in the notion of collective effervescence 
defined by Durkheim (1912/1915). My definition of emotional energy is outlined in 
section 3.2.2 in terms of a biological-social human dualism consistent with the social 
ontology defined by Durkheim (1912/1915).  The biological element of this dualism 
I define using Dewey’s (1894; 1895) theory of emotion.  In section 3.2.2, I establish 
the coherence between biological and social elements of emotion, and what may be 
observed via the study of ethnomethods.  
 3.2.1 A fundamental definition of analogical reasoning.  
The goal of this study is to explore the emotional essence of analogical 
reasoning. As noted in chapter 2, this emotional essence is excluded as a possibility, 
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if analogical reasoning is defined from the cognitive sciences perspective described 
in terms of structure mapping theory in the science education literature. To address 
this problem I defined analogical reasoning broadly, as a form of reasoning based on 
fundamental categories of similarity and difference. Here the phrase fundamental 
categories is used in an epistemological (origin of knowledge) sense. This 
fundamental approach to defining analogical reasoning pre-dates the contemporary 
cognitive sciences and science education literature (cf. Gentner, 1983; Glynn, 
1994a). It is consistent with a long history of empiricist philosophy on the topic of 
analogy preceding the psychology literature (cf. Hume, 1777/2007). On this basis I 
adopt the view that analogical reasoning is not essentially a construct belonging to a 
psychology discipline.  It is possible that as a human phenomenon it may exist 
independent of the field of psychology, as it did before the dominance of 
psychological theory in twentieth century science education (cf. section 2.2). On this 
basis it is possible for analogical reasoning to be defined from different perspectives, 
starting from the establishment of similarity and difference. 
To be more specific, in the initial stages of my study, I defined analogical 
reasoning as any localized social situation where knowledge, in the form of shared 
understanding, was being co-constructed through the establishment of similarity and 
difference. The implication of this definition is that when similarity and difference 
become evident in my data, analogical reasoning may also be observed and such 
situations warrant closer analysis. In practical terms this definition would include 
everyday mundane situations where similarity and difference are used without 
explicit mention of analogy. For example, it may include embodied imitation 
(Holyoak & Thagard, 1997) or gestures (Hwang & Roth, 2011; 2013) as discussed in 
section 2.3. By adopting this broad, fundamental definition of analogical reasoning, a 
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diverse collection of situations may be identified as a way of exploring analogical 
reasoning in mundane situations, beyond the more narrow focus achieved through 
previous cognitive perspectives.  
Most importantly, this fundamental approach to re-defining analogical 
reasoning at the outset of my study is not radically different from the philosophical 
understanding of analogy discussed by Gentner (1983). For example, Gentner and 
Holyoak (1997) articulated a view, by referring to cognitive processes of analogical 
reasoning as a way of finding similarity and difference between concepts. The 
presence of the fundamental categories of similarity and difference is therefore the 
common foundation between cognitive analogical reasoning and my fundamental 
definition stated above. 
The point where my fundamental definition differs with the cognitive 
perspective is on the cognitive sciences presumption of concepts existing before 
analogical reasoning occurs. To use the terminology of Gentner and Holyoak (1997), 
similarity and difference were discoverable via analogical reasoning. This 
presumption embedded within their cognitive science perspective, means conceptual 
objects within analogy are presumed to exist before the analogy is constructed within 
a social interaction. The presumption avoids the need to answer questions about how 
conceptual objects come into existence as knowledge in the first instance. Because 
my study addresses these questions of how, my definition does not adopt the Gentner 
and Holyoak (1997) presumption.  
My approach is advantageous by allowing me to understand the phenomenon 
of analogical reasoning, and the co-construction of relational concepts, from a 
different perspective. In this way my definition is not imposing a particular theory, 
other than the need for fundamental categories of similarity and difference, and a 
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social ontology. To re-iterate this point, in my study analogical reasoning is any 
localized social situation where knowledge, in the form of shared understanding, is 
being co-constructed through the establishment of similarity and difference. 
3.2.2 Emotional energy. 
 3.2.2.1  Dramatic and undramatic emotional energy. 
In this study I adopted the construct of emotional energy (Collins, 2004) to 
define the emotional experiences of people in localized social situations. The 
conceptualization of emotional energy is derived from Durkheim’s (1912/1915) 
notion of collective effervescence developed via his studies of shared emotion in 
religious practices. Consistent with both these sources, emotional energy is defined 
as the glue that binds social groups in localized situations (Collins, 2004). Emotional 
energy binds society, by unifying group members around shared objects, ideas or 
concepts. Consistent with individual emotion it ebbs and flows as people seek out 
situations providing emotional energy (Collins, 2004).  
The dominant forms of emotional energy described by Collins (2004) tended 
to involve highly visible, dramatic measures of emotion. The evidence Collins (2004) 
used to identify emotion tended to draw upon self-reports (requiring self-awareness), 
and overt bodily actions and verbal expressions including prosody. Collins (2004) 
routinely refers to intensity and positive-negative valence (value-meaning) in relation 
to dramatic forms of emotional energy. 
In my study, I tended to explore forms of emotional energy that were 
undramatic as these became most pertinent to my investigation. Collins (2004, 
p.106) briefly defined undramatic emotional energy as an “uninteresting emotion, 
from the point of view of the actor” that was taken-for-granted within our everyday 
social interactions. He viewed undramatic emotional energy as having a zero 
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valence, meaning that is it was neither a positive or negative emotion, it was simply 
the emotional experience that “nothing out of the ordinary” was happening. A major 
outcome of my study is the way I identified experiences of undramatic emotional 
energy in situations involving silence, pauses or stillness where there was evidence 
of mutual observation of objects evidence by subsequent co-construction of scientific 
concepts. In other situations, ongoing eye contact, glances and smiles provided 
evidence of undramatic emotional energy preceding the establishment of science 
concepts.  
Because of its taken-for-granted quality Collins (2004) suggested that 
Garfinkel’s ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, 1967) may provide a suitable perspective 
to understand undramatic emotional energy. While Garfinkel (1967), studied 
unremarkable, ordinary situations where ethnomethods were taken-for-granted by 
group members, Collins (2004) suggests that Garfinkel took undramatic emotional 
experiences for granted.  My study builds on Collins’s (2004) theoretical work by 
understanding undramatic emotional energy as the emotional experience of 
ethnomethods within social interaction. In the school science context of my study,  
undramatic emotional energy became evident through ethnomethods that contributed 
to situations of enacted objectivity (sections 5.3 & 6.3.1) and shared foci on ideas 
that I call conceptual entrainment (sections 5.2 & 6.3.2). The detailed description 
and analysis of undramatic emotional energy is an important outcome of my study. 
 3.2.2.2  Durkheim’s biological-social dualism. 
Emotional energy in this study was understood through an ontological 
perspective defined in terms of Durkheim’s (1912/1915; 2005) biological-social 
dualism (cf. Davis, 2016). The biological self provides the basis for understanding 
lived human experiences at a biological level of raw sensory perception. To make 
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shared sense from this biological experience, the context of human society produces 
shared meaning of sensory perception giving birth to our sense of self as social 
beings (Durkheim, 1912/1915). My earlier discussion on ethnomethodology 
indicates some of the intricacies of how this shared sense making may be achieved 
through the localized enactment of ethnomethods. 
 This biological-social dualism, used to define fundamental human existence 
is important in my study for understanding a fundamental operational definition of 
emotional experience. Throughout this section I explicate a consensus definition of 
emotional experience consistent with the simultaneous biological and social 
experience of being (sections 3.2.2.3 and 3.2.2.4). In section 3.2.3 I extend on my 
definition of emotional experience at a social or collective level of experience by 
outlining the notion of respect, developed previously by Durkheim (1912/1915) in 
the context of religious practices.   
 3.2.2.3  The experience of emotion as a biological being.  
The biological experience of emotion in humans is important to my dualistic 
perspective of human existence (ontology) as a simultaneous biological-social being 
(Davis, 2016; Durkheim, 1912/1915). As humans, our social being is defined through 
our sense of self via social interaction, and our biological being is defined through 
individual perception of lived experiences, including experiences of social 
interaction. Dewey (1894; 1895) outlined how lived emotional experiences at an 
individual level comprised the elements of internal feelings, embodied movements 
and a cognitive element such as vague ideas. Dewey (1894; 1895) developed his 
theory of emotion by analyzing Darwin’s (1872) study on the expression of emotion 
and the James and Lange theories of emotion, as being grounded in physiological 
arousal (Dewey, 1894).   
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The three components of Dewey’s (1894) theory are consistent with 
contemporary consensus on emotion as evident by Scherer’s (2005) component 
process model of emotion which is explicitly supported by sociologists such as 
Thoits (2007).  I have adopted Dewey’s (1894) theory of emotion as a way of 
operationalizing the biological experience in non-laboratory, contextualized 
situations of science classrooms. My choice to retain this theory is based on its 
coherence with ethnomethods, as whole embodied motions and sound situated within 
social interaction. The basic elements of simultaneous and interdependent feelings, 
ideas and embodied movement provide a practical conceptualization of emotional 
experience, observable through the embodied sounds and motions of particular lived 
situations in the science classroom. 
To operationalize Dewey’s (1894) three components of emotional experience 
I discuss each of them below. The experience of internal feelings arises through and 
with the physiological actions of the body. In this study I identify the experience of 
feelings as the intersection between the phenomenon of perception and the internal 
biochemical experience of the body. This is the same type of biochemical experience 
established and located by Vendetti et al. (2015), using magnetic resonance imaging 
(MRI), involving semantic retrieval during cognitive analogical reasoning. Feelings 
arise from our internal biochemistry. People experience this biochemistry as living, 
biological beings giving rise to an experience of life as perception. For this reason, 
whenever people interact they feel something, and consistent with their presumption 
of a shared objective reality, they presume others feel something as well (section 
3.1.3.3). This presumption is subject to verification by members of social interaction, 
simultaneously with ideas, through the ethnomethods of particular situations. Thus, 
feelings as a component of emotion are intertwined with ethnomethods.  
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For a feeling to be perceived by the individual, bodily movements are 
essential in terms of physiology. These movements may include increased heart rate, 
perspiration, heavy breathing, facial gestures or other bodily movements. For 
example, feeling embarrassed may involve a reddened face and increased 
perspiration, which requires physical action from the autonomic nervous system, and 
the cardio-vascular system. Such internal physiological motion produces the 
subjective experience of feeling. Embodied movements in relation to feelings may 
occur concurrently. An arm movement, a smile or an eye glance are all physiological 
movements with underlying lived biochemical experiences. The existence of feelings 
and biochemical actions are obvious by the motions and sounds of the body at the 
organism level of the biological being. It is on this basis that people share their 
feelings through localized ethnomethods. 
Within this theoretical framework, feelings are different from emotions 
because emotions involve an idea.  Feelings are the internal biological perception of 
an emotion, but the idea associated with emotion provides a label and meaning to the 
perceptual experience. For this reason, the final element of emotion is what Dewey 
(1895) described as the intellectual element observable as the focus of an emotion. 
As Dewey explained: 
The emotion is always ‘about’ or ‘toward’ something; it is ‘at’ or ‘on account 
of’ something. And this prepositional reference is an integral phase of the 
single pulse of emotion; for emotion, as well as the idea, comes as a whole… 
(Dewey, 1895, p. 17) 
A notable feature of this something, as a necessary focus for emotion, is its 
vagueness. This something may be less of a clear concept, and more of a notion or 
vague idea. The experience of emotion is simultaneous and interdependent with these 
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vague ideas, which may be thought of as embryonic concepts. That is, the idea may 
start out vague and may become clearer as our experience progresses. This vagueness 
of the idea as an intellectual or cognitive element is consistent with the social level of 
shared understanding as described earlier in relation to time and reflexivity of 
ethnomethods (section 3.1.3.1).   
It takes time to have a lived experience at biochemical or individual levels of 
existence. The vagueness of the idea within an emotional experience suggests the 
spontaneous, holistic quality of emotion is a way for people to know something is 
important, without any need to know why (Bereiter, 1985). Emotion attracts and 
maintains individuals in the experience, and through the emotional experience a 
person may learn more about the idea within the emotion. More importantly, the 
object to which an emotion becomes attached is not the physical object, but an idea, 
or a group of ideas, about the physical object (Durkheim, 1912/1915). This is an 
important distinction as the physical object may remain unchanged while the idea 
(and emotion) about the object changes over time. 
 In this section I described a consensus view (Dewey, 1894; Scherer, 2005; 
Thoits, 2007) of an operational definition of emotional experience at the level of an 
individual, biological being. I now extend this understanding of emotional 
experience to account for collective emotional experiences within localized social 
interaction in section 3.2.2.4 (Collins, 2004; Durkheim, 1912/1925; Thoits, 1989). 
This collective emotional experience is further defined in terms of emotional energy.   
3.2.2.4  The experience of emotion as a social being. 
 As a social or collective experience emotional energy becomes evident 
through coordinated bodily motions and sounds in the form of gesture and 
conversation. These may include eye contact, glances, head movement, body 
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orientation, gestures, or facial expressions (Collins, 2004; Tobin, 2006). They 
become indicators of collective emotional energy where evidence of coordination 
may be observed through synchrony, alignment, entrainment, or shared focus 
(Collins, 2004). In terms of conversation in my study, coordination becomes evident 
through ethnomethods such as convergence in speech rates, speech overlap, finishing 
each other’s sentences and mimicry. The coordination of these observable embodied 
motions and sounds are effectively the coordination of ethnomethods.  
 In addition to this physical evidence of coordinated ethnomethods, emotional 
energy may also become visible through evidence of conceptual entrainment (Davis, 
2016). This involves the coordination of the idea component of Dewey’s theory of 
individual emotional experience. Milne and Otieno (2007) noted cognitive aspects of 
interaction and engagement in the context of emotional energy. These were identified 
as shared language and mutual focus on objects. This approach to observing the 
cognitive aspects of emotional energy in science classrooms relied on evidence in the 
form of shared language, but research on identifying shared ideas as part of 
emotional energy remains under-developed. This is primarily due to the taken-for-
granted, undramatic form of emotional energy arising through practices relating to 
shared ideas, and is investigated further in my study.  
 A notable feature of how emotional energy may be observed in science 
classrooms is the prominence of embodied motions. These are the motions of 
ethnomethods (section 3.1.2) and on this basis the operational definition of emotional 
energy draws on ethnomethods as a means of observation in my study. The use of 
these embodied motions or ethnomethods as an analytical resource illustrates the 
coherence between emotional experiences of people across their biological and social 
sense of being. In this sense it is possible to think of Dewey’s components of 
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emotion at a social level, in terms of shared ideas, shared feelings and coordinated or 
aligned embodied motions and sounds (ethnomethods).  
3.2.3 Respect as a form of emotional energy. 
To expand upon the basic operational definition of emotional experience 
across biological and social levels of being, this section draws further from 
Durkheim (1912/1915) to explain the notion of respect. Respect is an important form 
of emotional energy, used in my study to understand the connections identified 
between situated practices and collective emotional experiences. In this section I 
outline the concept of respect in relation to moral force, kinship and contagion.  It is 
important to note that these social phenomena (respect, moral force, kinship and 
contagion) do not originate as innate internal drives of human action (Durkheim, 
1912/1915). These are social phenomena that originate through the enactment of 
local social interaction. As such they are observable as, and through the embodied 
sounds and motions of ethnomethods as micro-social practices. They may become 
internalized to form learned psychological constructs (Durkheim, 1912/1915), but 
my study is focused on the observable enactment of these phenomena. 
 3.2.3.1 Moral force and respect. 
Durkheim (1912/1915) described the feeling (sensation) of moral force in 
relation to the emotion of respect. Moral force is a reflexive impetus driving people’s 
actions due to their sense of self as social beings. In a localized interaction moral 
force is associated with specific embodied sounds and motions between group 
members in response to each other. Like physical force, moral force is not directly 
observable (Durkheim, 1912/1915). What may be observable are the reflexive social 
interactions attributable to moral force. That is, the actions of individuals or groups 
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in response to previous internalization of moral force emanating from group 
interaction. 
The challenge to studying moral force is the notion of human agency. As 
Garfinkel (1967) famously noted, people are not cultural dopes. This means they do 
not simply act and react like a predictable stimulus-response mechanism. People 
make choices in the reflexive actions they use to respond in different ways to moral 
force. These choices are themselves driven by moral force. Some people may comply 
with their emotional experience of respect, some people may act to become 
transgressors, and others may not share particular emotions of respect at all. Where 
emotional energy is present in the form of respect, moral force is also present. 
As a researcher, respect and moral force are recognized by remaining 
indifferent to people’s ethnomethods and making sense of their actions over time. To 
illustrate this point, a typical classroom situation I experienced is outlined below: 
Rubbish Example 
A child throws some rubbish on the floor of a classroom. As the teacher, I 
glance at the child, make eye contact and frown at the child. The child then 
acts by picking up the paper and placing it in the bin. 
Analyzing this example from a Durkheimian perspective, moral force is illustrated 
by the child’s actions as a reflexive response to my actions (i.e., the eye contact and 
frown). I initiated the child’s experience of moral force through the frown gesture 
and the child reflexively acted on the moral force she felt from within. From a 
Durkheimian perspective, moral force is experienced by the child as a feeling 
associated with her emotion of respect, where the idea component is the idea of 
relations with me as the teacher. In an effort to repair the situation and restore a sense 
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of moral order the child acted on her internal feelings associated with the emotion of 
respect, by putting the rubbish in the bin.  
Moral force is not applied by me, but by the child upon her sense of self in 
relations to others, as a social being. It is the idea of the child’s sense of self in 
relation to the perceived moral order of the class, to which the child responds. In this 
case, the responsiveness of the child suggests that she has participated in previous 
interactions through which her sense of moral order within the class and interaction 
was originally established. In this way, moral solidarity with the classroom social 
group was restored by responding in relation to me as the teacher. The child’s 
response to her feelings by applying moral force to herself involves agency, as a 
choice about her sense of self. 
Through this type of localized social practice, moral force has its origins in 
society, because the feeling component of respect as an emotion is about relations 
with one another in the group (Durkheim, 1912/1915). Over time the moral forces 
acting on, and through, the sense of self become imprinted on the person’s mind 
where it acts, and results in taken-for-granted social practices. For example, a child 
who experienced similar social practices with me in the past may also have applied 
moral force to themselves by putting the rubbish in the bin without my prompt. In 
this way, moral force becomes internalized, and this internalized moral force defines 
who people are as social beings. That is, moral force shapes the internal structure of 
the mind from its external origins in society (Durkheim, 1912/1915). 
 A group member knows the feeling associated with the experience of moral 
force when they experience solidarity with others that we may identify as collective 
effervescence (Durkheim, 1912/1915) or emotional energy (Collins, 2004). 
Solidarity is an emotion of comfort and dependence emerging from knowing they 
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have achieved a shared understanding about an idea. Shared understanding gives rise 
to respect and solidarity as people come to know ideas as belonging to the social 
group or society. Equally if a person transgresses against an idea, they may 
experience the self-discipline of moral force. By transgressing against feelings 
associated with respect a person may experience discomfort resulting in self-
discipline or avoidance of particular situations. Thus, moral force may regulate the 
inner self, but it originates from, and is reinforced by, ongoing external social 
practices, experienced and shared with others.   
3.2.3.2  Family (Kinship) and respect. 
Kinship is a notion drawn from Durkheim (1912/1915) describing the 
collective emotional experience in relation to objects we treat as sacred. According to 
Durkheim (1912/1915) and Collins (2004) the experience of treating objects as 
sacred involves emotional energy establishing a sense of comfort and dependence 
(solidarity) with those objects. As an emotional experience kinship involves respect 
and moral force to establish a sense of community or relationship with and between 
objects and beings. As a form of respect (emotion), kinship functions to define the 
boundaries of groups. It may also involve spatialization objects to form a hierarchy, 
so objects and people become known in relation to each other. 
Durkheim’s notion of kinship is not just a theoretical construct. It is very 
much part of a person’s experience of social reality in everyday situations, and is 
recognised as a form of respect. As an example of the importance of kinship as 
respect within contemporary Western culture I cite two distinctively different 
examples. In the first example, respect is associated with the enactment of a sense of 
community within deprived inner city communities in the United States (Patterson, 
Cromby, Brown, Gross & Locke, 2011). In this sense respect (kinship) gives rise to 
105 
 
practices of acceptance of difference within groups and determines who is in the 
community and who is not.  
In a totally different context respect (kinship) was applied to ideas as well as 
beings. Here I cite the context of medical practice in the United States. Gruppen 
(2013) suggests that knowing or not knowing concepts is not a purely intellectual 
state. Rather it is a powerfully emotional experience affecting judgment and 
professional practice (Gruppen, 2013). In this context respect is associated with an 
emotional experience around the inclusion or exclusion of concepts within medical 
practice. It is considered good medical practice to respect concepts from different 
disciplines. Yet this respect is not uncritical, as concepts must meet particular criteria 
to be included as relevant to particular situations of medical practice (Gruppen, 
2013). The inclusion or exclusion of concepts therefore becomes an achievement of 
the collective enactment of criteria as social practices, driven by a sense of respect. 
3.2.3.3  Transference (Contagion) and respect. 
Contagion is another important idea, for my study, drawn from Durkheim 
(1912/1915) that describes the transference of emotional energy (respect) from one 
object or being to another. Durkheim (1912/1915) developed the idea of contagion 
by studying religious practices of indigenous cultures. Contagion explains how the 
idea about simple everyday objects, such as a piece of wood, may be transformed 
into an idea that the physical object is sacred. Through contagion of emotional 
energy we develop shared feelings and shared ideas about objects so that an ordinary, 
everyday, physical object may become associated with an idea such as sacredness. 
This becomes evident in the way we change our embodied sounds and motions in the 
presence of objects that become known as sacred. 
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A simple way to think about contagion is to relate it to the transference of 
emotional experiences in everyday social situations. For example, in primary school 
classrooms, teachers often use contagion or transference to manage student 
behaviour or to engage students in learning by giving symbolic rewards. When a 
student performs well during a lesson they may be given a gold star or a stamp to 
stick on their hand. The giving of the reward tends to involve a situation of praise by 
the teacher that often involves a classroom ritual of public recognition. This tends to 
provide an intense emotional experience for the child. In a Durkheimian sense the 
experience of this emotional energy becomes attached to the idea of the physical 
reward object given to the student. The contagion of the emotional energy from the 
lived experience to the idea of the physical reward object becomes evident in the way 
the student treats the object for the remainder of the day, or thereafter.  It becomes a 
symbol of the intense emotional experience and enables the experience to be re-lived 
by the student throughout the day. Through this physical object which may be a 
mundane piece of sticky paper or a blotch of ink, the student’s experience of 
emotional energy may be transferred to new situations. In this way the student’s 
sense of self is affected as evident through continued good behaviour or learning 
engagement. Quite often children will talk about the experience and show the 
physical reward object to their parents when they arrive home after school. This is an 
example of contagion or transference. 
In the context of the science classroom, and learning concepts, contagion is 
more subtle. The transference of emotional energy between ideas in a science 
classroom was noted, but not extensively reported, by Olitsky (2007). In that study of 
emotional energy and classroom engagement, Olitsky reported the transference of 
emotional energy from science activities to science concepts. In my study situations 
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of contagion or transference will be explored in detail throughout my data analysis 
(chapter 5). 
3.3 Chapter Summary 
 This chapter outlines my methodological orientation in terms of my 
application of ethnomethodology to describe classroom situations, and my theoretical 
framework that defines the fundamental phenomenon of analogical reasoning and the 
biological-social lived experiences of emotional energy. In section 3.2.1, I defined 
analogical reasoning as any localized social situation where knowledge, in the form 
of shared understanding, was being co-constructed through the establishment of 
similarity and difference. This broad, fundamental definition was crafted recognise 
instances of similarity and difference while removing burden of preconceived theory.  
The purpose of this definition was to assist in the identification of situations worthy 
of analysis as possible instances of analogical reasoning, in whatever form they may 
be observed.  
 In sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3, I provided practical definitions of 
ethnomethods and ethnomethodology.  My definition of ethnomethods is based on 
my reading of studies in ethnomethodology (cf. Garfinkel, 1967; 1996; Garfinkel et 
al., 1981; Liberman, 2013; Pollner, 1987; Pollner & Emerson, 2002; Zimmerman & 
Pollner, 1971). The definition of ethnomethods in situations of classroom interaction 
is consistent with Durkheim’s notion of social practices as sounds and motions, 
explicated in his work on microsociology in his study of religious life (Durkheim, 
1912/1915; Rawls, 2004). To address the study of ethnomethods I have initially 
taken an instrumental approach by defining the key concepts and presumptions used 
in ethnomethodology. These included; time and reflexivity, whole episodes and 
reduction, the presumption of a shared reality, ethnomethods being taken-for-
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granted, competence and indifference, and the issue of topic and resource. I have 
then related these concepts and presumptions to a practical example using 
Liberman’s (2013) study on following sketch maps. This example was selected as it 
illustrates the notion of FA/EM pairing as a way of understanding situations from 
either a formal account or an ethnomethods perspective. The FA perspective tends to 
explain what is achieved throughout a situation, and the EM perspective tends to 
describe how particular formal accounts were achieved through the lived experiences 
of embodied sounds and motions. In my study I refer to the theory of structure 
mapping and the TWA model as representing formal accounts of analogical 
reasoning. The enacted ethnomethods in my science classes provide access to EM 
accounts of particular situations, identifiable as analogical reasoning. 
 To understand the emotional energy of these situations of analogical 
reasoning I outlined an operational definition of the lived experience of emotional 
energy in section 3.2. Having drawn on the work of Collins (2004) and Durkheim 
(1912/1915) I narrowed my definition of emotional energy to a lived experience at 
both biological and social levels of experience. To observe these lived experiences of 
emotional energy I illustrated the alignment of Dewey’s (1894; 1895) component 
theory of emotion with my earlier definition of ethnomethods. Based on this 
alignment my approach to understanding emotional energy uses ethnomethods as a 
resource. In this way I am using the same resource to understand both emotional 
experience and collections of embodied practices related to situations of analogical 
reasoning.  
Finally, in section 3.3 I briefly introduced some theoretical understandings 
around the concept of respect as a particular form of emotional energy. This is an 
important concept that helps in understanding the connectivity between practices, 
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lived emotional experience and the origin of shared understanding through social 
interaction. I have discussed respect in relation to kinship as a particular form of 
respect, contagion as the spreading of respect (emotion), and moral force as the 
internalization of respect with its origins in lived experiences of social interaction.  
The relevance of these phenomena will become evident through my analyses in 
chapter 5 and my discussion in chapter 6. 
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Chapter 4 
Methods of Data Production and Analysis 
4.0 Overview 
The methods used in my study align with the ethnomethodological 
orientation and theoretical framework previously outlined in chapter 3. In this 
chapter, I outline the study context, ethics and risk management strategies in section 
4.1. As a teacher-researcher (section 1.2.1) my previously established relationships 
with the study participants contributed to my ability to reduce and manage the 
research risks associated with this study. In section 4.2 I outlined methods related to 
data collection including the equipment used, and the basic transcription and image 
collation methods. These initial data reduction techniques explain the treatment of 
raw data. Once raw data were collected, a selection criteria was applied to identify 
specific sequences of interaction for close analyses. These selection criteria are 
detailed in section 4.3. 
In section 4.4, I explain the unit of analysis in terms of episodes of interaction 
involving ethnomethodological achievements. In sub-section 4.4.1, I provide 
examples of different episode formats based on the analytical practices of Garfinkel 
et al. (1981). I then outline the reduction of my analyses to enable understanding of 
specific ethnomethods such as physical gesture, speech gesture, the style of speech 
gesture and entrainment of gestures (4.4.2). In terms of analogical reasoning the 
analysis of ethnomethods at this level of reduction enabled me to understand how 
particular accounts were being co-constructed across different episodes of 
interaction. In a similar way these ethnomethods enabled me to explain how 
emotional energy was experienced through enacted ethnomethods. 
 My quality criteria for evaluating data is addressed in section 4.5. These 
quality criteria are informed by the fourth generation evaluation framework of 
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trustworthiness and authenticity (Guba & Lincoln, 1989). I have outlined these in 
sub-sections addressing credibility, transferability, dependability, confirmability and 
authenticity. For each of these criteria I describe adjustments made to account for the 
key concepts and presumptions embedded within ethnomethodology as discussed 
earlier in section 3.1.3 (cf. Garfinkel, 1967; Pollner & Emerson, 2002; Zimmerman 
& Pollner, 1971). 
4.1 Context for the Study 
 4.1.1 Middle secondary science classes. 
This study was conducted in a rural secondary school in Queensland, 
Australia, with a student population of approximately 900. The school was situated 
in a low socio-economic community as indicated by its Index of Community Socio-
educational Advantage (ICSEA). In relation to Australia-wide, publicly available 
statistical data, 49% of the school population was in the bottom quartile for socio-
educational advantage, and 77% in the bottom half of the ICSEA distribution 
(ACARA, 2015). 
The participants in this study were recruited from my Year 9 and Year 10 
science classes. For the Year 9 class, there were 12 participants out of a class of 28 
students and data were collected over three school terms of 10 weeks duration per 
term. In the Year 10 class there were 13 participants out of a class of 22 students and 
data were collected over a single school term of 10 weeks. 
4.1.2 Access and ethics. 
Access for this study was approved by the Queensland Department of 
Education Training and Employment, Strategic Policy and Portfolio Relations 
Branch (DETE). A copy of the letter of approval is found in Appendix J. Ethics 
approval for this study was obtained from the QUT Human Research Ethics 
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Committee (QUT HREC). The study was approved as a low risk study in August 
2013, with QUT Ethics Approval Number 1300000525. A copy of the approval 
email is at Appendix K. 
The access approval and ethics applications identified six sources of risk and 
these were addressed as follows: 
 Privacy risk was managed by security of video, audio and transcript data 
being held off the school campus in a secure location. Access to 
identified data was restricted to the principal investigator and QUT 
supervisors. Data were de-identified where possible, with different data 
types being stored separately to avoid cross-identification. A list of 
student participants was maintained to cross-identify to pseudonyms 
during the data collection phase, but this list was destroyed once data 
collection was complete. All students are identified in this thesis by 
pseudonym only. Images have had school logos removed, and are 
presented in black and white. 
 Privacy of non-participants within the classroom was protected by 
positioning cameras so images of non-participants were not captured. 
Any background auditory data captured from non-participants was 
deleted from transcripts and analysis. 
 Release of images for publication was subject to participant and 
parent/guardian consent. This consent was separate from the consent to 
participate in the study, in accordance with approvals obtained from the 
QUT HREC and DETE. 
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 Coercion risk was addressed in a number of ways: 
•  The right not to participate, without penalty, was explained to students 
during the introduction of the study. 
•  Parental/guardian consent and student consent were obtained. 
•  The right to withdraw at anytime without penalty was stated during 
the introduction of the study to potential participants. 
•  Student assessment items were independently moderated, and the 
moderation process documented. Moderation is a routine practice that 
exists in schools whereby student assessment items are independently 
marked and checked by a teacher, other than the teacher of the class 
being assessed. This ensures that teacher marking is fair and 
reasonable, and is a common form of redress when students dispute a 
grade. This was explained to potential participants before they 
provided informed consent. 
● Inconvenience to participants was managed by keeping data collection 
within the naturalistic setting of classroom routine, and by positioning 
recording equipment prior to each lesson to minimise transition between 
activities involving data collection.  
The Participant Information and Consent, and Image Release Forms approved 
by QUT HREC and DETE are attached (Appendix H & I). These two forms required 
both student and parents/guardians to give informed consent. Separation of these two 
consent authorizations provided participants the choice of participating without the 
need for image release. This separation aimed to maximise participation rates. 
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4.2  Data Collection 
4.2.1 Materials and equipment. 
The equipment used in this study included: 
● Five high resolution digital video cameras, with battery and data storage 
capacity to enable recording of time of at least one lesson (70 minutes).  
● Tripods for each of the cameras. 
● Four audio recorders on lanyards with minimum recording times of one 
lesson (70 minutes). 
● A standalone computer, off the school site, to enable secure, timely 
transcription and initial analysis of the data within 8 hours of collection. 
● Adobe Premiere Elements 12 software, used to view and collate video 
data.  
4.2.2 Video, audio recordings and data transcription. 
Video data were collected using five high definition digital video cameras 
mounted on tripods and located approximately 1.5 metres from each group of 
students. The cameras were set up at the start of each lesson and left to run for the 
duration of the lesson. Audio data were collected using the audio function from the 
video cameras, supplemented by four audio recorders worn by students on lanyards. 
These audio data supplemented the camera audio by capturing parts of the 
conversations missed by the cameras. Data captured included interactions between 
students and me as the teacher-researcher. 
Data collection occurred over five terms, each of ten weeks. Approximately 
50 sets of group data were collected in this study. Data from the video/audio 
recorders were downloaded to a computer and reviewed within 8 hours of collection. 
Key sequences of social interaction were saved, logged and digitally filed. Audio 
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data were transcribed using conventions informed by conversation analysis (CA) 
(Roth & Hsu, 2010; Ten Have, 2007). CA transcripts exclude usual conventions of 
punctuation as these symbols are typically used with specific meaning in the context 
of CA. The full transcript conventions used in this study are at Appendix G, and a 
sample of typical conventions is illustrated in Table 4.1 below:                                  
Table 4.1 Sample of Typical CA Transcript Conventions 
Symbol Example in Use Explanation 
[  ] 
 
(.) 
: : 
((  )) 
ˉ 
half-life of carbon is 14 [about] 
                                          [about] 5600 years 
about that 5730 okay(.) so: that’s what half-life  
is: : 
((nodding)) 
 ˉdon’t ˉunderstand ˉwhat 
Overlapping speech. Note the vertical alignment of  
overlapping words. 
A brief pause of less than 0.2 seconds 
Prolongation of a sound. Each colon is 0.1 seconds.   
Annotation of non-spoken activity. 
ˉ    flat pitch.  
 
Concurrent with analysis of transcripts for vocal cues, physical gestures were 
captured by extracting visual data from raw video footage using Adobe Photo Shop 
Premiere Elements 12. This was done by marking the moments in the video where 
images relevant to the analysis were located. Still images were taken at precise 
moments to illustrate alignment between conversation and gesture. Each still image 
was saved and cross referenced to the marked location in the video using the time 
function. Before use in the analysis, images were converted to black and white and 
school logos were removed. Images were adjusted in size to show only the precise 
gesture of interest and compressed to reduce storage space. A sample of an image 
showing gestures is shown in figure 4.1 below: 
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Figure 4.1. Sample of gestures in a still image. 
 Figure 4.1 above, shows eye and face direction as well as hand gestures. In 
my analysis this type of image may be enhanced with arrows and markings to 
highlight specific features. For example, features such as mutual focus may be shown 
with arrows, or datum points on consecutive images may be shown as a means for 
referring to movement across moments of time. In some images I have aligned 
features of conversation where these are relevant to my analysis.  
 4.2.3 Researcher field journal. 
I maintained a written field journal throughout my data collection and 
analysis. This journal recorded feelings and thoughts I experienced during my 
investigation. The reflexive nature of social practices means interpretations were 
based on my capacity to observe, engage in and understand the social practices. This 
journal documented my experiences. I did not use these data directly in the report of 
my study, however the reflective practice involved in keeping the journal influenced 
my thinking and analyses throughout the life of my study. Entries in my journal were 
varied from records of conversation with my supervisor, my reflections on 
interactions with my students, reflections on my reading and what this meant for 
understanding concepts such as emotion. I reviewed these notes in relation to 
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subsequent reading and writing to make sense of my data and form a coherent 
dissertation. 
4.3 Selection of Interaction Sequences 
Video and audio data of interactions were collected from two science classes 
involving groups of students that varied in specific member composition from class 
to class. Groups consisted of 2-5 people, and at times included me as the teacher. 
This produced a population of approximately 50 sets of group data. Each data set 
comprised a collection of video and audio data for a particular group, situated in a 
lesson involving science inquiry.  
Lessons involving science inquiry were created to maximise opportunities to 
study analogical reasoning from student perspectives. I adopted a broad definition of 
science inquiry in my pedagogical context, to include empirical and deductive 
inquiry (Valiela, 2001) as well as student explorations of scientific information 
during online research. To facilitate situations involving analogical reasoning, many 
of these lessons involved teacher generated analogical models being situated within 
the science inquiry activities. For example, a probability game was used to generate 
data and simulate the pattern of decay in relation to radioactive half-life.  In another 
lesson, students were provided tea leaves, Styrofoam beads, water and a hotplate to 
conduct an observational study of water movement and heat. In an online research 
activity students explored scientific models and language, to explain isotopes and 
radioactive decay. As the teacher/researcher I could see the possibilities for 
analogical reasoning (cf. section 3.2.1) to arise from these situations, but I did not 
impose the theoretical presumptions embedded within the TWA model or FAR 
guide. My approach involved lesson designs that would be conducive to students 
engaging in social interaction through which analogical reasoning may be recognized 
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in its fundamental forms as discussed in section 3.2.1. My purpose was to analyse 
analogical reasoning indigenous to the enacted practices of my students without the 
influence of cognitive theories in their classroom practices.  
After each lesson, situations of analogical reasoning were identified in the 
video and audio data. Analogical reasoning was identified as any localized social 
situation where knowledge, in the form of shared understanding, was being co-
constructed through the establishment of similarity and difference (section 3.2.1). 
Using this definition I identified many situations of analogical reasoning within 
classroom interaction. These included a range of spontaneous interactions such as 
graphical representation of probability data to explain radioactive half-life, use of 
hand gestures to represent observed phenomena, use of drawings and symbols to 
represent phenomena, or use of language to relate observed phenomena with 
unrelated concepts. 
To obtain the richest data from many examples of interaction meeting my 
definition of analogical reasoning, I established selection criteria. My selection 
criteria were focused closely on the quality of interactions, as ethnomethods were my 
resource for analysis, not the type of analogy. Criteria were based on the following 
considerations: 
● Was it possible for analogical reasoning to be observed at a particular 
moment, or across several moments, in the data (cf. section 3.2.1)? 
● Was there evidence of a sustained episode(s) of interaction leading to a 
situation involving analogical reasoning (cf. section 3.2.1)? 
● Was the audio and video data quality sufficient to illustrate adequately 
conversation and physical gestures leading to a situation involving 
analogical reasoning (cf. section 3.2.1)? 
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4.4 Data Analysis 
 My data analysis focused on situations of interaction where analogical 
reasoning was evident, consistent with my definition in section 3.2.1 and my 
selection criteria in section 4.3. This analysis began with an initial data review within 
8 hours of collection where interaction sequences were identified for further analysis. 
From these selected interaction sequences, transcripts were written with 
corresponding images marked on the video data using the techniques explained in 
section 4.2. Over the duration of about two and a half years I developed a thorough 
understanding of the data by documenting iterations of my analyses, including the 
presentation of data into meaningful episodes of interaction. My analytical 
procedures are detailed in this section.  
4.4.1 Ethnomethodology and unit of analysis. 
Earlier in section 3.1 I explained how researcher understanding in 
ethnomethodology is achieved over time, by studying episodes-of-interaction as the 
unit of analysis. To aid analysis I also reduced some episodes into smaller fragments. 
I generated episodes and fragments from transcripts of video and audio data by 
interpreting data to determine what members were achieving in terms of shared 
understanding. Once these episodes were defined I analyzed them in detail to 
understand how shared understanding was being achieved in each episode or 
fragment. These episodes and fragments each contributed small pieces to my 
understanding of analogical reasoning and emotional energy. To explain how 
episodes and fragments were presented in my study I outline below the key structural 
features of my data presentation. 
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4.4.1.1  Turns of conversation. 
In my study, episodes are made up of turns of conversation including speech 
and/or physical gesture. I structured each turn in an episode with a number, 
correlated with an individual speaker followed by the transcript. For example, ‘025 
Disney its moved over’ would display turn 025 where the speaker, Disney, utters the 
words its moved over. To aid readability of the analysis I have deviated from CA 
conventions by identifying each line in the episode as a turn.  This is consistent with 
the work represented in Garfinkel et al. (1981). 
My approach to using turns in this study follows the tradition of Garfinkel 
(1967) who emphasized episodes-of-interaction rather than paired turns as the unit of 
analysis. This is different from CA where each turn tends to be paired with another, 
as a unit of action and response in the formation of meaning. This CA approach was 
used by Harvey Sacks (Silverman, 1998) and highlights an important divergence 
between CA and ethnomethodology. 
Understanding the contribution of particular turns to the co-construction of 
meaning is important, but turns are fully understood in ethnomethodology as part of 
a series of turns. Each particular series of turns make up an episode of interaction. In 
some episodes the turns achieve meaning in a sequential way, and I refer to these as 
sequential episodes.  In other episodes a turn is enacted, but there is silence or no 
immediate response by members, until some other turn later in the episode. This type 
of episode I refer to as a non-sequential episode.    
4.4.1.2  Non-sequential episodes. 
Non-sequential episodes may be formed where meaning is achieved over a 
long duration, where silences or different topics are evident across the data. To 
illustrate the structure of a non-sequential episode I extracted data analyzed by 
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Garfinkel et al. (1981) in their study concerning the discovery of the first optical 
pulsar (neutron star), at Steward Observatory in 1969. To illustrate this episode I 
selected turns of interaction from the two astronomers, Cocke and Disney. This non-
sequential episode is represented as extract 1 drawn from Garfinkel et al. (1981), 
below. 
Extract 1 from Garfinkel et al. (1981) 
Turn Speaker Transcript 
018 
019 
 
025 
 
067 
068 
069 
070 
071 
072 
073 
074 
 
107 
Disney 
 
 
Disney 
 
Disney 
 
Cocke 
 
Disney 
Cocke 
Disney 
 
 
Disney 
We got Don’s number 
(1.5) 
 
Its moved over 
 
It looks clearer [there] 
(1.0) 
It disturbs me:: that’s its right in the middle of the screen 
[now still] 
[its stir: it hasn’t] it isn’t John, look= 
=its moved a little bit, yeah:n = 
= yeah, its moved to the right 
(0.8) 
 
Should we go en’ ring Don up 
 
In extract 1 above, I demonstrate my method for representing non-sequential 
data as a meaningful episode of interaction. Notice how the turn numbers in the left 
column are in order, but are not sequential, because serial turns related to other topics 
were removed. In their original study, Garfinkel et al. (1981) did not represent their 
data as shown in extract 1 (above).  However they did analyze their data in this way. 
That is, they selected turns from across the transcript to establish meaning, 
interpreted from their analysis. To explain briefly their analysis I outlined the 
ethnomethodological meaning they interpreted from these data. My explanation, 
below, does not reflect the rigor of their analysis, but merely provides an overview of 
how and why a non-sequential episode of data may be a useful unit of analysis. 
In their analysis Garfinkel et al. (1981) established the notion of a vague 
object they called a vague it by extracting non-sequential turns from different 
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locations across their transcript. Their analysis established a pattern of 
ethnomethodological achievement in the way members (Disney & Cocke) accounted 
for the observed object, not as an optical pulsar, but as a vague object. By analyzing 
the entire transcript Garfinkel et al. (1981) interpreted a pattern of ethnomethods 
where the scientists referred to their object as an ‘it’. References to the object as an 
‘it’ were distributed throughout the transcript in non-sequential turns of conversation 
as illustrated in table 4.3 above. For Garfinkel et al. (1981) this was indicative of 
uncertainty about what ‘it’ may have been. This uncertainty was reinforced by 
Disney’s repeated requests about calling Don (turns 018 and 107). Don was the lead 
investigator, who was absent on this particular night, when the observations were 
made. More importantly, it was the way in which Disney’s requests about Don were 
ignored by his team that was the focus of Garfinkel et al. (1981). Disney’s requests 
were interpreted as indicating further, the vagueness of shared knowledge about the 
object referred to as ‘it’.  If the team had agreed that ‘it’ was the scientific object they 
were looking for, they may have responded to Disney, and called Don. Instead the 
team ignored Disney, continued to observe, and call the object an ‘it’. Garfinkel et al. 
(1981) used these non-sequential turns of interaction to understand how the scientists 
accounted for their scientific objects as vague objects during practices of discovery. 
By analyzing non-sequential turns in this way, Garfinkel et al. (1981) effectively 
treated these non-sequential turns as a complete episode of interaction. This was 
implicit in Garfinkel’s analysis. In my study, where I analyze episodes with non-
sequential turns I explicitly represent these turns in the style shown in extract 1 
above.   
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4.4.1.3  Sequential episodes.   
More commonly an episode of data, as unit of analysis, will be presented with 
sequential turns of interaction. To illustrate an episode with sequential turns I have 
shown several moments of sequential conversation between Disney and Cocke where 
they declare their vague ‘it’ as a pulsar (neutron star). See extract 2 below:  
Extract 2 from Garfinkel et al. (1981) 
Turn Speaker Transcript 
132 
133 
134 
135 
136 
Cocke 
 
Disney 
 
Disney 
God Damn! 
(0.4) 
God, fantastic! 
(0.5) 
That’s a bloody pulsar! 
 
In this example (extract 2, above), at turn 136 Disney exclaims ‘that’s a 
bloody pulsar’, as a way of declaring greater certainty about the object previously 
treated as a vague it. This was the first moment where the team fully resolved their 
uncertainty about the object and achieved a shared understanding about the vague ‘it’ 
as a scientific object in the form of an optical pulsar.  The brevity of this episode 
contributes to the sequencing of turns. In my study a short series of turns as shown in 
extract 2 may also be treated as a fragment of a larger episode of interaction. 
4.4.2 Reduction of episodes and ethnomethods. 
As explained earlier (section 3.1) ethnomethodology involves analysis of 
whole episodes of interaction as a way of understanding how group members achieve 
shared understanding through social interaction. In section 3.1.3.2 I also explained 
my analyses in terms of changing frames of reference from whole lived experiences, 
to analyzing microscopic aspects, and then reconstituting my analyses at the level of 
whole episodes of data. In this section I outline the methods used in this analytical 
reduction of my data to study ethnomethods in terms of physical gesture, speech 
gesture, speech style and entrainment. 
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4.4.2.1  Ethnomethods as Physical gesture.  
By adopting different disciplinary perspectives a form of consensus may be 
established around a definition for gesture. In the psychology literature physical 
gesture is considered to be part of the same psychological structure as speech gesture 
and cognition (McNeill, 1985; Wilson, 2002). From a philosophical perspective, 
consistent with ethnomethodology, the enactment of gesture is considered the 
enactment of thought itself (Merleau-Ponty, 1962/2012).  In the science education 
literature, physical gesture is well accepted as a form of embodiment of ideas about 
objects or concepts as abstractions of the physical world (Aubusson, et al., 1997; 
Roth & Lawless, 2002). These may include iconic gestures such as a cup-shaped-
hand, holding an imagined substance, or deictic gestures such as pointing at a tree to 
direct the attention of others (cf. McNeill, 2000; Roth & Lawless, 2002).   
In my study I identified physical gesture as any enactment of body 
movements as part of social interaction (cf. McNeill, 2000; Roth & Lawless, 2002). 
This approach to identifying physical gesture is consistent with Durkheim’s 
(1912/1915) notion of social practices and the nonverbal measures of emotional 
energy defined by Collins (2004). All of these different studies identify motions of 
the body as a form of communication or social interaction, albeit from slightly 
different perspectives.   
Examples of physical gesture may include embodied actions such as eye 
contact, glancing, nodding, hand gestures, body rocking, movement away from, or 
toward objects, stillness, or head shaking (cf. Collins, 2004; Tobin, 2006). In 
particular situations of my analysis, I draw on previous studies of physical gesture as 
a resource for understanding my data. For example, heading nodding was previously 
studied by Darwin (1872) and Stivers (2008), providing a resource for understanding 
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similar occurrences in my data. Occurrences of physical gestures are often 
momentary and for this reason still images were used to capture physical gestures for 
detailed analysis as outlined in section 4.2.2 above.  
4.4.2.2  Ethnomethods as Speech gesture.  
As an important part of the sounds within social interaction (Durkheim, 
1912/1915) and as a vocalized measure of emotional energy (Collins, 2004), speech 
is also treated as a form of gesture (McNeill, 1985; 2000; Merleau-Ponty, 
1962/2012). As such speech gesture is also an important part of ethnomethodology, 
evident by the use of conversation  transcription techniques (cf. Garfinkel, 1967; 
Silverman, 1998). My analysis of speech gesture commenced with the reduction of 
video and audio data into written transcripts using conventions of conversation 
analysis (see section 4.2.2, above). In addition particular aspects of speech gesture 
were reduced further using analyses from previous studies focusing on particular 
aspects of speech. For example, specific utterances of speech gesture such as yeah 
(Lambertz, 2011), okay (Beach, 1995), sorry (Szczepek Reed, 2010), or but 
(Rigalleau, Guerry & Granjon, 2014) were associated with particular meaning in 
previous studies. Where relevant I draw on these previous studies as a resource for 
understanding particular speech gestures within my data. As part of my whole 
approach to understanding ethnomethods I evaluated the contribution of these 
previous studies within the context of my study.   
4.4.2.3  Ethnomethods as the Style of speech gesture.  
In the conceptualization of emotional energy (see section 3.3) Collins (2004) 
identified the style of speech, distinct from the content of speech, as an important 
property for understanding emotion. Collins (2004) defined the style of speech in 
terms of emphasis, pitch, and rhythm. Other studies in emotion (Scherer, 2003) and 
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science education (Roth & Hsu, 2010) have also identified speech rate and volume as 
important measures of speech style, otherwise called prosody. Prosody is important 
in my study as the link between prosody and emotional experience is well established 
(Collins, 2004; Scherer, 2003). For this reason I analyzed aspects of prosody where 
relevant in my data, such as rising or falling tone, or convergence in the rate of 
speech. 
The purpose of analyzing prosody was to identify and understand experiences 
of emotional energy. My analyses focused on particular aspects of prosody including 
divergence or convergence in speech rate, rising, flat or falling pitch, volume 
variations and emphasis on particular words or syllables.  In addition I identified 
rhythmic properties of speech gesture by identifying ethnomethods such as speech 
overlap, mutual sentence completion, or silence (Collins, 2004). By analyzing these 
various properties of speech gesture, separate from the content, I was able to identify 
emotional energy in particular situations. 
An example of identifying emotional energy through speech is the analysis of 
speech rate, in terms of rate convergence. To calculate speech rate I inserted each 
turn of conversation from the transcript into an online software tool at 
http://www.wordcalc.com (2010). This counted the number of syllables in each turn 
which I recorded in a tabulated version of the transcript. Throughout this process I 
checked a sample of turns to ensure the accuracy of the syllable count. I also 
modified my transcripts to include numbers in the form of words, and I ensured 
pseudonyms contained the same number of syllables as respective participant names. 
I then used my video data to replay each turn of interaction and record the time for 
each turn using the computer generated timer. The time was recorded in the 
transcript table. I then calculated speech rate in syllables per second (SPS) using a 
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calculator. For some of the episodes I calculated the mean and standard deviation of 
speech rates across the entire episode.  This was done using an Excel spreadsheet and 
the statistics functions for average (mean) and standard deviation (see appendices E 
and F). 
4.4.2.4  Ethnomethods Involving Entrainment of gestures.   
As indicated earlier in section 3.3 an important feature of emotional energy is 
its collective quality. This was evident through coordination and entrainment of 
ethnomethods in the form of physical and speech gestures. The entrainment of 
physical gesture is generally easy to observe. For example, Milne and Otieno (2007) 
provided still images of students all facing toward a shared object of interest. More 
subtle entrainment may be evident in the style of speech gesture. For example, two 
people having a conversation where they complete each other’s sentences may be 
considered a form of entrainment around shared ideas (Schegloff, 2000). Other 
ethnomethods such as convergence of speech style (Erickson & Schultz, 1982) or an 
episode of group laughter (Roth, Ritchie, Hudson & Mergard, 2011) have also been 
associated with entrainment between group members. Entrainment of gestures was 
important in the identification and analysis of emotional energy.  
4.5 Quality Criteria for Evaluating Data 
The quality criteria for evaluating data in this study are informed by the 
fourth generation evaluation framework of trustworthiness and authenticity defined 
by Guba & Lincoln (1989). This framework was developed for studies conducted 
within the broad notion of a constructivist paradigm and is therefore relevant to my 
study. I modified this framework where appropriate to maintain the integrity of my 
ethnomethodological approach. The criteria defined in this framework include 
credibility, transferability, dependability, confirmability and authenticity.  
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4.5.1 Credibility. 
In qualitative studies credibility is parallel to internal validity and is 
concerned with strength of alignment between the constructed reality of members 
and the reconstructions attributed to them by the researcher (Guba & Lincoln, 1989). 
In ethnomethodology internal validity is evaluated by the strength of alignment 
between the constructed reality of members and the reconstruction of their 
ethnomethods explaining how member accounts of reality were constructed. In my 
study this was achieved by treating ethnomethods with indifference, attaining 
competence in ethnomethods as a researcher/participant, and tests of progressive 
subjectivity with disinterested third parties to the study, and my supervisors. 
4.5.1.1  Indifference and member competence.  
One of the key presumptions of ethnomethodology is that group members are 
competent at their localized ethnomethods, and for this reason, researchers treat 
ethnomethods with indifference. As both teacher/participant and researcher, I was 
positioned as a member of the class with competence as a participant of the 
ethnomethods produced by class members. From a researcher perspective this added 
credibility to the study as I was already an insider to my particular class groups. This 
familiarization with ethnomethods was described by Garfinkel as going native 
(Garfinkel, 1967; Pollner & Emerson, 2002), and in my position, I had already 
achieved native status. This notion of going or being native is consistent with Guba 
and Lincoln’s (1989) notion of prolonged engagement and persistent observation 
contributing to data credibility. Such in-depth engagement with the study context 
enabled me to establish shared knowledge with each class, about localized methods 
of social practice and meanings arising from specific practices.  
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In this study, shared knowledge of the class member’s ethnomethods was 
achieved by teaching the class three times per week, and getting to know the students 
and their patterns of interaction. Over the two years leading into this study I taught 
some of the students in earlier year levels (Years 8 & 9), I knew some of them 
through their older siblings who I also taught, and I also established relations with 
parents. My rapport with the students in this rural community school was quite 
strong. Persistent observation was also enhanced by the use of video and audio 
recording technologies enabling situations to be observed on repeated occasions 
throughout the life of my study. This contributed to my member competence, by 
enabling me to study the ethnomethods of the class in detail. 
4.5.1.2  Ethnomethods are taken-for-granted.  
As outlined earlier in section 3.2.2 ethnomethods and their achievements tend 
to be taken-for-granted by members in social interaction. This has implications for 
research quality in terms of member checks recommended by Guba and Lincoln 
(1989). A member check is where a researcher may discuss aspects of the data to 
clarify a members meaning. This would ensure the researcher’s reconstruction of the 
situation aligns with the member’s construction. At best member checks can only 
check a formal account of the situation. Asking members how they achieved their 
formal account would result in another formal account, rather than an account of 
their ethnomethods (cf. section 3.2.2).  
To overcome this problem, researcher competence in localized ethnomethods 
is essential. This is because ethnomethods are used as a resource by members to 
achieve formal accounts, but they are also used as an analytical resource by the 
researcher. Researcher competence is therefore important to understanding the 
ethnomethods being enacted and how particular ethnomethods achieve formal 
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accounts of shared reality (cf. Garfinkel 1967; Garfinkel et al., 1981). In my study I 
achieved researcher competence in localized ethnomethods by being a member of the 
school community and classroom situations as the teacher/researcher. The depth of 
my localized knowledge of ethnomethods was discussed above. 
4.5.1.3  Progressive subjectivity.  
Progressive subjectivity is the process of self-monitoring my own conceptual 
constructions to ensure my findings are not determined by my pre-conceived ideas. 
In this study I achieved progressive subjectivity by writing about my ideas from the 
earliest stages of this study.  Through my writings I have accumulated evidence of 
progressive changes in my thinking based on the data, my reading and ongoing 
analyses. For example, I have accumulated more than 160 chapter and dissertation 
draft updates documenting the progression of my thinking throughout this study. 
These documents demonstrate the development of my construction of findings in this 
study.  
In addition to recording the progression of my thinking I also sought 
feedback from disinterested experts within the field of science education, at different 
points throughout my study. For example, I presented my research at three 
conferences during my candidature (Davis, 2014; Davis, 2015; Davis & Bellocchi, 
2015), and I wrote a book chapter involving independent draft reviews (Davis, 2016).  
The book chapter addresses my methodology using samples of my data to illustrate 
analytical concepts. The feedback I received from two international scholars on the 
book chapter influenced my thinking, and in this way it was incorporated into my 
methodology chapter. By contributing to my methodology, writing this book chapter 
also influenced my analyses and findings.  
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4.5.2 Transferability. 
The criterion of transferability is concerned with the external validity of the 
findings of a study (Guba & Lincoln, 1989). That is, transferability is concerned with 
the application of findings from the study context into new contexts where the study 
was not performed. This is an issue of particular interest in ethnomethodology as this 
approach is concerned with understanding the lived experiences of particular 
situations. In relation to ethnomethodological studies this issue was addressed by 
Zimmerman & Pollner (1971) by making a distinction between the features of a 
setting and the general phenomena arising from the researcher’s analysis.  
For example, in extract 1 above (section 4.4.1) I outlined some data from a 
study by Garfinkel et al. (1981). One of the setting features particular to that situation 
was the organizational role of the team leader, Don, who was physically absent. 
Despite this, the shared idea of his absence influenced the situation in the way 
Disney referred to Don. This organizational feature would be considered a feature of 
the setting particular to this situation and not transferable to other situations.  In 
contrast, the general phenomenon arising from Garfinkel’s et al. (1981) analysis was 
the achievement of a situation of uncertain knowledge about the vague it. The vague 
it was achieved by the pattern of ethnomethods such as using the word it and Cocke’s 
unwillingness to call Don, despite Disney’s requests. Together these ethnomethods 
enabled Garfinkel et al. (1981) to conceive of a general phenomenon about the role 
of uncertainty in scientific discovery, illustrating the production of knowledge over 
the duration of a social interaction. In terms of transferability the pattern of 
ethnomethods giving rise to the vague it, may be transferable to other situations of 
scientific discovery. It is this component of the situation I would refer to as the 
general phenomenon, with potential for transferability.  
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The transferability criteria in ethnomethodology relates to the nature of the 
general phenomenon arising from the researcher’s work. It is the researcher’s 
phenomenon constructed from interpretation of the data, but not the lived social 
reality, that may be transferable to other contexts. Having established a general 
phenomenon its transferability is dependent on the criteria suggested by Guba & 
Lincoln (1989). Transferability refers to the possibility for applying the findings of 
the study to different contexts, and this is based on a judgment about the degree of 
similarity between the original and transferee contexts. Such judgments are made by 
transferee researchers when looking to apply findings to their context. 
The primary method for establishing the degree of transferability is the extent 
of thick description (Guba & Lincoln, 1989) enabling other researchers to determine 
the similarity of contexts. In the context of the study in this dissertation similarity 
may be based on factors such as the cultural and demographic background of 
students, school culture, the context of school science, the types of analogies being 
studied, and the material and architectural technologies available within the 
classroom. Thick description of data were achieved in this study by presenting 
detailed transcriptions as whole sequences in the appendices and providing images 
relating to particular fragments of data in the analysis. My detailed description of 
data in this study enables any general phenomenon to be evaluated by others, in 
terms of its transferability. 
4.5.3 Dependability. 
Dependability relates to the stability of data over time (Guba & Lincoln, 
1989). Evaluation of dependability is achieved if a disinterested observer who looks 
at the raw data could see the same patterns as the original researcher. To achieve 
dependability, data in this study is presented to document, as closely as possible, the 
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lived experiences at the centre of this study. This is achieved by detailed 
transcription of conversation including simultaneous ethnomethods such as physical 
gesture, speech gesture, speech style and entrainment. Transcriptions are 
supplemented with still images aligned with transcript data. This enables presentation 
of data as a close representation of lived experiences for interpretation by 
disinterested observers. 
Dependability was enhanced in this study by practices of transparency 
whereby transcripts and visual data are drawn directly from the study context and 
made available for public interpretation and confirmation (cf. Guba & Lincoln, 
1989). This is achieved to some extent throughout this study via peer debriefing with 
supervisors and the presentation of data samples at three public conferences, as 
indicated above. Presentation of extended extracts and parts of transcripts also makes 
raw data available for reader scrutiny. The book chapter addressing my methodology 
also presented samples of data, and these were independently reviewed by the book 
editors as part of the publication process (cf. Davis, 2016). 
4.5.4 Confirmability. 
Confirmability is concerned with ensuring data, interpretations and findings 
are grounded in the contexts and situations of the study. This is achievable by 
making raw data and the processes used to reduce data, available to external 
reviewers for inspection and confirmation (Guba & Lincoln, 1989). To facilitate 
confirmability research methods comprise the establishment of an internal audit trail 
whereby raw data were coded and cross referenced to reduced data to maintain 
traceable links between levels of summarization. For example, in my working 
transcripts, turns of conversation were written with the time of each turn referenced 
to the time on respective video data.  Moments were flagged on each video where 
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still images were possibly relevant. As still images were collected from the video 
data, the time point of each image was recorded as part of the file name for the 
electronically stored image. In this way the transcripts, still images and videos were 
cross-referenced for latter retrieval and analysis. This cross-referencing system 
supports this dissertation and future publications by enabling extraction of data 
aligned across transcripts, images and video. 
4.5.5 Authenticity. 
Authenticity of data in this study was evaluated in terms of the member’s 
ability to contribute their own ethnomethods as part of the construction of situations 
and their power to contribute through these situations (cf. Guba & Lincoln, 1989). At 
a practical level this authenticity was achieved by the structure of group situations in 
my science classrooms being naturalistic. That is, lessons were conducted in 
accordance with the unit plan and formal curriculum. Once the video and audio 
equipment were set up at the start of each lesson, the enacted practices of class 
members were part of normal classroom situations. In these situations I was busy 
teaching the entire class across a number of groups.  Given the inquiry activities 
within these classes my focus was on teaching, transition between activities, and 
student safety.  My role as a researcher did not emerge until after the data were 
collected.  
The authenticity of data was further enhanced through the analysis phase of 
the study by the presumptions of ethnomethodology noted above. Specifically, my 
treatment of ethnomethods with indifference enabled me to position my analysis 
without making value judgements.  The application of indifference enabled me to 
focus on what was being achieved by particular ethnomethods rather than being 
concerned about the nature of ethnomethods.  
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4.6  Study Limitation: The Act of Writing 
 An inherent limitation to this study arises through my role as an interpretive 
researcher who claims to capture an understanding of the “emotional essence of 
analogical reasoning”, and to report on this understanding. My understanding of this 
emotional essence was derived from my subjective lived experience as the 
teacher/researcher of my own science classes and my subsequent analyses of data 
that included the act of writing (van Manen, 2015). On this basis my subjective 
experience as a researcher embedded in the classroom contributes strongly to the 
quality of my understanding (cf. section 4.5.1.3).  
I recognized however that the act of writing in interpretive research 
establishes a distance between myself as the researcher, and the life-world I seek to 
describe and analyze (van Manen, 2015). By creating this distance the act of writing 
contributes to a degree of objectivity that I also recognize in my data analysis in the 
context of scientific objectivity, addressed later in sections 5.4.2.3 and 6.3.1. In the 
context of interpretive inquiry, this is a limitation on achieving absolute subjectivity 
in the expression of my understanding of the emotional essence of analogical 
reasoning. 
 A positive offset to the limitation imposed by my act of writing is that my 
understanding becomes accessible and sharable with a broader science education 
audience. This situates my writing not just for my own purposes of doing 
interpretative research, but also to make the subjectivity of my research and my lived 
experiences of that research accessible to others. Like the students I studied in this 
investigation, my selection of language positioned me as a researcher in relation to 
the topic of my inquiry. It also positioned me in relation to future readers of science 
education research who may have different ontological and epistemological 
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perspectives. To reach this audience my act of writing in the style I have selected 
brings my understanding closer to the audience I hope to reach.  In this sense, my act 
of writing has, to a degree, distanced me from my subjective experience, but 
potentially shifted the explanation of my understanding closer to my audience. In this 
sense my act of writing, including the language and writing style I have selected, 
aims to communicate my subjective experience to others, and to situate the meaning 
of that experience in the context of science education from where my experience 
originated. 
4.7 Chapter Summary 
 In this chapter I outlined the context and ethical issues relevant to this study 
as a participant/researcher investigation within my own science classes. I provided 
examples of the methods used in reducing my data from raw video and audio data 
into transcripts using conventions of conversation analysis and de-identified still 
images. These initial data reductions were further enhanced by extracting episodes of 
interaction as my unit of analysis. These episodes and fragments of episodes varied 
in structure with sequential and non-sequential turns of interaction, and I 
demonstrated these using data from Garfinkel et al. (1981).    
 Once episodes of interaction were selected and their documentation refined to 
reflect best the actual lived experience of group members, I analyzed these data by 
focusing on specific aspects of enacted ethnomethods. These included physical 
gesture, speech gesture, style of speech gesture (prosody) and entrainment of 
gestures.  This further reduction of the data involved drawing on conceptual 
resources from previous studies as a way of understanding specific ethnomethods 
from a researcher perspective. These conceptual resources were drawn from studies 
in related bodies of literature. 
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 Finally I outlined my quality criteria for evaluating data using a framework 
including credibility, transferability, dependability, confirmability and authenticity. 
These criteria were based on Guba and Lincoln’s (1989) fourth generation evaluation 
framework with modification to account for the key concepts and presumptions 
embedded in ethnomethodology. For example member checks were not part of my 
data quality criteria due to the taken-for-granted status of ethnomethods in social 
interaction. Member checks were replaced with my researcher competence as a 
native member of the science classes where the study was conducted. I also 
explained the ethnomethodological approach to transferability. This was explained 
by illustrating the difference between situated features of a setting and general 
phenomenon constructed by the researcher through data analysis. My quality criteria 
for evaluating data therefore reflect a consensus perspective between qualitative 
research in general and the specific features of ethnomethodology.  
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Chapter 5 
Analogical Reasoning: Analysis and Findings 
5.0 Introduction 
 In this chapter I outline my data analysis, addressing the following research 
questions: 
1. How is shared understanding about concepts achieved in localized 
situations between students, and students and teacher? 
2. How are conceptual networks in the form of a family of concepts, 
hierarchy, and transference of shared understanding about concepts 
achieved in localized situations of analogical reasoning? 
3. How are conceptual networks in the form of a family of concepts, 
hierarchy, and transference of shared understanding about concepts 
related to the achievement of difference and similarity in localized 
situations of analogical reasoning? 
My analyses focus on three separate data sets of group interaction leading to 
or involving analogical reasoning as a fundamental human phenomenon (section 
3.1). These group interactions were identified as: 
● Beta decay sketch map. This group included me and Year 9 students with 
pseudonyms of Chris and Pete. Chris and Pete were working on an 
assignment involving online research on the topic of carbon-14 and beta 
decay. The analogy was evident via a spontaneous drawing. 
● Beta decay hand gestures. This group included me and a Year 9 student 
with a pseudonym of Tim. Tim was in the same class as Chris and was 
working on his assignment involving online research on the topic of 
carbon-14 and beta decay. The analogy was observed as spontaneous 
hand gestures. 
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● Analogical modelling of ocean currents. This situation involved a 
teacher planned model, but analysis focused on spontaneous analogy 
within interactions. This group included four Year 10 students with 
pseudonyms of Dre, Shady, Simon, and Sam. I also joined the group at 
different moments. The students were conducting an observational 
inquiry using a beaker of warming water with tea leaves and foam beads 
as an analogical model for ocean currents. Students were given the 
equipment and a simple worksheet requiring them to make observations, 
explain what they observed, and later, think about what this model may 
resemble in the context of global systems (the unit topic). 
Analyses of these situations of group interaction are presented in five 
sections. In these five sections I analyse the data to address the research questions 
sequentially, and this builds the key ideas of this study. Research question 1 is 
addressed across the first two sections, entitled finding each other (Section 5.1). 
Finding-each-other is a notion I develop throughout section 5.1 to describe a 
collection of ethnomethods experienced by members of a group that establishes a 
starting point for analogical reasoning. I analyse finding-each-other across the two 
different situations that involve interactions about carbon-14 and beta decay. These 
two situations contribute to an understanding about how different starting points may 
be defined, with different students, when teaching the same formal curriculum. 
Building on the two different start points from finding-each-other in section 
5.1, I explore two different analogies of carbon-14 and beta decay by analysing how 
objects and landmarks on the map-in-use are constructed in section 5.2. This section 
also addresses research question one and outlines key ideas from the data that are 
used in later sections, and in chapter 6.  
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Research question 2 is also addressed across two sections. Section 5.3 
addresses conceptual networks, hierarchy and transference in the context of my Year 
10 group exploring an analogical model for ocean currents. The analysis in section 
5.3 builds establishes descriptions of undramatic emotional energy by exploring 
emotional energy and objectivity, as well as transference of emotional energy. I 
complete my response to research question two in section 5.4, by exploring the  
formation of a family of concepts (section 5.4). In this section I continue to analyse 
data from my Year 10 class, as I explain how ideas and concepts are included or 
excluded from the group as the intensity of emotional energy change. I also provide a 
detailed analysis of the formation of hierarchy in enacted practices involving 
language, distance and emotional energy. 
Finally, I address research question 3 in the section entitled difference and 
similarity (section 5.5). This section brings together the analysis of sections 5.1 
through 5.4 to explain the co-construction of difference and similarity in analogical 
reasoning. This final section continues analysis of my Year 10 group and explores 
how emotional energy contributes to enacted analogical reasoning. 
5.1 Finding-Each-Other 
My exploration of the following episodes, I have called finding-each-other, 
addresses research question one by establishing how shared understanding about 
concepts was achieved in episodes that preceded analogical reasoning. Finding-each-
other describes situations of disjuncture or disruption in the flow of ethnomethods, 
where disjuncture was an achievement within the learning situation. This disjuncture 
contributed to episodes where each group member was seeking knowledge about the 
other in relation to concepts. Episodes of analogical reasoning in my study were 
preceded by episodes of finding-each-other. These finding-each-other episodes 
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illustrated situations where group members established some basic shared 
understanding as a foundation for subsequent interaction involving analogical 
reasoning. To explore situations of finding-each-other I have analyzed two different 
situations. The first involved Chris, Pete and me (section 5.1.1), and the second 
involved Tim and me (5.1.2). 
5.1.1 Finding-each-other before the beta decay sketch map. 
5.1.1.1  Achieving uncertainty.  
This situation involved two Year 9 students, Chris and Pete, sitting adjacent 
to one another, each at a computer within my science classroom.  They were working 
on an assignment involving online research to answer questions on the topic of 
carbon-14 and beta decay.  I was at the other side of the classroom when Chris 
initiated the following interaction by calling for my assistance. In episode C01 
fragment 01 (below) Chris asked me to ‘explain the half-life process’ at turn 1, by 
reading directly from the assignment task sheet and gesturing with his index finger at 
the task sheet (turn 2). This directed my attention as I approached Chris and replied 
at turn 3 below. 
Episode C01, fragment 01 
Turn Speaker Transcript 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Chris 
 
Mr Davis 
 
Pete 
Mr Davis 
Chris 
((reading from task sheet)) Explain the half-life process (.) what do they mean by that 
((points at task sheet)) 
Okay_(.) so′: half′ life′(.) remember we did that thing with the uhm:: 
((positions his hand like he’s holding something)) 
Xs ((shakes his hand from side to side)) 
the Xs ((shakes his hand up and down)) when you were shaking that thing 
((Nodding)) 
In turns 1 and 2 Chris read verbatim from his assignment sheet, the question 
presented on the assignment task sheet, as if it were Chris’s own question (turns 1 & 
2). Through these gestures (speech gesture and hand gesture) Chris’s utterance had 
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the effect of revealing something about his conceptual locality (3.1.4.2) in terms of 
what was unknown to him. My initial response was to utter ‘okay(.)’ (turn 3) 
indicating my  momentary readiness to move in a different direction from Chris. 
Beach (1995) explained how the term ‘okay’ is commonly used in conversation to 
acknowledge the first speaker’s position, but then to position the second speaker to 
take the conversation in a different direction.  
A change in direction occurred in episode C01 when I stated ‘so′: half′ life′(.) 
remember we did that thing with the uhm::’ (turn 3), moving the discussion in a 
different direction from the one initiated by Chris. I changed the direction of the 
conversation at turn 3 by directing Chris’s attention to a prior learning experience 
about radioactive half-life. This redirection was evident, not by Chris’s response, but 
by Pete’s interjected response about his recollection of ‘Xs’ (turn 5) in reference to a 
prior learning experience involving coins with an ‘X’ on one side. 
At the moment where turn 2 was complete Chris had announced his 
uncertainty about the topic, by seeking an answer from me about half-life. At this 
same moment I became uncertain about Chris’s conceptual locality (3.2.3) as evident 
by my response at turns 3-4 where I referred Chris to a prior learning experience. 
Instead of resolving Chris’s uncertainty with an answer, I responded by re-directing 
him to a prior experience (turn 3-4), and in this way I was inviting Chris to confirm 
his recollection of the prior learning experience. My response was not what Chris 
was seeking because I did not answer the question he had asked (turn 1-2), and for 
this reason his uncertainty at turn 1-2 was unresolved. At the same time, Chris’s 
response to me was not what I was seeking because Pete responded to me, instead of 
Chris (turn 5), leaving my uncertainty about Chris’s locality unresolved. We were 
both in a state of uncertainty at the completion of turn 4.     
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If I had answered Chris’s question directly with his requested information 
(turn 1), I would have revealed my conceptual locality to Chris. For this reason, 
Chris’s question may be considered an interactional technique, or ethnomethod, for 
finding me. However, when I changed the conversational direction, this positioned 
Chris to respond by revealing something more about his conceptual location to me. 
For this reason, my redirection of Chris may be considered an ethnomethod for 
finding Chris. Collectively, turns 1 to 4 illustrate the way Chris and I co-constructed 
uncertainty about one another’s locality and required responses from each other in 
order to find each other. 
A different outcome from the situation in turns 1 to 4 was observable in the 
way Pete responded in turn 5 to my re-direction of Chris. Pete responded by stating 
‘Xs’ and shaking his hand horizontally as though he were holding a cup (turn 5). I 
responded to Pete by copying his gesture and saying to Chris ‘the Xs when you were 
shaking that thing’ (turn 6). By imitating Pete with the hand gesture and the use of 
the term ‘Xs’, I was demonstrating entrainment and solidarity with Pete. Entrainment 
becomes evident through the alignment of gestures including speech gesture and/or 
style of speech (cf. Roth and Tobin, 2010). The entrainment of gestures around 
shared ideas is established as evidence for solidarity or emotional energy in 
classroom situations (cf. Milne and Otieno, 2007). In the present classroom situation, 
my imitation of Pete with hand gestures and the speech gesture of ‘Xs’, about the 
idea of the prior learning experience provided evidence of emotional energy.   
Both the formal content of these gestures and the emotional energy 
experienced through these gestures, provide an example of Pete and I establishing 
emotional energy around our shared ideas. The experience of emotional energy 
became a central feature of how we understood each other in relation to our shared 
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idea. Understanding each other’s conceptual locality was achieved through an 
experience of emotional energy about the idea we were gesturing. As a science 
teacher if I were to account for this in a formal sense, I may refer to this situation as 
Pete and I recalling or retrieving a shared familiar concept or experience. In contrast 
to this formal account, these embodied sounds and motions (ethnomethods) illustrate 
how shared understanding of a familiar concept was co-constructed between Pete and 
me.  
 This achievement of understanding each other’s conceptual locality was the 
outcome of a collection of ethnomethods I call, finding-each-other. Yet the 
ethnomethods of finding-each-other are unique to each particular classroom 
situation. They do not always result in an immediate outcome of shared 
understanding about a particular idea, as was evident in the continuing situation 
between Chris and me. 
Turn 7, fragment 01, above, provides an example of how practices of finding-
each-other may continue between different group members. In response to Pete and I 
(turns 5-6), Chris moved his head vertically in an up and down arc within the sagittal 
plane (turn 7) or nodded, suggesting affirmation, approval or affiliation between 
speakers (Darwin, 1872; Stivers, 2008). Aligned with the suggestion of affiliation, 
this nodding gesture may also be interpreted as an acknowledgement of acceptance 
of the situation, or understanding of the ideas (Kang, Hallman, Son & Black, 2013; 
Roth & Tobin, 2010). To the extent that the nod was not associated with immediate 
disjuncture, it may be interpreted in this situation as indicating some level of shared 
understanding between Chris and me. Yet, in the pedagogical context of this 
situation the nod remained problematic. It was problematic because, as the science 
teacher, I needed to identify Chris’s conceptual locality (understanding) in relation to 
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the science concept, rather than simply gain his acceptance of the conversation.  The 
nod on its own was ambiguous as it did not give any clear indication as to Chris’s 
conceptual locality. I needed something more, such as a speech gesture, in order to 
confirm Chris’s locality. Unlike the situation with Pete, the limitations of Chris’s 
gesture at turn 7 sustained my uncertainty about Chris’s conceptual locality. This was 
uncertainty I wanted to resolve.   
5.1.1.2  Remembering for Chris.  
The conversation initiated in fragment 01 above continued after turn 7 with 
my utterance ‘and you drew a graph, and every time you threw the things ((coins 
with an ‘X’ on one side)) you lost about half of them’. This utterance is shown at 
turn 8, fragment 02 below. Fragment 02 consists of a series of utterances where I 
recounted a prior learning experience on behalf of Chris. 
 Episode C01, fragment 02 
Turn Speaker Transcript 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
Mr Davis 
Chris 
Mr Davis 
 
 
 
Chris 
Mr Davis 
and you drew a graph, and every time you threw the things you lost about half of them 
((Nods)) 
The same thing happens with these things(.) ((open palm hand pointing to the task sheet)) 
So when you break down carbon-14(.) when half of it is broken down that’s one half-life 
so if you’ve got a hundred atoms and then there’s only fifty left that’s a half-life so the 
actual half-life of carbon-14 is [about]   
                                                       [about] 5600 years   
about that 5730 okay(.) so: that’s what half-life is:  ((3.39SPS)) 
 By stating my recollection of Chris’s prior experiences during a different 
lesson (turns 10 to 13), I was creating an account of that prior experience on behalf 
of Chris. In this pedagogical context my recollection may have assisted Chris to 
resolve his own question from turn 1 fragment 01.  In response to my account, Chris 
nodded vertically at turn 9 (like he did earlier at turn 7 of fragment 01) and then at 
turn 14 he completed my utterance. The completion of my utterance by Chris was 
evident in the overlap of ‘[about]’, and the continuation of his utterance with ‘5600 
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years’ (turns 13 & 14). The overlap and the continuation from this overlap are speech 
gestures providing some evidence of entrainment about ideas indicative of emotional 
energy (cf. Milne & Otieno, 2007; Tobin, 2006). This was indicative of a moment 
where Chris and I may have come close to finding-each-other.  
 These moments of speech gesture entrainment in fragment 02, above, 
provided evidence that Chris and I were beginning to achieve a shared understanding 
of each other’s conceptual localities. That is, it was evident we were beginning to 
find each other in relation to the idea of the half-life of carbon-14, and Chris’s prior 
learning experience. But this interpretation of entrainment in this particular situation 
may be interpreted beyond the speech gestures. The entrained speech gestures in this 
situation may be indicative of entrainment upon concepts (ideas) within the content 
of the speech. As the speech gesture gave evidence of entrainment at that particular 
moment, the emotional energy was around the ideas Chris and I were enacting. As 
Chris made the utterance ‘[about] 5600 years’ (turn 14), he provided evidence of his 
shared focus with me, about the ideas I had uttered immediately prior (turns 10-13). 
This entrainment on shared ideas or concepts was confirmed as I continued at turn 15 
with ‘about that 5730 okay(.) so: that’s what half-life is:’. In turn 15, I confirmed 
Chris’s utterance (turn 14) by stating a similar number and then using ‘okay’ with a 
0.1 second pause followed by an elongated ‘so:’ to move the conversation toward a 
conclusion.  
As a collection of ethnomethods the speech gestures evident in turns 13-15 
were indicative of what I call conceptual entrainment. My notion of conceptual 
entrainment is supported by evidence from experimental psychology via the concept 
of lexical entrainment of conversation (Brennan & Clark, 1996). Essentially, the 
words we use act as proposals for our conceptualization of objects. Acceptance of 
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particular words into the interaction establishes evidence of entrainment not just on 
the words, but on the concepts they propose to describe (Brennan & Clark, 1996). 
The experience of conceptual entrainment between Chris and me in this situation 
added to the evidence of physical entrainment via our co-presence and overlapping 
speech gesture. Taken together, I have interpreted physical and conceptual 
entrainment as evidence of undramatic emotional energy (section 3.2.2.1) about 
shared ideas in this situation.  
This interpretation of emotional energy in my study is developed further 
throughout this dissertation. At this point I make the observation that this innovation 
is in relation to the undramatic character of the physical and conceptual entrainment 
illustrated in my data. In the empirical examples most commonly cited by Collins 
(2004), emotional energy is illustrated as a dramatic and highly visible phenomenon. 
However, Collins (2004) specifically stated that despite being often unnoticed, 
undramatic emotional energy was the more common and most important form of 
emotional energy. Collins (2004) described undramatic emotional energy as a 
subdued, focused, undramatic collective emotional energy. In studying students in 
science classroom contexts, Olitsky (2007) also suggested that emotional energy 
would most likely be present in an undramatic form. As illustrated in the example of 
conceptual entrainment above, undramatic emotional energy becomes observable as 
a high level of mutual focus and shared concentration about a concept. On this basis, 
I propose that my notion of conceptual entrainment developed from the data in 
fragment 02 above, is an example of this undramatic emotional energy about ideas, 
concepts or objects. 
This momentary example of conceptual entrainment between Chris and I in 
fragment 02, was indicative of some progress towards finding-each-other. It was 
149 
 
indicative of taking a step closer to resolving uncertainty about our conceptual 
localities. But this example was only related to one particular aspect of the 
uncertainty Chris had been attempting to resolve. The practices of finding-each-other 
therefore continued. 
5.1.1.3  Giving vague directions.  
My statement at turn 15, fragment 02 was immediately followed by turns 16 
and 17 in episode C01, fragment 03, below. In turn 16 Chris stated ‘0I don’t 
understand
0’ and I responded with ‘ˉdon’t ˉunderstand ˉwhat’ (turn 17). Chris’s 
statement that he did not understand was a reversion to his initial question that took 
me by surprise and became a source of frustration for me as outlined below. 
Episode C01, fragment 03 
Turn Speaker Transcript 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
Chris 
Mr Davis 
Chris 
Mr Davis 
 
 
Chris 
Mr Davis 
 
Chris 
Mr Davis 
Chris 
0I don’t understand0 ((3.33 SPS)) 
 ˉdon’t ˉunderstand ˉwhat ((5.75 SPS)) 
This bit here ((points to the research question on the task sheet)) ((2.72SPS)) 
okay‛ ((pulls up a chair and sits beside Chris)) okay (5.00) so what its really asking you 
identify the half-life is basically what is the half-life number (.) we already know = and 
then describe it= so explain what it is = so the idea is =  
yeah 
and that’s all you have to explain for half-life (.) you don’t have to actually explain what 
beta decay is in this section 
so what about this ((points to the section on Beta Decay)) 
so this is actually where you need to explain Beta Decay okay ((pointing at the task sheet)) 
alright ((nods)) 
At turn 16, fragment 03 (above), Chris was referring back to his original 
question from the task sheet in turn 1, fragment 01, as evident by the conversation 
that followed where I explained what the question was asking in terms of half-life 
(turns 19-21 & 23-24). The quieter speech gesture by Chris at turn 16, showed he 
was seeking a more complete answer from me, rather than a simple recount of a prior 
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learning experience. At this point, Chris’s gesture serves as a continuation of the 
initial uncertainty he had created, which required me to make a further response.  
As the teacher/researcher I recall my feelings at this point (turn 17) in the 
discussion as a feeling of frustration. Roth and Tobin (2010) have demonstrated 
frustration through the analysis of prosody (vocal resonance and speech rate) and 
note its association with challenges to beliefs.  My frustration was evident in the tone 
and rate of my speech response. As Chris quietly uttered ‘0I don’t understand0’ (turn 
16) at 3.33 syllables per second, I responded with ‘ˉdon’t ˉunderstand ˉwhat’ (turn 
17) at 5.85 syllables per second. My utterance at turn 17 was delivered in a flat tone 
as indicated in the transcript by ‘ˉ’.  In addition my rate of speech was 5.85 SPS, 
compared to Chris’s rate of 3.33 SPS and my average speech rate for this episode 
that was 4.24 SPS (Appendix F). This misalignment in rates of speech, differences in 
tone and feelings I experienced, suggested Chris and I were experiencing further 
disjuncture in our conversation. This disjuncture illustrated that Chris wanted a more 
complete answer to resolve his uncertainty discussed in Fragment 01.  
My response at turn 19 was to utter ‘okay‛’, with a falling pitch, to sit beside 
Chris, utter another ‘okay’, and then pause for five seconds. As indicated earlier, 
utterances of ‘okay’ may be associated with readiness to change direction (Beach, 
1995), and on this occasion I used an extended pause to determine what that direction 
might be (turn 19). I then continued at turns 19-21 with a further recount of what had 
been previously discussed about half-life in fragment 02. This recount, gave Chris no 
new information as evidenced by the content of turns 19 to 21. Further, it continued a 
pattern of practices where I appeared to be actively creating uncertainty as evident by 
continued responses, directing Chris to think about his prior learning experiences, 
rather than providing Chris with direct answers. This vagueness was further 
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reinforced as Chris moved on to his next question on beta decay at turn 25. I 
responded with ‘so this is actually where you need to explain beta decay okay’ (turn 
26). This response was effectively a restatement of the question. With the phrase 
‘you need to explain’ I was not offering an elaboration of his initial response. Instead 
I was telling Chris to do the work himself. But before I left Chris in his situation of 
uncertainty, I questioned him more directly to confirm Chris’s conceptual locality on 
this particular part of the topic.  
5.1.1.4  Questioning Chris.  
Before leaving Chris I asked ‘do you understand what beta decay is’ (turn 28, 
fragment 04, below). This question became a source of disjuncture when it received a 
non-committal ‘sorta:: ((sort of))’ from Chris at turn 29 and then a prolonged silence 
of four seconds at turn 30 (Fragment 04, below). Through this situation further 
uncertainty was achieved as shown in Fragment 04: 
Episode C01, fragment 04 
Turn Speaker Transcript 
28 
29 
 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
Mr Davis 
Chris 
 
Chris 
Pete 
 
 
Mr Davis 
so: do you understand what Beta Decay is ((sits back in chair, looking at Chris)) 
sorta:: ((sort of; leans forward and starts searching on the computer))  
4.0 
Pete do you know what beta decay is 
ah: beta decay I KNOW what that is (.) its uhm ((faces computer and conducts searches on 
the internet)) (.) uhm 
6.5 
Lets lets have a think about it (.) draw a picture (.) that might be easier 
Chris responded to the question with ‘sorta::’ (turn 29), and stared silently at 
his computer for four seconds (turn 30) before referring the question to Pete in turn 
31. Pete then responded with ‘ah: beta decay I KNOW what that is (.) its uhm(.) 
uhm’ and then directed his gaze onto his computer screen (turn 32). Both Pete and 
Chris sat in silence with faces directed at their computers for a further 6.5 seconds 
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(turn 33). I sat silently for more than 10 seconds throughout turns 30 to 33, observing 
Chris and Pete.  
In this situation Chris’s silence was received by me as a continuation of 
uncertainty about Chris’s conceptual locality. This was evident in my response at 
turn 34 where I stated ‘lets have a think about it (.) draw a picture (.) that might be 
easier’. At this moment I was changing the pedagogical strategy pursued throughout 
this episode of interaction. I was signalling my intention to provide an explanation of 
beta decay using a diagram. By responding in this way I indicated acceptance of my 
own understanding of Chris’s conceptual locality. 
5.1.2 Finding-each-other before beta decay hand gestures. 
5.1.2.1  Catching up.  
This situation (episode B01) involved myself and Tim. Tim was a Year 9 
student in the same class as Chris and Pete.  He was sitting at a computer and 
working on the same assignment task, approximately 4 meters away. Immediately 
before episode B01, Tim had engaged in eight and a half minutes of reading and note 
taking using his assessment task sheet, the internet and his notebook. Like Chris in 
section 5.1.1 above, Tim was working on his assignment task on the topic of carbon-
14 and beta decay. 
Episode B01 commenced with Tim speaking as I was attempting to sit down 
beside him. As shown in fragment 01 below, Tim uttered the words ‘so:: when that’ 
as I pulled my chair out from the desk (turn 1). At this moment Tim had commenced 
the conversation before I had time to focus on his utterances. Tim continued with ‘by 
emitted electrons’ as I sat and adjusted my reading glasses (turn 1). By adjusting my 
glasses I was still positioning for the conversation, Tim had already commenced. 
Tim then continued in turns 2-3 with ‘it affects one of the neutrons and carbon 
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fourteen decays into (.) uhm’. At turn 4, I finally responded with ‘yep [yep]’. Across 
these turns, Tim had commenced the conversation before I had time to focus on his 
ideas, and this set the scene for an episode of interaction where I was catching up 
with Tim. See episode B01, fragment 01 below. 
Episode B01, fragment 01 
Turn Speaker Transcript 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
Tim 
 
 
Mr Davis 
Tim 
Mr Davis 
Tim 
Mr Davis 
Tim 
so:: when that ((Mr Davis pulls out his chair at ‘so’)) by emitted electrons ((Mr Davis sits 
and adjusted his glasses at ‘electrons’)) it affects one of the neutrons and carbon fourteen 
decays into (.) uhm   ((2.70 SPS)) 
yep [yep]                              ((1.00 SPS)   
        [nitr]ogen fourteen (.)  ((5.00 SPS) 
so::: (1.5) ((2.00 SPS)) 
would that be the process ((3.00 SPS) 
ˊsorry ((3.33 SPS)) 
would that be the process ((3.00 SPS)) 
Through turns 1 to 3 above, Tim was making utterances to provide 
descriptions of what he had previously read about carbon-14 and beta decay. Tim 
began to speak at turn 1 before I had time to sit down. My first response was to utter 
‘yep [yep]’ at turn 4. The utterance of ‘yep’ is similar to the utterance of ‘yeah’, 
interpreted in conversational contexts as having three possible meanings (Lambertz, 
2011). ‘Yep’ may indicate alignment in terms of shared opinion, it may indicate 
agreement with a particular idea stronger than alignment, or it may act as a continuer. 
As a continuer an utterance such as ‘yeah’ or ‘yep’ would keep the conversation 
flowing. The utterance enables the listener to show interest while allowing the 
speaker to continue (cf. Lambertz, 2011). 
In the context of fragment 01 it was most likely my utterance of ‘yep’ acted 
as a simple continuer. That Tim took this as a continuer was evident in the way Tim 
continued at line 5 where he overlapped my second ‘[yep]’ with the start of the word 
‘[nitr]ogen.’ Tim gave no time for any further response by me, as he took my 
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utterance as a continuer, and maintained the flow of his statements. In addition to this 
continuation, Tim explicitly asked for confirmation of agreement at turn 7 with 
‘would that be the process?’ This question at turn 7 suggested my initial ‘yep’ at line 
4 was taken by Tim as a continuer, as he still needed to seek agreement at turn 7.   
Tim’s acceptance of ‘yep’ as a continuer was linked to his own speech 
gestures in fragment 01. In turn 1 Tim was presenting his ideas sourced from his 
readings. Tim appeared enthusiastic to present his ideas, evident in the way he 
accepted my ‘yep [yep]’ continuer and overlapped my second ‘[yep]’ with the 
beginning of the word nitrogen (turn 5). In this situation this overlap was different 
from the overlap by Chris in section 5.1.1. In the present overlap at turns 4-5, there 
were no shared ideas or shared concepts evident. For this reason this overlap did not 
provide evidence of entrainment or emotional energy.  On the contrary the lack of 
conceptual entrainment was indicative of low emotional energy.  Tim was not 
overlapping with my ideas at this moment. He was overlapping my utterances and 
presenting his own ideas as a way of confirming them as valid knowledge, evident at 
turn 7 where Tim asked me ‘would that be the process?’ At this moment Tim had 
briefly presented his ideas about beta decay and was now asking for confirmation of 
his ideas as knowledge.  In a map-in-use sense, he had made his conceptual locality 
(understanding) public and was seeking to know if it was close to my conceptual 
locality (understanding) as the science teacher (3.2.3). 
In contrast to Tim’s confirmation-seeking gestures, my speech gestures in 
turns 4, 6 and 8 provided evidence that I was still orientating myself to Tim, and in a 
sense, trying to catch up to Tim in terms of his conceptual locality (3.2.3). This was 
observed as disjuncture in fragment 01 starting with my ‘yep [yep]’ speech gesture 
(turn 4). By enabling Tim to continue, my speech gesture at turn 4 delayed my 
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obligation to respond to Tim. For me, this ethnomethod buys time in a moment where 
Tim was eager to present his ideas and receive confirmation.   
The notions of buying time and catching up were further evident in my next 
two utterances at turns 6 and 8. At turn 5, Tim uttered ‘nitrogen fourteen(.)’ with a 
momentary pause. I responded with ‘so:::’ elongated over 0.3 seconds followed by a 
pause of  1.5 seconds (turn 6). My response added nothing to the conversation, 
except to slow the conversation by creating a pause when I extended the vowel sound 
on ‘so’. Tim then continued by explicitly seeking confirmation of his ideas by asking 
‘would that be the process’ (turn 7).  
My response was to utter the word ‘ˊsorry’ at turn 8, with a rising pitch, 
shown by using ‘ ˊ ’ in the transcript. The prosodic feature of pitch in this situation 
was consistent with other studies associating it with the speakers’ attempt to resolve 
disjuncture, after their ethnomethods were responsible for the disjuncture in the first 
instance (Szczepek Reed, 2010). Disjuncture in fragment 01 was created by my turns 
4, 6 and 8 as I delayed the timing of my response to Tim. At this moment in the 
conversation the word ‘ˊsorry’ acted only as a further extension of time because it 
added no meaning to Tim’s concepts. It merely invited Tim to repeat his question 
(turn 9). As this was my third utterance where no conceptual meaning related to 
science was added to the conversation, ‘sorry’ with a rising pitch also acted as an 
apology for the disjuncture. As an ethnomethod ‘ˊsorry’ continued the disjuncture, 
extended time and then repaired the disjuncture for the conversation to continue.   
 A pattern of disjuncture similar to turns 4 and 6 was evident at two further 
turns where I responded with ‘uh::m:: yeah:’  (turn 16) and  ‘yep:: ‘ (turn 18) as I 
read some of Tim’s notes in the turns between fragment 01 and 02 (See Appendix B 
for intervening turns). These ethnomethods of disjuncture continued into fragment 02 
156 
 
below. Within fragment 02 final resolution of disjuncture was achieved as I caught 
up with Tim’s conceptual locality.  
5.1.2.2  Mr Davis catches up.  
The achievement of ethnomethods in fragment 01 was to give me (i.e., Mr 
Davis) time to catch up with Tim. During that time I was scanning Tim’s notes until I 
found a point where I could question Tim’s work, and catch up. This became evident 
as I pointed to Tim’s notes and asked ‘so what’s happening there ((glances at 
notebook)) in that last bit’ at turn 20, below. Tim responded with ‘is beta decay (.) in 
beta decay the electron decays and then the beta decay .hhh ((shakes head slightly)) 
no so it breaks down the neutron’ (turn 21 & 22). 
Episode B01, fragment 02 
Turn Speaker Transcript 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
Mr Davis 
Tim 
 
Mr Davis 
Tim 
so what’s happening there ((glances at notebook)) in that last bit ((3.33SPS)) 
is beta decay (.) in beta decay the electron decays and then the beta decay .hhh ((shakes 
head slightly)) no(.) so it breaks down the neutron ((3.73SPS)) 
yeah well what happens is one of the neutrons [breaks up] ((4.00SPS)) 
                                                                                     [becomes unstable] ((6.67)) 
Tim's response at turn 21-22 was the point where I caught up with Tim. His 
response at that moment was characterized by uncertainty, indicating a boundary of 
his current conceptual locality. This helped me form an understanding of his 
conceptual locality. This uncertainty was evident by Tim's pause after the first 
utterance of ‘beta decay(.)’ and his inhalation while shaking his head ‘.hhh ((shakes 
head slightly))’ (turns 21 & 22). In addition to this, after shaking his head Tim 
changed direction in his answer by rejecting his first utterances and making a new 
statement with ‘no(.) so it breaks down the neutron’ (turn 22). The ‘no(.)’ served as a 
self-correction as evidenced by his next statement about the neutron breaking down. 
Tim’s uncertainty in turns 21-22 was followed by my response at turn 23 
where I presented an explanation for Tim.  At turn 23 I explained ‘yeah well what 
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happens is one of the neutrons [breaks up]’. By making this speech gesture I was 
now revealing my own conceptual locality (understanding), thereby enabling Tim to 
confirm his conceptual understandings, as knowledge, in relation to me as the 
teacher. This was the moment where our practices of finding-each-other had 
achieved shared knowledge of our respective conceptual localities.  
This achievement became evident as the conversation changed in character. 
Initially, disjuncture was prolific, and this changed to a conversation flowing with 
signs of emotional energy and conceptual entrainment. The conceptual entrainment 
at this moment signified the start of a new situation. This was evident by turn 23-24 
where I ended the first part of my explanation with ‘[breaks up]’ and Tim overlapped 
my words with ‘[becomes unstable]’. At this moment Tim and I demonstrated 
solidarity and emotional energy in the way that Tim overlapped my speech gesture 
with ideas of similar meaning. This was a case of conceptual entrainment as it 
showed that Tim was entrained on my utterances immediately before the overlap.  
His overlapping gesture showed solidarity and emotional energy through our shared 
thoughts. From this point, the conversation showed evidence of conceptual 
entrainment that had not been consistently present in finding-each-other. 
5.1.3 Summary: Finding-each-other and emotional energy.  
My analyses of the episodes above (5.1.1 & 5.1.2) provide a study of how 
group members interact via embodied sounds and motions to achieve understanding 
about each other’s understanding. In the situation of me and Chris (5.1.1) the episode 
of finding-each-other achieved uncertainty via ongoing disjuncture.  From my 
perspective as a teacher I was not revealing my conceptual locality (understanding) 
on the topic, as I was working to determine Chris’ locality. This was evident in the 
way I attempted to re-direct Chris to prior learning experiences. Chris’ inability to 
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recall these experiences caused uncertainty for me about his conceptual locality. The 
evidence in this situation shows how both Chris and I were creating uncertainty for 
each other as part of our practices of finding-each-other. The episode concluded with 
a resolution to the uncertainty via my suggestion of drawing a diagram, leading into 
the next episode of interaction analyzed in section 5.2.1 below. 
In the episode involving Tim (5.1.2), finding-each-other also involved 
disjuncture and uncertainty. Like Chris, Tim was working to find my locality as a 
means for confirming his own locality. Uncertainty was prevalent as I required time 
to listen to Tim and read his notes before I would reveal my locality.  Once I 
established Tim’s conceptual locality the episode of finding-each-other was complete 
and a new episode became evident as analyzed in section 5.2.2 below.  
Throughout these episodes evidence of emotional energy was sporadic. For 
example, the momentary conceptual entrainment between Chris and me in fragment 
02 episode C01 (turns 13-14), or the conceptual entrainment between Tim and me in 
fragment 02, episode B01 (turns 23-24). This feature of sporadic emotional energy in 
situations of ongoing disjuncture characterized the practices of finding-each-other as 
co-constructing situations of uncertainty and ambiguity about each other’s 
conceptual locality. Because of this disjuncture moments of shared focus were 
limited. In these moments we each were seeking to know the others conceptual 
locality, instead of shared understanding about a concept. For this reason emotional 
energy was not evident beyond occasional moments.  
These episodes of finding-each-other address research question one by 
exploring how members situate themselves for further engagement around a topic 
where shared understanding becomes possible. As a general phenomenon, finding-
each-other may be defined as a set of ethnomethods achieving uncertainty about 
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conceptual locality.  In this sense it does not directly achieve shared understanding. 
Yet finding-each-other was important to research question one because each episode 
reached a point where analogical reasoning could commence. That is, finding-each-
other became a pre-condition for defining a start point from which analogical 
reasoning was possible, and in this way, finding-each-other contributed to the 
establishment of shared understanding. Compared with Liberman’s (2013) study of a 
map-in-use, this is like finding yourself on the map, before starting a journey (cf. 
3.2.3.2). As discussed later in chapter 6 this has important implications for science 
pedagogy as it enabled different start points and different analogies to be enacted 
with different students. This was evident in situations where the formal curriculum 
topic was common across different situations (cf. 5.1.1 & 5.1.2).  
5.2      Objects and Landmarks on the Map-in-Use 
In this section I address research question one by explored episodes of 
analogical reasoning following each of the two episodes of finding-each-other 
analyzed above. These situations of analogical reasoning are quite similar to 
common classroom analogies using sketched drawings (Venville, 2008) or embodied 
actions through role play (Aubusson, et al., 1997; Coll, 2008). In the ensuing analysis 
I explore how these analogies are co-constructed through the embodied sounds and 
motions of ethnomethods. In this sense, the analogy is not represented by the end 
product, such as a drawing and a listing of similarities and differences. Instead the 
analogy exists as the lived experiences of embodied ethnomethods and emotional 
energy as a co-constructed situation of analogical reasoning. That is, analogical 
reasoning is analyzed as it happens, as a map-in-use. 
In addressing research question one, concerning how shared understanding 
about concepts is achieved, this section establishes how concepts are enacted in 
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terms of familiar and unfamiliar spaces. To foreground the findings of this analysis, 
my notion of familiar spaces is about belonging to a family of concepts. My notions 
of a family of concepts in this study is informed by Durkheim’s (1912/2008) use of 
kinship (3.4), and Glynn’s (1994a) undefined use of a family of concepts to describe 
analogical reasoning (cf. 2.3.6 & 3.2.3.3). Objects and concepts become familiar by 
being included within the family. Newly introduced objects or concepts are initially 
unfamiliar until they are also included over the duration of the situation. Notions of 
familiar and unfamiliar are in relation to the particular situation of interaction.  This 
idea was invoked from my data and will be developed throughout my analysis. 
Through my analysis I also developed the notion of superimposition. 
Superimposition is my way of identifying what was described as a ‘multi-levelled 
distribution of attention’ (Ochs, Gonzales & Jacoby, 1996, p. 356). Ochs et al. (1996) 
described what they observed in interactions between scientists as a distribution of 
attention as scientists interacted concurrently with people and objects through 
gesture, graphics and imagination. In my study I interpreted these layers of attention 
in terms of the familiar and unfamiliar spaces occupied by objects or concepts. 
In the first set of data involving Chris and me, I analyzed a physical sketch 
map-in-use of beta decay in section 5.2.1. In the second set of data involving Tim 
and me, I analyzed an embodied enactment of subatomic particles in section 5.2.2. 
Through each example I highlight the emotional energy associated with the 
embodied sounds and motions comprising ethnomethods of analogical reasoning.   
5.2.1 A sketch map-in-use of beta decay. 
5.2.1.1  Objects, emotional energy and the nucleus.  
The term sketch map was introduced in section 3.2.3 where I discussed its use 
as an example of a mapping study in ethnomethodology (cf. Liberman, 2013). I used 
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the term in this section as it relates directly to the analogy at the focus of classroom 
interactions, but it also provides a concrete example of analogical reasoning as a 
map-in-use.  
In relation to the classroom analogy, the sketch map of beta decay started at 
turn 34 when I suggested ‘lets have a think about it (.) draw a picture (.)’ and Chris 
responded with the utterance ‘how do I do that’ at turn 35, see episode C02 fragment 
01 below. 
Episode C02, fragment 01 
Turn Speaker Transcript 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
Mr Davis 
Chris 
Mr Davis 
 
 
 
Chris  
Mr Davis 
Chris 
Mr Davis 
 
Chris 
Lets lets have a think about it (.) draw a picture (.) that might be easier 
how do I do that 
so I’ll show you ((stands up and takes the pen from Chris)) I’ll draw a little diagram for you 
here (.) so in the nucleus of this carbon we’ve got one two three four five SIX we got six 
protons there okay ((I draw each as a small circle.  Chris watches closely, his elbow on the 
desk, his hand holding his head)) and:: we’ve got(.) how many neutrons have we got 
fourteen 
well(.) we’ve got a MASS of 14(.) so if its fourteen minus six 
eight 
eight(.)  we’ve got one two three four five six seven EIGHT neutrons okay ((draws 8 N’s 
near the protons)) 
yeah 
 Turns 34/35 involve important ethnomethods illustrating how teachers and 
students may have very different approaches to analogical reasoning.  My suggestion 
to draw a picture is indicative of my experience in re-enacting the concepts, and my 
confidence in being able to enact a sketch map as a way of explaining beta decay. In 
contrast Chris explicitly indicates he has no way of knowing what to do by asking 
how do I do that. Turns 34/35 illustrate how the analogy does not exist at these 
moments in time. I merely indicated my intent to enact an analogy at turn 34, and 
Chris indicated a lack of understanding on how this could be done.  
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As a map-in-use, the analogy was being enacted as seen in figure 5.1 on the 
left hand side and in turn 36-37, where I took a pen and paper from Chris, and 
announced ‘I’ll draw a little diagram for you here (.)’. The pen and paper belonged to 
Chris for whom these were everyday things. At turn 37 I then started to draw small 
circles as I made the speech gesture ‘in the nucleus of this carbon we’ve got one two 
three four five SIX we got six protons there okay’ (turn 37-38). Throughout these 
moments (turns 37-38) I was focused on drawing each circle and counting each one 
as a proton within ‘the nucleus of this carbon’. Simultaneously, Chris sat with his 
elbow on the desk, his hand holding his head, and his face aligned toward the 
gestures of my hand as I drew the protons as circles in figure 5.1 (turn 38-39). As 
evident from Chris’s facial alignment, my hand and speech gestures had gained 
Chris’s attention as he was entrained on these gestures.    
   
Figure 5.1. The remnant of an occurrence of analogical reasoning related to transcript episode 
C02, fragments 01 and 02.  
  My hand and speech gestures were the ethnomethods I used to enact the 
concept of ‘the nucleus of this carbon’ (turn 37) as I was simultaneously drawing 
circles on the left hand side of figure 5.1.  By enacting my thoughts in this way my 
gestures entrained Chris simultaneously on the drawing and on the concepts I was 
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speaking about. This was achieved by the way I spoke about the drawing, not as a 
group of ink markings, but as protons within this particular carbon nucleus (turns 37-
39 & 43-44). In these moments Chris and I were superimposing ideas. The idea of 
familiar everyday circular ink markings enacted in figure 5.1, was being 
superimposed by the idea of the nucleus of a particular carbon-14 atom through my 
speech gestures in turns 36-39. I was not drawing circles, I was drawing protons, and 
I stated this emphatically as I counted the last one and announced ‘SIX we got six 
protons there okay’ (turn 37-38).  
My utterance of ‘okay’ at turn 38 was followed by a shift in topic from 
protons to neutrons in turns 38-39. This shift in topic provides evidence of how my 
utterance, ‘okay’, was implying a change in direction in my next utterance at turn 39 
(Beach, 1990; 1995). By making the speech gesture, ‘okay’, my ethnomethods 
signalled to Chris, my satisfaction with our shared understanding of the circles as 
protons, and my intent to move on to something else. Chris’s response was to remain 
physically entrained and silent. 
This response by Chris was undramatic, and may be considered no response 
at all. But his silence and continued entrainment constituted a gesture in itself.  
Through this undramatic gesture Chris was maintaining the emotional energy he was 
experiencing through his physical and conceptual entrainment on the protons. That 
is, Chris’s maintenance of his undramatic emotional energy provides evidence of his 
conceptual entrainment.  His undramatic response provided evidence of Chris 
accepting the ink markings as protons. This acceptance was evident by his enactment 
of a shared focus on the concept of protons as a form of conceptual entrainment.  If 
Chris did not accept the circles as protons, as both teacher and researcher, I would 
expect him to respond by causing disjuncture. The absence of disjuncture confirmed 
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shared understanding and evidence of a first moment where a sketch map of the 
carbon nucleus was becoming visible.   
The image at figure 5.1 (above) shows one aspect of the sketch map-in-use 
becoming visible. However, the sketch map-in-use became conceptually observable 
through the hand and speech gestures as ethnomethods producing the image (figure 
5.1), and as the embodied and materially mediated account of the carbon nucleus.  
Thus the sketch map of beta decay, as a map-in-use, was becoming visible both 
physically and conceptually. 
The next step Chris and I took on this sketch map-in-use was to establish our 
shared understanding of the neutrons as evident by my utterance at turn 39, ‘and:: 
we’ve got(.) how many neutrons have we got’. I used this utterance to change 
direction at ‘and::,’ but the elongation here, and the pause after ‘we’ve got(.)’ 
suggested uncertainty as to how I would proceed. It was possible I was about to 
announce the neutrons in the same way I announced the protons earlier, but instead I 
changed direction by asking Chris ‘how many neutrons have we got’ (turn 39). 
Chris responded to this question with the answer, ‘fourteen’ (turn 40). This 
answer was incorrect, and had the potential to become a source of disjuncture in the 
conversation. My response, however, evaded any disjuncture before it could arise, by 
offering Chris another question with, ‘well(.) we’ve got a MASS of fourteen(.) so if 
its fourteen minus six.’ This second question was not changing the first question, but 
it was giving some additional conceptual knowledge to Chris and re-structuring the 
question. By restructuring the question in this way my ethnomethods had a greater 
chance of positioning Chris to respond with a correct answer. My second question re-
positioned Chris, where he needed limited understanding about carbon-14 to answer 
the question correctly. He only needed to understand the mathematical relationship 
165 
 
when six is subtracted from fourteen. In this way, I guided Chris to a new conceptual 
locality by helping him to announce the answer of eight (turn 42). The question at 
turn 39 and the sequence of interaction up to turn 42 created a situation making Chris 
more active in the co-construction of understanding about this object. While Chris 
needed additional scaffolding to make his contribution successful, I created a 
situation where Chris might get closer to the objects in terms of his conceptual 
locality of understanding on the carbon nuclei map-in-use (i.e., the conceptual sketch 
map). 
Following Chris’s utterance of ‘eight’, I confirmed Chris as correct by stating 
‘eight(.) we’ve got one two three four five six seven EIGHT neutrons okay’ (turn 
43). As I announced each neutron by its number I drew it on the paper as a circle 
with an ‘N’ in the middle, as shown in Figure 5.1. Finally the response from Chris 
was to utter ‘yeah’ at turn 45.  In the context of this situation, I interpreted Chris’s 
utterance of ‘yeah’ to indicate his agreement because he was involved in the co-
construction of these eight neutrons (cf. Lambertz, 2011). The neutrons I drew were 
the eight neutrons Chris announced at turn 42. They were visible as Chris’s neutrons 
and he was agreeing with my drawing via his utterance of ‘yeah’. 
In this first fragment (episode C02 above) Chris and I enacted a sketch map-
in-use with shared understandings about concepts such as protons and neutrons 
within the nucleus of carbon-14. In achieving this shared understanding we 
objectified the familiar objects of pen and paper, with unfamiliar (outside the family) 
objects of protons and neutrons, at the same time and in the same space. I use the 
term objectification to refer to the treatment of things and concepts as discrete 
entities where one object may become known independently from some other object. 
Objectification in the situation of fragment 01 involved the treatment of unfamiliar 
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concepts as if they were the familiar physical objects being drawn on the paper.  This 
simultaneous objectification through the superimposition of unfamiliar concepts over 
familiar objects was evident in the way Chris and I spoke about the concepts as our 
shared visual gaze was focused upon the drawing in front of us. At these moments 
we were treating the drawing as if it were really the object of a carbon-14 nucleus. In 
this way we made the unfamiliar concepts visible and knowable through the physical 
gestures, the drawing, and our speech gestures.  
The key element to making this enactment of objectification possible through 
our ethnomethods was our concurrent experience of emotional energy. Our 
ethnomethods in fragment 01 provide an excellent example of subdued, focused, 
undramatic collective emotional energy throughout this situation (cf. 5.1.1; Collins, 
2004). My challenge in this analysis was making undramatic emotional energy 
observable, and this was possible through the study of ethnomethods.  
For example, at turn 38 where I transitioned from protons to neutrons and 
Chris maintained his entrained gesture, this was an example of undramatic emotional 
energy. To elaborate this point, Chris was physically entrained on the drawing as 
indicated by the retention of his bodily entrainment throughout the topic transition 
(turns 36-39).  In addition, his acceptance of the concept of protons by not creating 
disjuncture evidenced conceptual entrainment via his agreement with my speech 
gestures. The undramatic emotional energy appeared through the disjuncture-free 
flow of these turns (36-39), where dramatic emotion was undetectable. Undramatic 
emotional energy is evident in the continuity of bodily entrainment and ongoing 
acceptance of shared ideas that achieve the continuity of an unremarkable, 
disjuncture-free interaction about protons and neutrons (cf. Collins, 2004). 
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The undramatic emotional energy in fragment 01 continued through turns 40-
42, even when Chris gave an incorrect answer. Although my ethnomethods at turn 41 
may have helped in the repair of Chris’s answer, Chris was able to respond without 
disruption to his conceptual entrainment. The lack of disjuncture and the 
achievement of ongoing entrainment on the shared ideas that were unfolding were 
evidence that Chris was maintaining his conceptual entrainment as a form of 
undramatic emotional energy.  
By the end of fragment 01, Chris and I had experienced a successful 
(disjuncture free) interaction with an observable level of undramatic emotional 
energy and increased familiarity with concepts of the carbon nucleus, protons and 
neutrons. We had established newly familiar objects (protons, neutrons, carbon-14 
nuclei) as conceptual reference points for future conversation. My analysis in this 
section contributes to elaborating how shared understanding was achieved through 
social interaction. At this point I have not analysed the evidence with respect to 
similarity and difference and for this reason I have not treated these data as a 
complete example of analogical reasoning in this section. Now I will explain how 
Chris and I used these newly familiar objects to co-construct shared understanding 
around the concept of beta decay.   
5.2.1.2  Changing conceptual locality.  
In this section, I analyse how Chris and I treat the protons and neutrons as 
familiar objects. This became evident in the way we spoke of these objects without 
questioning their existence. That is, at no point in our interactions were questions 
raised about the nature of these objects, established through the ethnomethods in 
fragment 01, above. In effect Chris and I were now taking these objects for granted, 
as familiar everyday objects in the same way we treated the pen and paper.  For 
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example, at turn 46 in episode C02 fragment 02 below, I uttered an emphatic ‘NOW’ 
following Chris’s ‘yeah’ at turn 45 from fragment 01. This emphatic ‘NOW’ marked 
the moment where I achieved some confidence in my own understanding about 
Chris’s understanding, of the objects as protons and neutrons. ‘NOW’ I was ready to 
move on to explain beta decay at turn 46.  
Episode C02, fragment 02 
Turn Speaker Transcript 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
Mr Davis 
 
 
 
Chris  
Mr Davis 
 
 
 
 
Chris 
Mr Davis 
Chris 
Mr Davis 
Chris 
NOW what happens in beta decay is that one of the neutrons loses an electron ((points & 
draws an electron)) and what happens is when it loses an electron ((points to neutron)) 
that’s already a neutral charge and the electron ((points to the electron)) is negatively 
charged so what happens to the neutron  
becomes positive  
yeah, it loses a negative charge and becomes positive (.) so it turns into a proton okay 
((draws the new proton. Chris nods)) 
((points to the electron)) that goes off into the atmosphere and ((points to protons)) you 
end up with one two three four five six seven (.) SEVEN protons then ((Chris nods)) and 
seven neutrons which has turned that into nitrogen ((points to nucleus)) 
yeah ((nods))  
((points to the electron)) that is the beta decay that is the beta particle 
yeah ((Nods)) 
so that’s what the process is ((Chris nodding)) so any more questions on that 
no that’s fine sir 
 At the commencement of fragment 02 the drawing in Figure 5.1 comprised 
six circles as protons and eight circles with an ‘N’ inside them as neutrons. These 
were now established as familiar objects and formed conceptual landmarks on the 
analogical map-in-use that was unfolding through our interactions (3.2.3). In my 
metaphor of the map-in-use, conceptual landmarks are points of reference Chris and I 
may use to locate one another during conversation.  
A conceptual landmark was evident at turn 46-47 where I said, ‘what happens 
in beta decay is that one of the neutrons loses an electron’ and I drew a circle with an 
‘e’ inside and an arrow away from the neutron (Figure 5.1) as I uttered the word 
‘electron’. Through this hand and speech gesture I made reference to one of the 
neutrons by pointing to it and calling it a neutron. In this way I was now using this 
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concept as a familiar landmark from which Chris and I could move forward on the 
map-in-use.  
Starting from this landmark I then established a new landmark in the form of 
a negatively charged electron (beta particle) emitted from the neutron as it decayed.  
This new landmark became evident as I stated ‘and what happens is when it ((the 
neutron)) loses an electron that’s already a neutral charge’ (turn 47-48). I then 
pointed to the electron as I said ‘and the electron is negatively charged’ (turn 48-49). 
Having established the new, unfamiliar landmark (electron) in relation to the known, 
familiar landmark (neutron) I was now describing these landmarks in terms of 
electric charge as I pointed to each one on the paper. Through these gestures (turns 
47-48) my conceptual locality was momentarily established on the map-in-use, and 
in doing this I had created a possibility for Chris to shift his conceptual locality 
(understanding) closer to mine. This possibility became evident in the turns that 
followed from turn 49 onward.  
 At turn 49, I provided Chris with an opportunity to illustrate his conceptual 
locality in relation to conceptual landmarks by asking him ‘so what happens to the 
neutron’. Chris responded with the utterance ‘becomes positive’ (turn 50) and I 
confirmed his utterance with ‘yeah’ (turn 51), indicating my agreement. This was 
another moment where I guided Chris to contribute actively to the co-construction of 
the objects. I was getting Chris to co-construct the map-in-use by helping him 
orientate to, and understand the concepts. I was doing this with Chris in relation to 
the physical sketch map as an analogue for the conceptual sketch map, both of which 
were being simultaneously co-constructed. After confirming Chris’ utterance, I then 
explained that by becoming positive the neutron ‘turns into a proton’ (turn 51), as I 
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wrote a ‘P’ over the ‘N’ in one of the neutrons (turn 52) as shown at Figure 5.1 
above.  
 As Chris nodded his head vertically at turn 54, I continued by pointing to the 
electron (turn 53) and saying ‘that goes off into the atmosphere’. I pointed to each 
proton as I counted them saying ‘SEVEN protons then ((Chris nods)) and seven 
neutrons’. I then pointed to the nucleus as a whole saying ‘which has turned that into 
nitrogen’. Chris was nodding his head and looking at the sketch map as I explained 
the ideas. At turns 56 and 57 Chris supplemented his nodding with two occurrences 
of ‘yeah’. Finally, I summarized the conversation by pointing to the electron and 
stating ‘that is the beta decay that is the beta particle’ (turn 57). 
Fragment 02 provides evidence of how Chris and I worked together to share 
an analogical journey as a map-in-use. In this analogical journey the emergent 
physical drawing formed the familiar object, changing throughout the journey. The 
practices of analogical reasoning were visible through the enactment of embodied 
gestures, speech gestures and the drawing. The start point for this fragment was a 
partial sketch map with protons and neutrons established as familiar objects or 
landmarks in fragment 02. These landmarks became reference points for new 
concepts such as an electron as the beta particle, negative and positive charge and 
the emergence of a new proton, enacted throughout the situation. As landmarks were 
co-constructed shifts in shared understanding (conceptual localities) became evident 
as an engagement with a conceptual map-in-use. As I enacted new concepts into the 
situation, they were constructed in relation to previously established landmarks. That 
is, to enact the beta particle (electron), it was constructed in relation to one of the 
neutrons previously established as familiar in fragment 01. The enactment of new 
concepts was achieved by the simultaneous objectification of familiar concepts, 
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unfamiliar concepts and markings on the physical sketch map through my hand 
gestures of drawing and pointing. In addition to this, I invited Chris to get 
conceptually closer to the concepts by involving him in the enactment. This was 
achieved by questioning Chris, to elicit speech gestures. 
In this way Chris was being orientated toward new concepts in relation to 
existing landmarks. As new landmarks were established they became familiar to 
Chris. This familiarity made them available as future points of reference. The map-
in-use was therefore constantly changing, and as it changed, Chris’s conceptual 
locality also changed. The map-in-use thus defined Chris’ particular experience of 
analogical reasoning from ink markings, through gestures and drawings to shared 
conceptual understanding about carbon-14 and beta decay.   
 5.2.2 An embodied map-in-use of subatomic particles. 
5.2.2.1  Emotional energy, entrainment, and solidarity.  
The situation presented in this section (episode B02) as the embodied 
performance of subatomic particles took place immediately after the finding-each-
other episode analyzed earlier in section 5.1.2. The following episode (B02) is 
prominent in the way emotional energy was evident through speech rate and 
gestures. The pace of episode B02 featured convergence of our speech rates as 
evident by comparison of average speech rates across episode B01 (finding-each-
other) and episode B02 (embodied performance). In episode B01 where we 
experienced much disjuncture and very little emotional energy, Tim’s average speech 
rate was 4.25 syllables per second (SPS) and my speech rate was 2.67 SPS.  In 
contrast, for episode B02 Tim’s speech rate was 4.52 SPS and my speech rate was 
4.41 SPS (Appendix E). The change in my average speech rate to match Tim’s 
speech rate was important as it showed convergence in the style or prosody of our 
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speech gestures.  This convergence is considered a factor in identifying emotional 
energy (Roth & Tobin, 2010).  
A further factor contributing to evidence of emotional energy was the focus 
of attention on gestures and concepts evidenced through speech overlap (Schegloff, 
2000).  Speech overlaps were observed in episode B02 fragment 01 below at turns 
25-26 where Tim overlapped my utterance midway through turn 25 with ‘[yeah]’ and 
made a nodding gesture with his head (Lambertz, 2011; Stivers, 2008). In turn 27, I 
then continued my sentence with ‘and then what’s left if you’re neutral and you lose 
a negative charge.’ As I completed this turn Tim continued my statement with ‘and 
then you’ at turn 28 providing evidence of his entrainment on my statement in turn 
27, as shown in episode B02, fragment 01:  
Episode B02, fragment 01 
Turn Speaker Transcript 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
Mr Davis 
Tim 
Mr Davis 
Tim 
Mr Davis 
Tim 
Mr Davis 
Tim 
Mr Davis 
 
Tim 
Mr Davis 
 part of it becomes the [electron] that goes away the decay ((Figure 5.2))  ((5.00SPS)) 
                                          [yeah]           ((nods head and licks lips))                    ((4.00SPS)) 
and then whats left if your neutral and you lose a negative charge             ((3.05SPS)) 
[and then you]                                                                                                        ((5.00SPS)) 
[what does the charge] become  ((continues with hand gestures))              ((6.49SPS)) 
POSITIVE   ((Looks at me, points index finger  towards me))                          ((4.82sps))                                                                   
positive and that’s why it becomes a proton so                                                ((6.00sps)) 
and that’s why it becomes nitrogen                                                                    ((4.92sps)) 
yeah so as soon as you change the number of protons from  
[six to seven you’ve created nitrogen]            ((Figure 5.3))                           ((3.23SPS))                 
[yeah so like (.) so that’s how many (.) oh ok so]                                              ((2.50SPS)) 
by that beta decay happening its creating nitrogen                                          ((3.09SPS)) 
Evidence of entrainment across turns 25 to 28 suggested Tim was 
experiencing emotional energy about the ideas we were discussing, as he was willing 
to continue my sentence. I interpreted these turns as evidence of Tim making a 
presumption about us sharing the same conceptual locality (cf. Garfinkel, 1967; 
Schutz, 1943).  That is, Tim presumed his understanding about the topic was the 
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same as my understanding and this provided him the confidence to confirm and 
continue my sentence. This confidence became possible through our shared 
experience of emotional energy, evident by our mutual entrainment on both the 
concepts enacted and the particular ethnomethods constituting that enactment. 
Evidence of emotional energy continued further where I overlapped Tim’s 
turn 28 as I uttered ‘[what does the charge] become’ in turn 29. At that moment 
Tim’s attempt to continue my statement at turn 27, was overlapped by my 
continuation at turn 29. These turns illustrate our collective experience of emotional 
energy through our entrainment not just on the ideas (conceptual entrainment), but 
on one another’s gestures about those ideas (physical entrainment). 
I interpreted this conversation between Tim and me as indicative of our 
sharing the floor as simultaneous speakers, practicing the orderly co-construction of 
shared understanding (Schegloff, 2000).  This simultaneity involved Tim and I being 
highly attuned in gestural and conceptual entrainment, interpreted in my analysis as 
evidence of high intensity emotional energy. High intensity emotional energy 
became further evident after my question of ‘[what does the charge] become’ (turn 
29). Tim replied emphatically with ‘POSITIVE’ and raised his index finger in 
alignment with his eye gaze directly toward me. Intense emotional energy involving 
mutual focus was evident through the emphatic speech, Tim’s eye alignment toward 
me and my hand gesture (Collins, 2004; Roth & Tobin, 2010).     
The emotional energy ensued through another instance of continuation at turn 
31 where I stated ‘positive and that’s why it becomes a proton so’ (turn 31) and 
without any pause Tim continued my sentence for me with ‘and that’s why it 
becomes nitrogen’ (turn 32).  I then followed Tim’s statement in a similar way at 
turn 33 with ‘yeah’ to agree with Tim and then with ‘so as soon as you change the 
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number of protons from [six to seven you’ve created nitrogen].  In effect through 
turns 31-33, Tim and I completed our shared explanation to beta decay where we 
each contributed parts of the same sentence.  
Finally, fragment 01 contains ongoing hand gestures, nodding and alignment 
of physical gaze. Visual evidence of these gestures is shown in figure 5.2 below 
where I made hand gestures entraining our shared physical gaze as indicated by our 
facial and eye entrainment toward the hand gestures.  
 
  
Figure 5.2.a. Gesture of sub-atomic particles: Fingers become neutrons. 
 
 
Figure 5.2.b. Gesture: A beta particle breaking away from a neutron. 
 
In a similar example ongoing eye contact and physical gaze toward hand 
gestures was evident throughout turns 33-35 in fragment 01.  My interpretation of 
these fragments in relation to physical gaze, glances and eye contact, all concerned 
use of the eyes as a form of communication. Heron (1970) established eye contact as 
one of the primary forms of interpersonal encounter where, like touch, it provides a 
primary means of both sending and receiving communication in precisely the same 
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moment. For this reason eye contact, direction of gaze and glances are considered 
evidence of attentiveness and mutual focus on shared objects (Canadas & Lupianez, 
2012). 
In fragment 01 with Tim, I have interpreted these items of evidence 
collectively as indicators of intense emotional energy where Tim and I displayed 
gestures of solidarity about the ideas through physical and conceptual entrainment.  
The experience of emotional energy in fragment 01 establishes the foundation for my 
analyses of the ethnomethods of enacted analogical reasoning, presented next in 
terms of the embodied performance of beta decay and the arrangement of objects.  
5.2.2.2 Embodied map-in-use of beta decay.  
Episode B02, presented previously in 5.2.2.1, starts at turn 25 of fragment 01 
where I was explaining beta decay by talking about the neutron and saying ‘[part of it 
becomes the electron] that goes away the decay’ and making hand gestures as shown 
Figure 5.2, above. At turn 25, fragment 01, as I  started to utter the word ‘part’ my 
hands were situated with the thumbs and index fingers of both hands held tightly 
together as though I was holding a very small object as shown in figure 5.2.a. I then 
uttered ‘[part of it ((‘it’ is the neutron)) becomes the electron] that goes away the 
decay’. As I started to say ‘becomes’ my hands were repositioned about 10cm apart 
with the thumb and index fingers held as though I was holding two very small 
objects as shown in figure 5.2.b. 
Figure 5.2 illustrates the use of hand gestures in relation to speech gestures.  
My hand gestures may be interpreted in figure 5.2.a as the performance of a neutron 
and in figure 5.2.b as the performance of an electron emitted from a decaying 
neutron. These hand gestures were iconic gestures, well established as important in 
the construction of meaning during face to face interaction (Beattie & Shovelton, 
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2011; McNeill, 2000). As I made speech and hand gestures in turn 25 there was no 
explicit agreement in analogical terminology, of my hands being like neutrons or 
their movements like beta decay. Yet as the conversation unfolded, the hands, as 
familiar physical objects became associated with specific unfamiliar, abstract 
concepts (i.e., neutrons). In figure 5.2.a, I held my fingers together as I referred to the 
neutrons using the term ‘it’ in turn 25. I then uttered ‘becomes the electron’ and at 
this utterance my hands moved apart with my fingers remaining close together 
(figure 5.2.b). Both Tim and I shared a physical eye gaze directed at the hands as I 
spoke (figure 5.2.a, and 5.2.b).  
Through these moments of turn 25 my hands, as familiar everyday objects, 
were being spoken about as sub-atomic particles. Like the ink markings in Chris’s 
sketch map, discussed previously in section 5.2.1, the hand and speech gestures in 
figure 5.2 and turn 25 illustrated the objectification of abstract concepts. 
Objectification was performed through our ethnomethods which provided visible, 
familiar everyday objects directing the physical gaze of Tim and me creating a 
shared physical entrainment. The physical entrainment was observable via the 
alignment of our faces and eyes toward the hand gestures (fragment 01 & figure 5.2).  
Concurrent with this physical entrainment on familiar objects, I uttered 
speech gestures about sub-atomic particles. The simultaneity of my speech gestures 
with the hand gestures, superimposed unfamiliar concepts on familiar objects within 
the same moment of shared experience.  As the hands drew together our physical 
gaze, my speech drew together our conceptual gaze, so that when my hands were 
presented and then moved apart, we were visualizing the actions of sub-atomic 
particles. In our experience of these moments we were treating the hands, not as 
hands but as sub-atomic particles. These moments illustrate the possibility of how 
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simultaneous hand and speech gestures may be something more than expressions of 
thought. They may be considered as thought itself (Hwang & Roth, 2011; Merleau-
Ponty, 1962/2012). In the following section, these ideas are developed further in 
terms of the spatial arrangement of objects, evident through our gestured thoughts. 
5.2.2.3  Familiar and unfamiliar spaces.  
In the context of science education Hwang & Roth (2011) studied gestures as 
the embodied performance of physics concepts. They established an understanding of 
these gestures in terms of spatial arrangements with connections between different 
spaces. For example, in Hwang & Roth’s (2011) study, a physics teacher made 
inscriptions about physics concepts on a chalk board as the domain of physics 
knowledge defining an inscription space.  The physics teacher then faced the 
students to talk about the inscribed physics concepts, and this face-to-face talk 
defined a narrative space. These two spaces were then connected throughout the 
physics lecture as the teacher turned and gestured toward the inscription space from 
the narrative space (Hwang & Roth, 2011).   
In the present section I illustrate different spaces evident in relation to hand 
and speech gestures in fragment 01, presented previously in section 5.2.2.1, with 
specific reference to utterances at turns 33-35. These turns are reproduced with 
images in figure 5.3 below. Fragment 01 was the focus of my explanation about the 
embodied map-in-use of sub-atomic particles during interaction between Tim and 
me. 
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  Images 
 
Turn Location Underlined 
a. 
 
Turn 
33 
 
35 
Speaker 
Mr Davis 
 
Tim 
 
 
 
Transcript 
yeah as soon as you change 
the number of [protons] 
                                  [yeah] 
b. 
 
34 
35 
Mr Davis 
Tim 
From [ six to seven] 
          [so like] 
c. 
 
34 
35 
Mr Davis 
Tim 
      [you’ve created nitrogen] 
 
[0so that’s how many(.) oh ok 
so0] 
d. 
 
Tim changes the topic after turn 36. He looks 
away at his notes and begins to utter something 
else. At the same time the my hands collapse in a 
strong backward flex toward my  body as they 
are no longer objectified. The concepts of 
nitrogen and carbon disappear from the 
conversation.  
 
Figure 5.3. Gestured enactment of carbon and nitrogen atoms 
My first point in relation to spatial arrangement concerns the general locality 
of my hands as I held them out in Figure 5.3a. In this locality they were away from 
my body, close to the midpoint between Tim and me.  In this situation my hands 
were held out as objects for both Tim and me to observe, as noted by Tim’s visual 
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entrainment at figure 5.3.c. This was similar to their locality in the earlier figure 5.2 
(above) where the hands were used in a similar way as objects. In contrast, the 
present example (figure 5.3) showed how the hands were collapsed and then brought 
back into my personal space as the topic of conversation changed (figure 5.3.d).   
For example, in figure 5.3.d my hands are in a collapsed position close to my 
torso. At that point Tim had finished his turn 35 with ‘so’ and looked away from the 
hands, down at his notes.  At this moment Tim was changing topic and the nitrogen 
atoms were no longer relevant to the conversation that followed.  For this reason my 
hands were no longer relevant, and so they were withdrawn from the public space. 
Through these enacted, embodied motions, space is used in the objectification of 
familiar objects such as hands.  The general locality of the hands is a shared public 
space, held at a distance from the body to which they belonged biologically.   
Within the general locality of my publicly available hands, their particular 
locality changed from moment to moment as evidenced in the present example at 
turns 33-35, aligned with images in figure 5.3. As these images show, my hands were 
held open (5.3a), with the tips of the corresponding fingers, on opposite hands, 
touching. Each of the images in figure 5.3, portray two perpendicular dotted lines. 
Because both the video camera and the background object were in fixed locations, 
the datum line on the background object enables changes in the location of the hands 
to be identified throughout figure 5.3. 
At turn 33, figure 5.3.a. I was talking about carbon, and stated ‘as soon as you 
change the number of [protons]’. As indicated by the underlined syllable at the end 
of protons I made the hand gesture shown in figure 5.3.a. At that moment my hands 
were aligned with the vertical line, but below the horizontal line. Tim and I had 
direct eye contact with each other, and Tim overlapped my utterance with his own 
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utterance of ‘yeah’ as a mark of his agreement, within the context of the more intense 
emotional energy established earlier in section 5.2.2.1.  
This particular space at figure 5.3.a. and this particular moment at turn 33, 
defined the particular locality of my hands as everyday familiar objects.  But at this 
moment they were also within the general locality of a shared public space, distanced 
from my body. This distance, together with the shape of my hand gesture and 
particular locality at that moment may be considered the ethnomethods achieving the 
objectification of my hands. That is, the treatment of my hands during interaction, as 
being something else other than part of my biological being. This objectification was 
enacted as part of the taken-for-granted ethnomethods where my hands, as familiar 
objects, may be considered to be occupying a familiar space.     
Simultaneously with these hand gestures my speech gestures had established 
the concept of carbon.  The concept of carbon was an unfamiliar concept at this 
moment of the situation, and for this reason I would call the locality of carbon at this 
moment an unfamiliar space. Most importantly, the concept of carbon was enacted 
through speech, located within the same particular moment as the hand gesture in 
figure 5.3.a.. With the high intensity of emotional energy in these moments 
(established in fragment 01 above) the coordination of speech and physical gestures 
provided evidence of shared ideas about the hands though they were the carbon. In 
this way, the coincidence of hand gestures and the speech gestures about carbon 
could be interpreted as enacting the superimposition of the unfamiliar space over the 
familiar space. This superimposition of unfamiliar and familiar spaces in a shared 
moment of intense emotional energy about concepts was my researcher interpretation 
of the objectification of the unfamiliar concept of carbon. By superimposing these 
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spaces Tim and I could easily speak of the hands as carbon in those moments where I 
was about to change its number of protons.  
In turn 34 and figure 5.3.b, I described the change in protons ‘from six to 
seven’ (turn 34) and my hands were raised to the level of the horizontal line and 
further left of the vertical line (Figure 5.3.b.).  Throughout this change in location, 
my hands were no longer treated as carbon. Instead they were in transit from the 
space known as carbon, in the process of beta decay and becoming something else.  
This transition in location involved my hands moving further left and descending 
below the horizontal line (Figure 5.3.c.).  In this new moment the familiar space of 
the hands was now superimposed with the unfamiliar space of the concept of 
nitrogen, as I uttered ‘you’ve created nitrogen’ at turn 34 in figure 5.3.c.. This 
gesture objectified nitrogen by its occupation of this new locality defined by the new 
space occupied by my hands. This was made possible through the hand and speech 
gesture simultaneously entraining Tim and me. The difference between carbon and 
nitrogen as objects was visible in the physical distance between particular localities 
as indicated in relation to the datum lines in figures 5.3.b and 5.3.c. In the same way 
my hands were objectified by the distance from my body, carbon and nitrogen were 
now objectified by their distance from each other. What transformed these unfamiliar 
concepts into familiar objects was their spatial arrangement in terms of their co-
incidence in the same moment of time where unfamiliar space was superimposed 
onto the familiar space of my hands.  As the hands were physically mobile they 
enabled the superimposition of one unfamiliar concept in one locality (figure 5.3.b.) 
and a different unfamiliar concept in another locality (figure 5.3.c.).  
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5.2.3 Summary of objects and landmarks on the map-in-use. 
Research question one is concerned the way in which shared understanding 
about concepts may be achieved in localized school science situations involving 
analogical reasoning. In section 5.2, I analyzed two examples where the concepts of 
carbon-14 and beta decay were enacted through localized social interaction using 
ethnomethods. These analyses explain how these concepts were co-constructed in 
each situation. One situation involved a drawing and conversation, the other involved 
hand gestures and conversation.  
Throughout section 5.2 I established some key ideas to explain the 
establishment of shared understanding over episodes of interaction where analogical 
reasoning was evident. I identified the idea of familiar spaces in my analysis on the 
basis of such spaces being occupied by familiar objects. I also identified unfamiliar 
spaces that were occupied by objects newly introduced to the episode of interaction. 
In the examples I analysed, these newly introduced unfamiliar objects were identified 
as science concepts enacted through speech gesture. Because members enacted 
unfamiliar spaces at the same time as their enactment of familiar spaces I described 
this simultaneous enactment as the superimposition of spaces. In this way, familiar 
physical objects were objectified as unfamiliar objects, and through this 
objectification, unfamiliar objects became familiar and treated as conceptual 
landmarks in subsequent interaction. Finally, I established how distance between 
spaces enabled members to treat objects in one locality as being different from 
objects in another locality.  This treatment of objects as being different was observed 
in episodes where the same familiar physical objects such as hands were used to 
occupy different spaces.  For this reason, the nature of the familiar object was not 
important to defining difference. The important elements were the enactment of 
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distance between objects over time and the superimposition of new unfamiliar 
objects. A further important feature of these episodes in section 5.2 was evidence of 
emotional energy in the form of physical and conceptual entrainment between group 
members.  In the following section, 5.3, I expand upon these notions of familiar and 
unfamiliar spaces, superimposition and emotional energy in order to explain the 
operation of emotional energy in the enactment of analogical reasoning.  
Superimposition and emotional energy are developed through the analyses of a 
different analogical situation in relation to conceptual networks, hierarchy and 
transference.  
5.3 Conceptual Networks, Hierarchy and Transference  
In this section I address part of research question two, analyzing data relating 
to the achievement of conceptual networks, hierarchy and transference of 
understanding. This analysis builds on the notions developed in section 5.2, using 
data from a different group, in a different class, and enacting a different analogical 
situation. The situation where these data were collected involved four Year 10 
students with pseudonyms Dre, Shady, Simon, and Sam, and me as the 
teacher/researcher. In this situation the students were working on an inquiry activity 
observing the motion of tea leaves and foam beads (balls) in warming water. These 
objects were used as an exploratory, analogical model to guide their thinking about 
ocean currents.  
In addressing question 2 of how conceptual networks, hierarchy and 
transference are achieved within analogical reasoning, I analyzed episodes of 
classroom interactions in terms of what was being achieved by the ethnomethods. 
Conceptual networks, hierarchy and transference became evident through patterns of 
ethnomethods and lived experiences that achieved; science observation (section 
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5.3.1), distancing (section 5.3.2), scientific language (section 5.3.3), transference 
(section 5.3.4), and objectivity (5.3.5). Each of these achievements was defined 
through my data analysis.   
5.3.1 Ethnomethods of science observation and emotional energy.   
Episode A01, fragment 01, below, shows Simon at turn 40 reading from the 
worksheet ‘what do you observe about movements in the contents of the beaker’ in 
relation to the motion of tea leaves. Turn 40 commences the formation of shared 
practices around observation and the establishment of the worksheet as a source of 
moral authority.   
Episode A01, fragment 01 
Turn Speaker Transcript 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
Simon 
 
Shady 
Dre 
Shady 
 
Dre 
Simon 
Sam 
Simon 
Sam 
Shady 
what do you observe about movements in the contents of the beaker ((reading from 
worksheet)) 
well we can't see much at the moment ((looking down into the beaker)) 
wel:l: if we wait its gonna ((going to)) heat up: bubble  ((makes a prediction)) 
and their gunna ((going to)) go to the side eh ((places hand over top of beaker and raises 
hand as he makes a prediction)) 
what do you reckons gonna ((going to)) happen to the balls when it starts boiling 
awh no you have to observe what it is 
its just sitting in the water 
well what 
I'll get a pen 
its sitting at the moment 
At turn 40 Simon’s statement about the necessity to observe the objects was 
initially met with comments such as ‘we can’t see much at the moment’ (turn 42, 
fragment 01) and a couple of utterances from Shady and Dre, making speculative 
statements on what might happen (turns 43-46, fragment 01).  Simon responded to 
these speculative statements at turn 47 (fragment 01) with ‘awh no you have to 
observe what it is’.  This action by Simon stopped the speculative conversation and 
focused group attention around making observations as evident by Sam’s utterance 
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‘its just sitting in the water’ (turn 48) and Shady adding ‘its sitting at the moment’ 
(turn 51). In the turns following Simon’s utterance at turn 47, group members 
responded (turns 48 & 51) by ceasing their speculation and simply making 
observations. This modification to group practices followed Simon’s repeated appeal 
to observe in accordance with the worksheet. By reading the worksheet at line 40 and 
referring to it again at line 47, I interpreted Simon’s speech gestures in relation to his 
sense of respect (3.4) for the worksheet instructions. Simon’s gesture provided 
evidence of him attributing authority to the worksheet, and acting in a way to satisfy 
his sense of respect for that authority.  
As indicated in section 3.4, Durkheim established the concept of respect in 
social interaction as a form of collective effervescence or emotional energy 
(Durkheim, 1912/2008). In the situation described in fragment 01 above, respect 
become evident through Simon’s repeated speech gestures bringing attention to the 
worksheet and connecting the worksheet to the moral actions of the group. As 
emotional energy, respect in this situation becomes evident as a shared focus on the 
idea of the authority of the worksheet, which is the source of moral authority for 
subsequent interactions where the students stop what they are doing and begin 
observing. Simon’s speech gestures coordinate group focus upon this moral authority 
and by modifying their enacted sounds and motions (ethnomethods) toward the 
enactment of observation, the other group members demonstrate their shared ideas 
and feeling of respect for the worksheet.  
The connection between the shared idea about the authority of the worksheet, 
the feeling of respect, and the coordinated ethnomethods of observing may be 
described in terms of moral force (3.4.1).  Associated with respect, Durkheim 
(1912/2008) described moral force as acting on a member’s internalized sense of 
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social being and giving rise to observable enacted ethnomethods. Moral force was 
described in terms of physical force, in that both forms of force remain invisible.  We 
can only know the existence of force (physical or moral) through the observable 
events following its application.  For example, Simon’s utterance at turn 47 ‘awh no 
you have to observe what it is’ was the moment where moral force became evident.  
Simon had already referred to the worksheet instruction at turn 40 where he had 
introduced the need to observe the objects. He then observed Shady and Dre 
transgress against the worksheet instruction (turns 42-46). Simon’s respect for the 
worksheet instructions may be observed through his speech gesture toward Dre and 
Shady. By making this speech gesture, Simon was attributing moral authority to the 
worksheet instruction.  Through a Durkheimian (1912/2008) interpretation, the 
connection between Simon’s feeling of respect for the worksheet, and his gesture 
(turn 47) may be described as moral force.  
As the situation in fragment 01 (above) unfolded, respect and moral force 
may be associated with the actions of Shady and Dre. In this situation moral force 
was not applied by Simon upon Shady and Dre, it was applied by Simon against 
himself, evident through his utterance. Simon’s utterance was an appeal to Dre and 
Shady to act on their own sense of respect for the worksheet. Dre and Shady 
responded by ceasing speculation and becoming observers as evidenced by Shady's 
utterance at turn 51 and their subsequent lack of speculation.  
The response by Shady and Dre to cease speculation may be called self-
prohibition (cf. Durkheim, 1912/1915). Self-prohibition was achieved when the 
students acted on their feeling of respect for the worksheet instructions, in the same 
way Simon had done earlier. In this way, each student applied moral force upon 
himself. The moral force related to this emotion experience of respect was 
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observable through the coordination of ethnomethods in the enactment of what I as 
the researcher recognised as scientific observation. The coordination of 
ethnomethods involved restraint and self-prohibition from previous actions to make 
scientific observation possible. The way observation was enacted through self-
prohibition of embodied sounds and motions (ethnomethods), was evident in further 
self-prohibition relating to the use of language and physical distance between objects 
and group members, to be analyzed below. 
5.3.2 Ethnomethods of distancing and emotional energy. 
The ethnomethods of distancing and emotional energy observed in this study 
contributed to understanding respect, objectivity and hierarchy in the enactment of 
analogical reasoning. This analysis commenced at turn 62 (fragment 02) below, 
where Dre quietly stated his actions as he performed them by uttering ‘0I’m gonna 
((going to)) move this ball here to the middle
0’ and then at turn 64 he says ‘Just move 
him to the middle’. At this moment Dre was touching the objects. 
Episode A01, fragment 02 
Turn Speaker Transcript 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
Dre 
 
 
Shady 
Dre 
 
 
 
Simon 
 
Dre 
Simon 
Shady 
Dre 
[0I’m gonna move this ball here to the middle0]  ((upper body leans forward, using 
hand to move gently the floating ball. Simon is staring at the beaker)) 
Just move him to the middle OY?  ((moves his head back a little))  
OY:A   ((raises head slightly)) 
OY::  its  S:TICKin   
((pulls upper body back into upright position, and removes right hand to his side. 
Dre smiles slightly))  
 
awh now look what you did  ((directed at Shady, who was poking the beads with a 
pen)) 
yeah and then they 
eh 
its stickin to the pen too 
well note that they want to stick  ((Shady, Simon & Dre all entrained on the object, 
Sam is taking notes))  
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92 
93 
note that the balls want to be attracted to each other and the edges of the water 
just leave it(.)  Shady leave (.) its what they want to do  
 Dre’s act of touching the objects at turns 62-64 was the final time he allowed 
himself to be so close to the objects. At turn 66 he announced the observation he 
made while touching the objects with the utterance ‘its S:TICKin’  (it’s sticking). 
Having made this observation he pulled his upper body away from the object, stood 
in an upright position and removed his right hand from the object, placing it to his 
side (turns 67-68).  
 The reason for Dre’s noticeable withdrawal from the objects was not clear.  
What was clear was that Dre quietly stated his intention, like a whisper, at turn 62 
with ‘0I’m gonna move this ball here to the middle0’, as he started to touch the 
objects. There were two important implications from this speech gesture. Firstly, Dre 
uttered his intention at the moment he started to touch the Styrofoam ball, suggesting 
he was seeking approval for touching the objects. Secondly, his utterance was 
whispered, suggesting a self-prohibition indicative of his moral feeling that such 
approval may not be forthcoming from the group. For this reason his gesture may be 
interpreted as an indication of Dre’s moral expectations that were breached by 
touching the objects. His moral expectations were further evidenced by his physical 
withdrawal away from the objects for the remainder of the lesson. That is, he did not 
touch the objects again at a later stage in the lesson.    
 From Dre’s moment of physical withdrawal from the objects, the issue of 
establishing physical distance between the members as embodied observers and the 
objects became an obvious moral issue. This was evident at turn 85 where Shady was 
poking the objects with a pen, and Simon responded with the utterance ‘awh now 
look what you did’. Shady responded at turn 88 with ‘its stickin to the pen too’, 
which was a statement about his observation during his interference with the objects. 
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Interspersed with these turns were utterances by Dre who was speaking to 
Sam. Throughout turns 89 to 92, Dre was continuing to speak with Sam on the topic 
of the objects, and at turn 93, Dre interrupted his own conversation to reprimand 
Shady. At turn 93 Dre utters ‘just leave it(.)  Shady leave (.) its what they want to 
do’.  With this utterance Dre was supporting Simon’s utterance at turn 85, as together 
Dre and Simon were appealing to Shady to prohibit himself from touching the 
objects. The speech gestures of Simon (turn 85) and Dre (turn 93) illustrated moral 
force from within, demonstrating their shared experience as a sense respect for the 
objects.   
Given how objectivity in science is typically associated with distancing the 
scientist from the object (White, 2009), these experiences of respect may be 
associated with the establishment of an element of objectivity.  On this basis I refer 
to this respect related to physical distancing as respect for the objects or objectivity. 
This objectivity as respect for the objects became evident through turns 85 and 93, 
where Simon and Dre shared the same solidarity or emotional energy about the 
objects, prohibiting them from intruding on the space of the objects.  In these turns 
(85 & 93) they were showing respect for the objects by keeping their distance, and 
they were appealing to Shady’s sense of respect to prohibit himself from touching 
the objects. This was an appeal to Shady’s internal sense of respect that they 
presumed was shared between them.    
  In addition to evidencing the enactment of physical distance and the 
experience of respect, turn 93 also provides evidence for an epistemological role of 
respect. That is, how respect influenced what was known about the objects. At turn 
93, Dre uttered ‘its what they want to do’ and in making this utterance he enacted the 
role of physical distancing as part of the practice of observation. Physical distance 
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was part of the co-construction of objects enabling them to be known by the 
uniqueness of their particular spatial locality in the same way carbon and nitrogen 
were objectified by their particular spaces earlier (5.2.2). Through Dre’s utterance he 
was indicating how physical distance enabled the objects to become known 
independent of the embodied interference of the observers. This indicated how the 
enactment of distancing group members from the objects was about giving the 
objects space to do ‘what they wanted to do’ (turn 93).  In essence, Dre was talking 
about the need to experience objectivity. To expand on the notion of objectivity as 
respect for objects that has been presented so far, I analyze evidence of objectivity 
enacted through the ethnomethods of scientific language in the following section.   
5.3.3 Ethnomethods of scientific language and emotional energy. 
Respect through language practices became evident via the evolution of Dre’s 
language over the life of the situation described in fragment 03 below. In fragment 
03 the pattern of Dre’s language practices during the preliminary period of finding-
each-other were characterized by the ethnomethods in turns 1 to 40 (Appendix A). 
To illustrate Dre’s initial language while finding-each-other, I have shown relevant 
turns 3, 20, 35 and 36 in fragment 03 below. At turn 3, Dre referred to the objects as 
familiar, everyday things as he emphatically asked ‘ARE WEˊ cooking ˊtea:’. He 
then repeated this everyday sentiment with ‘lets cook some tea’ (turn 20) and ‘I like 
my tea very weak’ (turn 35). 
Episode A01, fragment 03 
Turn Speaker Transcript 
3 
20 
35 
36 
Dre 
Dre 
Dre 
 
ARE WEˊ cooking ˊtea:  
lets cook some tea 
I like my tea very weak (.) RIGHT (.) now lets throw it on (0.3) that’s how(.) that’s some 
good tea ((smiles as he places the beaker on the hotplate)) 
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 These turns (3, 20, 35 & 36) were all situated in the interaction, before Simon 
had established the need to observe the objects at turn 40 (fragment 01), discussed in 
section 5.3.1.  At these moments Dre was treating the objects as familiar everyday 
things and this treatment was reflected in what he said, and how he said it. More 
explicitly, Dre’s statements suggested that the objects could or should become a 
drink.  The style of his speech was also very casual with emphasis and rising pitch at 
‘ARE WEˊ’. The statement of ‘lets throw it on’ also suggested the imprecision of 
everyday, mundane treatment of the objects as a cup of tea.  
 In contrast, after Simon announced the need for observation (turn 40, 
fragment 01), and most notably, after Dre imposed the prohibition of physical 
distance between himself and the objects (turn 67, fragment 02), Dre’s language 
about the objects changed (turn 76, fragment 03, below). At turn 76 Dre made his 
first statement of observation about the objects in a scientific sense. As he uttered 
‘so: uhm: we could note the ba::lls’ (turn 76) the elongation of words and his use of 
the word ‘could’ suggested Dre was analyzing his speech gestures as he made them. 
He was being deliberate and tentative in his speech as seen in fragment 04 below, as 
evidenced by his utterance ‘say something like that, I don’t know how you would 
word that’ (turn 79).  
Episode A01, fragment 04 
Turn Speaker Transcript 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
 
90 
91 
Dre 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dre 
 
so: uhm: we could note the ba::lls when their close together they stick together, when you 
get close to the edge its stuck to the edge (.)  3.2sps 
((glances at Sam))  
say something like that, I don't know how you would word that(.) thats saying it like a 
ret*rd but 4.1sps 
((Sam is making notes as Dre speaks))  
 
well note that they want to stick  ((Shady, Simon & Dre all entrained on the object,  
Sam is taking notes)) 
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92 
93 
94 
 
178 
179 
180 
 
 
 
 
Dre 
note that the balls want to be attracted to each other and the edges of the water 
just leave it(.)  Shady leave (.) its what they want to do  
and the tea leaves are slowly uhm starting to sink to the bottom of the beaker 
  
so by putting the tea bag into the beaker the water has been tinted ah goldish teaish 
colour and you can see and it shows the convection and the um the um movements of the 
water:: currents: currents as the currents of the water as it goes around 
Dre’s utterance at turn 79 evidences his careful selection of words, indicating 
self-awareness about the scientific quality of his own utterances, as he evaluates and 
makes a judgment on these utterances at turns 76-77. This self-awareness was 
evident because at turn 79 he was making a statement about the words he chose to 
use. This adds to the evidence of Dre speaking tentatively and deliberately in the 
context science. In addition, across turns 76-77 his tentative, deliberate speech 
gesture was uttered at a speech rate of 3.2SPS, compared with the utterances about 
himself at turns 79-80 flowing at 4.1SPS. The slower rate in turns 76-77, compared 
with the rate at 79-80, was indicative of Dre being more deliberate about his 
utterances.  
The essential point here is that Dre made a change to the way he spoke about 
the objects.  Previously he spoke of them in emphatic ways as a cup of tea (fragment 
03). Later he spoke of them in a tentative, deliberate (selective) way where the 
language he was choosing in those moments reflected the physical distancing 
established at the same time. There were no overt external influences in these 
moments causing Dre to speak this way. Despite this, new language in relation to the 
objects was emerging through Dre’s utterances. The self-prohibition of everyday 
language and the selection of new language may be interpreted as being associated 
with moral force enacted through ethnomethods that achieved observation. That is, 
Dre now (turns 76-77) enacted a self-prohibition upon the language he used about the 
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objects.  He prohibited himself from treating them like a cup of tea, and instead 
treated them with a sense of respect and objectivity, like scientific objects.  
Further evidence of this tentative, deliberate language was observed in turns 
89-93 (fragment 03), and then again, later in the data at turns 178-180 (fragment 04). 
In latter turns (178-180) Dre described the actions of the objects by uttering ‘you can 
see and it shows the convection and um the um movements of the water:: currents:’ 
(turns 179-180).  In these turns, Dre was still speaking in a tentative, deliberate 
language, but he was also using different concepts. Instead of speaking of the objects 
in ways such as ‘ARE WEˊ cooking tea’ (turn 3, fragment 03), he was now referring 
to the same physical objects in terms of concepts such as ‘convection’ and ‘currents’ 
(turn 179-180, fragment 04).  
In terms of objectification, the objects of Dre’s inquiry had remained in the 
same physical locality.  In this situation, Dre had relocated himself between turn 3 
and turn 180 by the enactment of distancing himself from the objects. At a physical 
level, the increased distance prohibited physical gestures that might interfere with the 
objects.  At a conceptual level, the change in Dre’s language practices increased 
conceptual distance by prohibiting certain types of speech gesture. For example, he 
no longer referred to ‘cooking tea’, but instead had begun to use scientific 
terminology. The gestural prohibitions (physical & speech) that distanced Dre 
physically from the beaker of tea, also enabled him to objectify the objects that were 
now further from his body.   
The tea was physically objectified as a familiar space. The prohibitions on 
speech gestures placed Dre in a position where he was maintaining a sense of 
objectivity or respect, but to do this through speech, he had to find new language to 
describe the objects. By finding new language to describe the objects he was 
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enacting and superimposing concepts as an unfamiliar space upon the familiar space. 
This was evident with the example at turn 180 where Dre tells the group ‘you can see 
and it shows the convection’.  At this moment Dre ‘can see’ (turn 179), and by his 
utterance ‘you can see’ (turn 179) he presumes others can see the same reality in the 
physical objects that he sees; that is, convection.  Physically Dre could see the 
familiar space of the objects, and as he uttered ‘it shows the convection’ he was 
superimposing an abstract concept, convection, as an unfamiliar space in relation to 
the interaction. That is, the concept of convection was unfamiliar to the particular, 
localized situation of treating tea leaves. Further evidence of new language, and new 
concepts as unfamiliar spaces, is observable as Dre goes on to say ‘movements of the 
water:: currents:’ (turn 180).  In this part of turn 180 he mentioned the visually 
accessible familiar space of moving water and superimposed the abstract concept of 
currents that pertains to the unfamiliar space of science. In section 5.3.4, I will 
explore how emotional energy binds these evolving objects within superimposed 
spaces. The evolution of these objects over the duration of the interactions I analyzed 
involve transference (5.3.4) and ultimately leads to the establishment of similarity 
(5.5).    
5.3.4 Transference and Unification of Conceptual Objects. 
In section 5.3.3 on scientific language my data revealed the evolution of 
language about physical objects and I described this in terms of the superimposition 
of unfamiliar spaces onto and familiar spaces. This notion of superimposition is a 
way of describing the physical and/or analytical contiguity of familiar and unfamiliar 
objects. I have explained the occurrence of superimposition in the context of respect, 
where respect is a form of emotional energy. An important feature of emotional 
energy is its quality of binding or unifying group members around objects as 
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discussed earlier in section 3.4.3 (Collins, 2004). In the context of language, this 
binding or unification of groups around objects was noted in a science classroom by 
Olitsky (2007) as the transference of emotional energy from enacted activity to the 
shared use of scientific concepts and language (see section 2.1.3). I now focus on 
phenomenon of transference and its association with the unification of conceptual 
objects. 
5.3.4.1  Transference: worksheet to beaker. 
Transference of emotional energy in the following example involved the 
inclusion of ideas about the worksheet and ideas about the beaker being included 
simultaneously within the mutual focus of the group. Transference was evident in 
episode A01, fragment 01, discussed in section 5.3.1, where I analysed the 
experience of respect by students for the worksheet instructions in relation to the 
need to observe the motion of tea leaves (turn 47). At different moments in fragment 
01 (episode A01) Simon, Shady and Dre attributed moral authority to the worksheet 
instructions and acted with respect towards the worksheet by refraining from 
speculating about the motion of the objects.  
Through self-prohibition from speculation, the group each shared respect as 
emotional energy toward the worksheet by attributing moral authority to it. This 
shared respect was achieved via their enactment of self-prohibition in relation to the 
objects being subjected to speculation and observation. To enact respect for the 
moral authority of the worksheet, the group transferred this respect to the objects by 
limiting their interactions with the objects, to observation only. This transference of 
respect from the worksheet to the objects is an important phenomenon observed in 
other situations in my data. 
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5.3.4.2  Transference: science teacher to beaker. 
A further example of transference of emotional energy and the unification of 
different conceptual objects at the focus of emotional energy may be interpreted via a 
comparison of two adjacent fragments from Episode A02, below. This example of 
transference commences with fragment 01, below, showing Sam at turn 112 quietly 
stating ‘0everybody else is like put the [whole tea bag in]0’. Sam was referring to an 
adjacent group that had placed a whole tea bag into their beaker. Simon and Dre 
responded by moving their face and body alignments toward the adjacent group (turn 
113) and Dre then uttered ‘[yeah do:n’t] (.)’ (turn 114), ‘do:n't use them as the 
example they put the whole tea bag in’ (turn 114). Dre’s utterance re-aligned the 
group focus away from the objects as shown in turn 114.  
Episode A02, fragment 01: Loss of respect  
Turn Speaker Transcript 
113 
114 
115 
116 
117 
118 
119 
Sam 
Dre 
 
 
Dre 
Sam 
Dre 
0everybody else is like put the [whole tea bag in]0   ((Sam, Simon & Dre faced away))  
                                                       [yeah do:n’t] (.)       
do:n't use them as the example they put the whole tea bag in   
((Dre points as he speaks, Sam, Simon and Shady aligned bodies at an adjacent group)) 
they tea bagged the sh*t out of it 
big cup of tea 
we like our tea ah: weak 
At turn 115-116, Dre pointed to the other group of students, concurrent with 
his utterance about that group. Sam, Simon and Shady responded by looking toward 
the other group as evidenced by their face and body alignments (turns 113, 116).  
The group was no longer entrained on their objects (i.e. the equipment on their 
workbench). At turn 117 Dre uttered ‘they tea bagged the sh*t out of it’.  For Dre, 
this was a moment of reverting to familiar everyday language in relation to the 
objects, on the other group’s work bench. Sam followed Dre with the utterance ‘big 
cup of tea’ (turn 118) and Dre then referred to his group’s objects with ‘we like our 
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tea ah: weak’ (turn 119). Through fragment 01 there was evidence that Dre’s group 
had lost their emotional energy or respect for the objects of their inquiry.  They lost 
their shared embodied alignment around the objects, and they re-aligned toward the 
adjacent group (turn 116). At the same time they reverted to familiar everyday 
language about the objects in turns 117, 118 and 119. They had not used this 
language since it was abandoned after turn 40, as discussed earlier in section 5.3.1 
and 5.3.3. This new situation in fragment 01 may be interpreted as a loss of 
emotional energy in relation to the objects that were previously treated with respect. 
The new focus of the group was around a new collection of objects in the form of the 
adjacent group of students. With this shift in focus, the group’s experience of 
emotional energy tended to become more dramatic and influenced by profane ideas 
evident in Dre’s reversion to everyday language. The experience of emotional energy 
had changed, and evidence of emotional energy as respect for the objects of inquiry 
had diminished. 
Suddenly the loss of respect was resolved, as respect was re-energized 
through transference in fragment 02 below. This was evident at turn 120, when I re-
entered the group, looked through the side of the beaker and asked ‘so what can you 
see here’. With my arrival, from the other side of the classroom, the physical gestures 
and speech gestures of the group changed. This was evident in the way Dre faced the 
objects and uttered ‘notice the(.) balls are’ (turn 121). Dre was attempting to make 
statements about his prior observations as I asked ‘whats happening here at the 
moment’ (turn 122).   
Episode A02, fragment 02: Respect re-energized 
Turn Speaker Transcript 
120 
121 
Mr Davis 
Dre 
so: so what can you see here ((leaning down looking through the beaker side angle)) 
notice the(.) the balls are 
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122 
123 
124 
125 
Mr Davis 
 
 
Dre 
whats happening here at the moment ((Mr Davis makes this statement while leaning 
down looking into the side of the beaker. As he makes this statement Sam and Simon 
immediately and concurrently lean down to look into the side of the beaker)) 
the balls are attracted to the edge ((points to the beaker, looks at Mr Davis)) 
Throughout turns 120-124 in fragment 02, above, there was a realignment of 
the group focus around the objects.  As Dre continued his description of observations 
with ‘the balls are attracted to the edge’ (turn 125) he pointed to the beaker and then 
looked at me. The physical re-alignment of the group is shown in figure 5.4 below.  
 
a. 
 
b. 
 
 
c. 
 
d. 
 
 
 Figure 5.4. Transference around  objects: Shady (far left), Sam (centre foreground), Simon (centre 
rear), Dre (right), Mr Davis (near Dre) 
As I approached the group in Figure 5.4.a Dre had stopped talking and was 
already looking at the objects with his hands on the bench. Simon is mostly obscured 
in Figure 5.4.a, but his face is visible and orientated toward the adjacent group, as 
indicated by the white arrow in figure 5.4.a. Sam was standing upright facing in the 
same direction as the adjacent group he had spoken of in turn 113, fragment 01. 
Figure 5.4.b shows the moment as I made my utterance in turn 122, where Dre began 
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to make a pointing gesture toward the objects, Simon had faced the objects (obscured 
in the image behind Sam), and Shady glanced at the objects.  Then in relation to the 
fixed, horizontal, dotted datum line in each image, Sam and Simon lowered their 
heads at the same time in figure 5.4.c as Dre continued to gesture about the objects. 
In figure 5.4.d, Simon and Sam had lowered their heads further so that they were 
both leaning on the bench and looking closely at the objects, as Dre completed his 
utterance at turn 125 by looking at me.  
 The change in gestures and entrainment across fragment’s 01-02 provide 
evidence of self-prohibition as seen by fragment 01 where there was interaction away 
from the objects, followed by fragment 02 where there was entrainment around the 
objects. The differences were my absence in fragment 01, and my presence in 
fragment 02. This situation may be interpreted in terms of the respect group members 
had internalized in relation to my social being as the science teacher. This may 
explain why their sense of my presence may have acted as a moral force changing 
the group’s shared focus across those moments. As the science teacher came closer 
to the students the respect was felt from within, acting as a moral force.  Thus, 
distance, space and respect became evident again as important features of another 
situation.  
 5.3.4.3  Superimposition and transference of respect. 
 I return now to the notion of superimposition, discussed in section 5.2 above. 
My arrival in the group as the science teacher, discussed in 5.3.4.2, may be 
interpreted as a superimposition of the social being of the science teacher, upon the 
social beings of each student, and importantly, the objects. For this reason upon 
experiencing the presence of the science teacher, through their sense of respect, this 
experience spread through the group members, as science students, energizing them 
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to re-align their bodies around the objects. The re-alignment of bodies around the 
objects came to exist as a series of gestures through which respect towards the 
teacher was enacted and experienced by the students.  In this way, respect for the 
teacher became evident in their transference of respect toward the objects as they 
directed their gaze toward the materials and began to gesture towards them.   
Transference of emotional energy was originally documented by Durkheim 
(1912/2008) as contagion (section 3.4.3) whereby relationships between ideas were 
established through situations of interaction. In relation to collective emotional 
energy (collective effervescence), Durkheim (1912/2008) described contagion as the 
transference of respect from one object to another during moments of intense 
emotional energy. In the context of my study transference of respect for objects by 
the students was observed between the worksheet and objects (5.3.4.1) and between 
the science teacher and objects (5.3.4.2). In both cases, superimposition of 
conceptual objects allowed respect directed at one currently respected object (e.g. the 
worksheet) to be transferred to another, newly respected object (e.g. the beaker). The 
notion of contagion or transference as a function of respect has important 
implications for my study around the co-construction of similarity within the context 
of analogical reasoning. This is addressed in section 5.5.2. 
5.3.5 Objectivity and emotional energy. 
Throughout section 5.3 I have explored emotional energy in terms of student 
experiences of respect, hierarchy and transference associated with the achievement of 
their shared understanding about concepts in the context of analogical reasoning.  
Importantly, these experiences of respect, hierarchy and transference of emotional 
energy have involved ethnomethods that I collectively described as practices of 
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observation, distancing and language prohibition. On this basis I have addressed 
aspects of research question two.  
Another perspective on what I have analysed in section 5.3 involves the 
practices of observation, distancing and language prohibition in terms of the 
enactment of objectivity by my students. As discussed in section 5.3, these practices 
I identify with objectivity were imbued with emotional energy as respect for the 
objects of scientific inquiry. Throughout section 5.3, and as indicated in section 3.4, I 
use the term respect in reference to a particular form of emotional energy. Durkheim 
(1912/2008) described this as the collective energy behind moral forces acting on 
people from within. Evidence in my data shows how respect is observable through 
the enactment of ethnomethods. These ethnomethods make the lived experience of 
respect observable as a subdued, undramatic form of emotional energy.  As a 
subdued, undramatic emotional energy, respect and its related ethnomethods 
establish situations where members view objects with a sense of detachment and 
independence from themselves. It may be argued that the intense focus upon objects 
at times creates an illusion of science being emotion-free. This was evident in the 
practices of self-prohibition, and the serious response of re-focusing on objects when 
the teacher arrived (5.3.4.2), or in attributing authority to the worksheet (5.3.4.1) by 
enacting speculation-free observation of the objects. My data provided numerous 
examples of how respect for objects involved subdued, undramatic emotional energy 
while intensifying mutual focus around the objects. The objects become the perennial 
center of the group, driven by intense, but undramatic, moments of respect for the 
objects. My notion of practices of objectivity, imbued with respect, will be expanded 
upon in my discussion in chapter 6 (section 6.3.1). 
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5.4 A Family of Concepts 
My analysis in this section addresses research question two by explaining 
how families of concepts are established via enacted ethnomethods and experiences 
of emotional energy. In section 5.4.1 I analyze situations where a science concept 
and a vague idea are excluded from the group’s shared understanding about the 
objects they are observing.  These situations explain the role of emotional energy in 
the enactment of ideas as proposals to the group, and the impact on emotional energy 
as exclusion is enacted by the group.  These data provide evidence of how the 
boundaries of a family of concepts may be defined by the group. 
In relation to the treatment of objects (ideas/concepts) included in the family 
of concepts, I analyze data to explain the establishment of hierarchy within the 
family in section 5.4.2. The context of hierarchy within the family of concepts 
involves the establishment of a relation between group members and concepts.  This 
is important, as the family is not simply a family of concepts. It is a family inclusive 
of group members, evident through enacted situations of self-deprecation and self-
prohibition. The enacted ethnomethods associated with self-deprecation and self-
prohibition situate objects in the social hierarchy, thereby including them within the 
family of student group members. 
5.4.1 Family, exclusion and loss of respect. 
5.4.1.1  Exclusion of a concept: neutrons. 
Through analysis of episode  A04 that I present in this section,  I explore how 
exclusion and loss of respect (emotional energy) about a science concept provides 
evidence of group boundaries, contributing to the notion of family. This episode 
commences with a long pause where Dre was observing the material beaker objects 
on the workbench (turns 95-96) in episode A04, fragment 01, below. Dre then started 
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the conversation at turn 97 with ‘why do you’ and a 0.1 second pause. He then 
continued with ‘why do you reckon the balls are attracted to:: the edges’ followed by 
another 0.1 second pause. At this utterance Dre pointed to the objects and directed 
his eyes (glanced) at Sam (turn 98). This glance suggested Dre was directing the 
question to Sam, as eye contact such as glancing has been associated with 
attentiveness and shared awareness (Canadas & Lupianez, 2012; Heron, 1970), see 
episode A04, fragment 01 below. 
Episode A04, fragment 01 
Turn Speaker Transcript 
95 
96 
97 
98 
99 
100 
101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
 
 
Dre 
 
 
Shady 
Dre 
Dre 
 
 
 
((Long pause of several minutes. No conversation, scratching, looking around waiting for 
something to happen, Dre is looking closely at the objects)) 
why do you (.) why do you reckon the balls are attracted to:: the edges (.) ((points to 
object and glances at Sam)) why that is  ((Shady is glancing at Dre as Dre speaks)) 
(3:00) ((Shady looks down at the beaker)) 
Neutrons ((looks at Dre and smiles. Dre looks back and smiles at Shady. Eye contact.)) 
((Dre glances at Sam while continuing his smile))  
((Laughter))  YOU got it  ((points to Shady and laughs strongly)) 
((Shady, Simon and Sam join the laughter. Back and forth body motion by Sam and Dre)) 
 ((Dre leans down to look at the beak through the side angle))  
(6:55) ((Dre looking through the side of the beaker)) 
As Dre made speech gestures at turns 97-98, Shady was glancing at Dre (turn 
98), indicating his attentiveness toward Dre’s gestures (Heron, 1971). Dre’s glance at 
Sam, however, directed the speech gesture toward Sam (turn 98), establishing an 
expectation that Sam might provide an answer. This expectation was consistent with 
earlier language practices evident in the earlier presentation (5.3.3) of episode A01 
fragment 04 (turns 81, 90, 91) where Dre spoke and Sam would write. Those 
moments established a pattern of Dre directing his speech gestures toward Sam.   
Despite these speech and facial gestures (glances), Sam did not respond to 
Dre, and there were three seconds of silence at turn 99. This silence suggested Sam 
did not have a suitable answer to Dre’s question. In the context of respect for the 
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science objects, Sam may be interpreted as exhibiting his sense of respect (and 
objectivity) by refraining from providing an incorrect answer. 
During this silence (turn 99) Shady shifted his visual focus from Dre to the 
beaker containing the objects. Then at turn 100 Shady broke the silence with an 
emphatic announcement of ‘neutrons’.  As Shady made this announcement he looked 
up from the beaker, looked directly at Dre and smiled. Dre responded by looking 
back at Shady and smiling.  At the moment of these mutual smiles, Dre and Shady 
had maintained eye contact (turn 100). Dre then glanced at Sam (turn 101).  Sam’s 
response was obscured from my camera view, but following Dre’s glance, Dre then 
burst into laughter as he pointed at Shady and shouted emphatically ‘YOU got it’ 
(turn 102). These gestures by Dre acted as an invitation for the group to join in a 
moment of laughter as evident at turn 103, where Dre, Shady, Simon and Sam 
laughed, with prominent back and forth body motions by Sam and Dre (turn 103). 
This outbreak of laughter across turns 100-103, evidenced a series of 
moments where the group enacted the exclusion of a concept (neutrons), newly 
introduced to the interaction as an unfamiliar space. The laughter as an ethnomethod, 
enacted the exclusion of the concept as a possible way for understanding the physical 
objects in the beaker at that moment. By suggesting that neutrons may be the answer 
to Dre’s question, Shady was enacting a scientific concept about which group 
members had some shared understanding. Yet despite their shared understanding 
about the concept of neutrons within scientific discourse (i.e. a community larger 
than the student group), it had no place in the student group’s particular localized 
situation, unfolding in the micro-society of the group. 
The most important feature of these moments was not the rejection of 
neutrons, but how the rejection was enacted and experienced.  In the moments 
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leading up to Dre’s question about the group was waiting for something to happen 
(turns 95-96).  Dre was watching the objects and then he deliberately formulated and 
uttered a question (turns 97-98). Deliberation, as a quality of this question, was 
evident in Dre’s language in the way he elongated ‘to::’ at turn 97, before stating ‘the 
edges’.  At that moment the elongation suggested a pause as he thought about the 
final direction of this question. This question established undramatic emotional 
energy as it coordinated the group’s focus upon the objects, in the form of an 
expectation of an answer being forthcoming. This was evident through the three 
seconds of silence where the group waited for an answer from Sam. But through the 
three seconds of silence (turn 99) a situation emerged where Dre’s question could not 
be answered by Sam or anyone else in the group. 
The intensity of this undramatic emotional energy became evident when 
Shady answered the question with ‘neutrons’ (turn 100). At that moment Shady and 
Dre established direct eye contact, Shady made a facial gesture consistent with a 
smile and Dre reflected this smile back to Shady.  This was a moment of shared 
emotional energy about the idea of neutrons, as a possible answer to Dre’s earlier 
question. The smile by Shady indicated he was not serious about the answer, which 
became evident through the laughter this moment was leading toward (turn 102). At 
turn 101, Dre reflected Shady’s smile indicating his understanding that Shady was 
not serious. Thus, the intensity of their emotional energy was sufficient for Dre and 
Shady to communicate understanding between one another through coordinated eye 
contact and coordinated smiles. 
Dre and Shady’s experience of emotional energy then became dramatic. As 
Dre was still smiling, he glanced away from Shady and toward Sam. Dre then 
laughed and pointed at Shady, drawing group attention to him, as he shouted ‘YOU 
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got it’ (turn 102). This dramatic event provided clear evidence of intense emotional 
energy as the group joined together in coordinated laughter.  
Laughter in fragment 01 may be interpreted as indicating two important 
features of this situation.  Firstly, laughter has been associated with the release of 
emotion (Dewey, 1894; Roth et al., 2011). To release emotional energy it must have 
been present in the subdued, undramatic moments prior to the laughter. In fragment 
01, the pre-laughter emotional energy appears to have been established through the 
expectation of a serious answer from Sam.  The non-serious answer from Shady 
initiated a release of emotional energy as laughter. This release was indicative of 
high intensity emotional energy that appeared dramatic because of the laughter. But 
the emotional energy existed before the laughter and was evident in an undramatic 
form through scientific observation by the students. The actions of laughter made the 
preceding undramatic emotional energy visible to me as the researcher.  
The second feature of the situation fragment 01 was the object neutrons being 
rejected, as and through, the enactment of laughter and the experience of a release in 
emotional energy. Unlike formal accounts of cognitive analogical reasoning, there 
was no logical discussion about Dre’s question, no suggestion of possible answers 
and the suitability or otherwise of neutrons as an answer.  The object of neutrons, 
whatever it may have looked like for each member of the group, was rejected 
outright by the group, not through an articulation of logic, but by the shared release 
of emotional energy. The feeling that neutrons was an incorrect answer was shared 
through smiles, glances, pointing and laughter. These ethnomethods released the 
emotional energy as a tension of expectation, producing laughter and rejecting 
neutrons as an object of parody. As indicated by Roth et al. (2011), parody in science 
classrooms may be interpreted as an indication of the seriousness of science.  By 
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laughing at a situation it may indicate an understanding of an alternative serious side 
to the situation.  In the situation of Dre’s group, the serious side of the parody was 
the rejection of neutrons from the possible family of concepts that may be used to 
explain the physical objects on the workbench.  
5.4.1.2  Exclusion of Dre’s vague idea. 
In episode A04 fragment 02 below, the situation of laughter then subsided 
into further silence at turn 105, for almost seven seconds. During that silence Dre 
was leaning on the bench looking through the side of the beaker at turn 104. Dre then 
recommenced the conversation from his earlier question at turn 97-98. This time 
however, Dre expressed himself in a hesitant tone with a disjointed proposal directed 
at answering his own question from turn 97-98. The hesitant tone was indicated in 
the utterance of ‘do ya reckon its cos::’ (do you think it’s because) with the 
elongation of the ‘cos::’ as he stood upright and pointed to the beaker in turn 106. 
Episode A04, fragment 02 
Turn Speaker Transcript 
105 
106 
107 
108 
109 
110 
 
Dre 
 
 
Sam 
Dre 
 (6:55) ((Dre looking through the side of the beaker)) 
do ya reckon its cos::  ((stands up and point to the beaker as he speaks))  you know how:: 
doesn’t the water like:  its very sli:ghtly: ((points at the beaker and Sam is looking)) but 
doesn’t it towards the middle like arc up a little bit  ((Dre glances at with Sam))  
n:eh: it dips down a little in the middle ((makes a slight hand gesture toward the beaker)) 
((Dre closes his eyes, lowers his head, and looks away.  Shady was looking at Dre)) 
At turn 107, Dre then uttered the word ‘you’ and then the words ‘doesn’t the 
water like: its very sli:ghtly:’ with an elongated ‘like’ and ‘slightly’. Finally, Dre 
structured his answer more coherently with ‘doesn’t it towards the middle like arc up 
a little bit’ as he glanced at Sam. These utterances by Dre were in effect an answer to 
his earlier question from turns 97-98. By glancing at Sam in turn 108, Dre was 
seeking confirmation from Sam (Canadas & Lupianez, 2012; Heron, 1970).  
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Sam’s response at turn 109 was ‘n:eh: it dips down a little in the middle’.  
This response was a rejection of the idea Dre had put forward for inclusion within the 
group. Dre’s response to this exclusion was observed initially at turn 110 as Dre 
closed his eyes, lowered his head and then looked away. There was no further 
discussion about Dre’s idea. Dre simply withdrew, as if he was excluded from the 
group, together with his idea.  
As Dre withdrew (turn 110), the group were observing his ethnomethods. 
This was physically evident by Shady’s eye direction toward Dre (turn 110), and it 
became evident in the unspoken, but coordinated shift of emotional energy away 
from the objects, Dre had spoken about. As Dre withdrew, the group responded at 
this moment by disengaging from the objects. At this moment the group lost focus 
about the objects and became engaged with an adjacent group.  This loss of focus 
was analyzed earlier in section 5.3.4.2 as a loss of respect for the objects.  
5.4.1.3  Summary of “exclusion”. 
In section 5.4.1 I have addressed research question two in relation to the 
formation of a family of concepts by explaining how emotional energy may be 
involved in the formation of family boundaries. The moments preceding this loss of 
respect comprised of two instances (5.4.1.2 & 5.4.1.2) where ideas/concepts/objects 
were excluded and on each occasion there was a release or loss of emotional energy.  
In the first instance, the release was through laughter at neutrons (fragment 01) and 
in the second instance the group shifted their focus, enacting a physical withdrawal 
from the objects of inquiry (fragment 02).  
Two important features emerge from these situations in relation to the notion 
of a family of concepts. Firstly, ideas were enacted into the group situation by a 
person who already had some emotional experience directed at the idea. The 
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embodied enactment of the idea was a means of sharing the idea and building 
emotional energy around the idea with the group, as a means of inclusion. Secondly, 
rejection of an idea had an emotional impact on the group. This was evident in the 
way exclusion was enacted against individuals and in subsequent group actions. 
These emotional experiences and enacted responses defined the boundaries of a 
family of objects (students, ideas, materials) in particular instances where ideas were 
briefly enacted through embodied sounds and motions, and then excluded from the 
family. 
5.4.2 Family, hierarchy and emotional energy. 
In addition to determining boundaries, via the inclusion or exclusion of 
objects into the group, the enactment of a family hierarchy also functioned to arrange 
objects within the group so that objects became known in relation to each other.  For 
example, in formal accounts of cognitive analogical reasoning, spatialization and 
hierarchy were used to represent relations between familiar (analogue) and 
unfamiliar (target) concepts (Glynn, 1994a). I explain this below by analyzing Glynn 
(1994a) as a documents-in-use before analyzing my classroom data. A document-in-
use in ethnomethodology refers to an approach to understanding a document as a 
resource in the enactment of a user’s interaction with the document ( cf. 3.1.4.3). 
5.4.2.1  Family, hierarchy and Glynn (1994a). 
In the literature review (2.3.6) I explained how I derived the categories for 
my research questions from Glynn’s (1994a) study. These categories were a family of 
concepts, hierarchy and transference. Glynn used these categories to explain how 
knowledge was arranged as conceptual networks, made possible by relational 
connections between concepts.  He also suggested that understanding could be 
transferred from a familiar concept to an unfamiliar concept. To explain how this 
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was possible, Glynn (1994a, p. 8) emphasized how analogy was, “a process of 
identifying similarities among two or more concepts,” and that, “analogy may 
involve an entire family of concepts, with varying degrees of family resemblance 
they share among themselves.” 
In this section I analyze Glynn’s illustration of a family of concepts and 
hierarchy by treating a data sample from his paper as a document-in-use (cf. 3.2.3.3). 
Glynn used an analogy of Bohr’s atom to illustrate his notion of analogy. In this 
illustration he establishes relations of family resemblance between two families of 
concepts within a hierarchical relationship, as shown in figure 5.5 below. 
 
Figure 5.5. Glynn’s model of analogy with a family of concepts and 
hierarchy, applying contiguity and superimposition (Glynn, 1994a). 
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As I read Figure 5.5, I am drawn to the two groups of concepts describing the 
bookcase and Bohr’s atom. Each family of concepts is grouped in its own hierarchy, 
where Glynn has described subordinate concepts as features. The compared with 
label and two way arrows connect features between each family of concepts. Each 
connected concept has been placed by Glynn adjacent to or contiguous with the 
other.  For example, books are contiguous with electrons, and my attentiveness is 
directed, by the bi-directional arrows, to compare these concepts as being similar.  
By placing these concepts close to each other, and connecting them with arrows, 
Glynn has directed me as a reader to imagine the possible similarity between a book 
and an electron. But any similarity I construct, in my occasion of reading this figure, 
is constructed in the context of these two families. In the context of all the other 
contiguous concepts, which I also compare, I make sense  of this diagram to reach 
some moral understanding with Glynn (asynchronously) that the bookshelf family of 
concepts is similar to the Bohr atom family of concepts.  
The hierarchy of each family is also situated within a larger hierarchy where 
concepts as family members are defined as subordinate concepts. As subordinate 
concepts, families are unified under a superordinate concept Glynn has called a tiered 
shelving system. I am directed to this by the explicit description of the superordinate 
concept and the arrows indicating a generalized concept at the top of the hierarchy. 
Finally Glynn has made a generalized model of his idea about analogy in the box at 
the top of figure 5.5.  
The aim of my analysis of Glynn’s analogy is to illustrate how Glynn’s 
explanation of analogical reasoning relies upon notions of conceptual networks in the 
form of a family of concepts within a hierarchy. This reliance on these notions is 
structured within Glynn’s explanation without these being part of the formal 
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cognitive perspective of analogical reasoning that he presents in his theory. Glynn 
appears to rely on these social categories as a resource to support his explanation. 
This situates readers or users of his journal article to enact, re-produce or co-
construct his idea of analogy and analogical reasoning. He has explicitly used 
categories with social origins such as family and hierarchy, and he has also used 
notions of contiguity and superimposition to illustrate similarity.  Glynn’s use of 
these social categories is not accidental, as he has explicitly used them in his 
explanation. He has explicitly used these terms in his language and he has used 
contiguity and superimposition in his diagram by the spatial arrangement of his 
particular family of concepts. Finally, he has used these categories not as statements 
of fact about the theory of structure mapping, but as ways to direct the attentiveness, 
imagination and enacted thinking of his readers. His way of structuring the re-
enactment of his analogy by readers is to use social categories such as family, 
hierarchy and spatialization in relation to each other as a way of defining objects 
(i.e., distance, contiguity and superimposition). My lived experience of reading 
Glynn (1994a), while asynchronous with Glynn, is very much a form of social 
interaction where Glynn has directed my enacted, embodied motions and sounds, in 
my reading and making sense of his analogy.  
5.4.2.2  Hierarchy and self-deprecation. 
In this section, I now focus on hierarchy as it became evident in episode A03, 
fragment 01 below. This episode comprises data from an earlier episode addressing 
self-prohibition and language practices (5.3.3). Throughout turns 76-80 in episode 
A03, fragment 01 below, Sam was writing notes as Dre spoke (turn 81). Within 
fragment 01, my focus was on turns 79-80 where Dre uttered ‘say something like 
that, I don’t know how you would word that (.) that’s saying it like a ret*rd but’. 
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Episode A03, fragment 01 
Turn Speaker Transcript 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
Dre so: uhm: we could note the ba::lls when their close together they stick together, when you 
get close to the edge its stuck to the edge (.)  ((3.15 SPS)) 
((glances at Sam))  
say something like that(.) I don't know how you would word that(.) thats saying it like a 
ret*rd but(.)     ((4.10 SPS)) 
((Sam is making notes as Dre speaks))  
see watch when they get close together they sort of like 
I interpreted these utterances at turns 79-80 in relation to Dre’s deliberate 
language in turns 76-77, established in section 5.3.3. At turn 79 Dre’s first utterance 
‘say something like that(.)’ invited Sam to consider some other words that may be 
similar to Dre’s statement in turns 76-77. Dre then continued with ‘I don’t know how 
you would word that(.)’ (turn 79), suggesting he perceived Sam to be better situated 
to describe their shared observations in a more deliberate way than Dre had done in 
turns 76-77.   Finally Dre finished his statement with ‘thats saying it like a ret*rd 
but(.)’ showing Dre making a remark about his self-perception in terms of his ability 
to describe the objects of inquiry. 
When read together the turns from 76-77 and 79-80 appear to establish a 
“denial of expectation” (Rigalleau, Guerry & Granjon, 2014, p. 467), similar to that 
associated with the use of the word ‘but’ in psycholinguistic studies (Lakoff, 1971). 
A denial of expectation is where a person makes an utterance to establish an 
expectation and then makes a further utterance to withdraw or deny the expectation. 
In the following analysis, I explain below how Dre’s denial of expectation was 
enacted, achieving a sense of hierarchy between Dre and the objects of inquiry.  
In a conversational sense, an example of a denial of expectation would be 
‘Paul is smart, but I don’t think he’ll pass the exam’. In this structure the first part of 
the utterance establishes expectations based on the localized situation, and ‘but’ is 
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inserted to introduce a new utterance removing the possibility of a likely expectation 
emerging from the first utterance. That is, we know Paul is smart from the first 
utterance, and we would expect a smart person like Paul to pass an exam however 
the ‘but’ leads to the next utterance introducing a denial of expectation.   
In the case of Dre’s utterances at fragment 01 there was greater complexity 
than the simple example of Paul, as in Dre’s situation ‘but’ appeared in the wrong 
location.  Turns 76-77 established Dre’s observations using his tentative, deliberate 
language.  In the context of Sam making notes, the expectation would be that Dre 
was deliberately selecting words for Sam to record on the worksheet. Then at turn 79 
Dre’s utterance of ‘say something like that(.)’ has the effect of the word ‘but’ as it 
acts as a denial of expectation by introducing the next utterances. For example if we 
relocate ‘but(.)’ from the end of turn 80, and substitute it to replace ‘say something 
like that(.)’ at turn 79 we would change Dre’s utterance to ‘but(.) I don’t know how 
you would word that(.) that’s saying it like a ret*rd’ as shown at turn 79a in the 
amended version of fragment 01. Both fragment 01 and fragment 01A are shown 
below to illustrate how moving the word but achieves the same meaning as ‘say 
something like that’ in turn 79 fragment 01.    
Episode A03, fragment 01 
Turn Speaker Transcript 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
Dre so: uhm: we could note the ba::lls when their close together they stick together, when you 
get close to the edge its stuck to the edge (.)   
((glances at Sam)) 
say something like that(.) I don't know how you would word that(.) thats saying it like a 
ret*rd but(.)   
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Episode A03, fragment 01A 
Turn Speaker Transcript 
 
76 
77 
78 
79a 
 
Dre 
 ‘but’ Relocated & Substituted in turn 79a, below: 
so: uhm: we could note the ba::lls when their close together they stick together, when you  
get close to the edge its stuck to the edge (.)   
((glances at Sam)) 
but(.) I don't know how you would word that(.) thats saying it like a ret*rd 
The interpretation of but being relocated and substituted, as shown in turn 79a 
in fragment 01A, does not change the meaning of Dre’s utterance, but it does make 
clearer the role of ‘I don’t know how you would word that(.)’ as a means of 
introducing a denial of expectation (Rigalleau et.al., 2014). Dre had indicated this 
denial of expectation with a ‘but’ at the end of his turn 80, which appeared out of 
place. This was probably because he had already achieved the denial with the earlier 
utterance ‘say something like that(.)’ and no longer needed the word ‘but’. The use 
of but at the end was indicative of how he felt about his original claims about the 
objects in turns 76-77.  The ‘but’ at the end of his utterance at turn 80 in fragment 01, 
while linguistically complex, conveys a feeling of denial supporting the coherence of 
his utterances in the earlier part of turn 79 (fragment 01.   
In the context of my study, this denial was important as it was indicative of 
Dre experiencing a sense of self-worth contributing to an understanding of respect 
and hierarchy. The denial in fragment 01 illustrated respect for the objects as Dre 
was indicating this was his best deliberate description of the objects. Through this 
denial he illustrated his own emotional sense that his best words were still not worthy 
of describing these objects. This may be interpreted as Dre situating himself in a 
hierarchical relationship with the objects, where the objects were at the top of the 
hierarchy. In addition, Dre’s invitation for Sam to amend his spoken words suggested 
Dre sensed his self-worth as less than Sam’s.  Through this denial of expectation Dre 
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was achieving a sense of hierarchy that became an important element in the 
establishment of respect for the objects.  
5.4.2.3  Hierarchy via language and distance. 
This sense of hierarchy was also evident in the practices of prohibition 
around physical distance and language analyzed in section 5.3. These practices may 
be interpreted as establishing a sense of hierarchy, in the way they expanded the 
freedom of objects by limiting the freedom of group members. Evidence of this sense 
of hierarchy was illustrated in episode A03 fragment 02 below, restated from section 
5.3.3.  At turn 92 Dre uttered ‘just leave it(.) Shady leave(.) its what they want to do’.  
Episode A03, fragment 02 
Turn Speaker Transcript 
93 Dre just leave it(.)  Shady leave (.) its what they want to do  
 The first part of Dre’s utterance (turn 93) concerned the physical relationship 
between Shady and the object, referred to as ‘it’. As established earlier (5.3), Dre 
was appealing to Shady’s moral force to establish physical distance.  This physical 
distance contributed to a sense of respect for the objects. The second part of Dre’s 
utterance ‘its what they want to do’ (turn 93) contributed to this sense of respect by 
granting the objects their own space in which they could act freely as independent 
objects. That is, independent of Shady and other embodied beings. 
 5.4.2.4  Summary of hierarchy. 
This section on hierarchy addresses research question two by explaining the 
experience of hierarchy involving ideas and students (group members) in the 
formation of a family of concepts. Bringing together fragment 01 and 02 with the 
analysis of prohibitions in section 5.3 a notion of hierarchy becomes evident from the 
data analysed in section 5.4.2.  This hierarchy emerges from the complex of 
ethnomethods that establish objectivity as respect for the objects.  Hierarchy was 
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established through the nuance of language and self-deprecation originating in 
undramatic emotional energy as respect for the objects.  It was co-constructed 
through ethnomethods contributing to enacted analogical reasoning, in a taken-for-
granted, undramatic way. This idea is explored further in Chapter 6.   
5.5 Difference and Similarity 
To address research question three I focus my analysis on the establishment 
of difference and similarity. In section 5.5.1 I revise my above analysis to explain 
how difference between concepts was achieved through enacted ethnomethods and 
experiences of emotional energy.  I then re-focus on my data in section 5.5.2 to 
explain how similarity is achieved between concepts.  
5.5.1  Difference and objectivity (respect). 
The establishment of knowledge about two objects being different was 
introduced through examples in section 5.2 concerning the use of distance between 
objects. The earliest examples I referred to consider objectification of hand gestures 
where my hands were held out away from my body as objects for public observation. 
The use of this space formed the basis for the co-construction of difference. In that 
example the difference between my body as an everyday biological object and my 
hand gestures as objects in that particular scientific discussion was established 
through enacted embodied sounds and motions as ethnomethods. 
As my analysis of those earlier cases evolved with Chris and Tim, I 
introduced the notion of familiar and unfamiliar spaces (section 5.2). For example, in 
figure 5.3 (section 5.2.2), I described how in one locality the familiar space of the 
hand gesture was superimposed with the unfamiliar space of carbon as a concept. 
Then in a new locality the same familiar space of the same hand gesture was 
superimposed with the unfamiliar space of nitrogen as a concept. In this way, 
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distance between objects and superimposition of familiar/unfamiliar spaces 
established conceptual difference. 
The idea that distance and space were used in ethnomethods to establish 
difference was a recurring theme throughout this analysis. I also explained how 
distance and space are enacted to experience a sense of objectivity or respect for 
objects in section 5.3 above.  The analyses of those episodes of data explained how 
physical distance and analytical distance via language contributed to an 
understanding of difference in the form of objectivity. Importantly, the enacted 
ethnomethods associated with the achievement of difference via objectivity also 
involved experiences of emotional energy.  These experiences of emotional energy 
were explained in terms of respect for the objects. In the section that follows I outline 
a special case of objectivity, involving contiguity of objects, transference of 
emotional energy and similarity.  
5.5.2 Similarity: a special type of objectivity (respect). 
In section 5.3.4 I established the idea of transference through data related to 
Dre’s group. In that example transference was illustrated in the way it re-energized 
respect for the objects. In my analyses of episodes in the present section I explain 
how understanding of similarity between objects was enacted through ethnomethods 
and experienced as emotional energy involving transference. 
Episode A02, fragment 03 below shows data from an episode linked to the re-
energized respect in fragment 02. During turns 125-143 (see Appendix A), I became 
engaged in a group discussion with Dre, Sam, Simon and Shady, where every group 
member contributed observations and ideas about the objects that were the centre of 
our attention.  That series of turns was characterized by speech overlap such as ‘[the 
tea is]’ (turns 128/129), very few pauses or elongation of words, and prosodic 
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emphasis such as ‘bubbles’ (turn 143/144). The group had become emotionally 
energized about the objects and this led into the moment of turn 145 in fragment 03 
below. 
 At turn 145 Dre erupted with excitement as he aligned his face toward me 
and moved his right hand through a circular gesture in a vertical plane.  Concurrent 
with this gesture and alignment, Dre’s excitement become evident through his speech 
gesture with the utterance of ‘awh:: we got some uhm:: whats the word:: circ:’ (turn 
145).  Through this speech gesture Dre was searching for a word to describe his 
observation of the objects in episode A02, fragment 03. The objects consisted of tea 
leaves moving in water as the temperature increased. 
Episode A02, fragment 03:  Transference, embodied performance & circulation 
Turn Speaker Transcript 
145 
146 
147 
148 
149 
150 
151 
152 
Dre 
 
Simon 
Mr Davis 
Dre 
 
Mr Davis 
Dre 
awh:: we got some uhm:: whats the word:: circ:  ((stands face orientates to Mr Davis and 
Dre moves his right hand in a vertical circular gesture))   
circulation 
Circulation how do you know that 
the bottoms heating up it rises to the top an cools and goes back down to heat up  
((points to the beak with left hand and Mr Davis bends down to look at the beaker)) 
ok so [how] 
          [can see] by the leaves going up ((moves his left hand in a vertical circular motion)) 
The utterance ‘awh::’ was a sound of excitement drawing the attention of the 
group, as evident by the outcome of fragment 03. Dre was excited because he had 
experienced one of those moments where, in Merleau-Ponty’s (1962/2012, p. 58) 
words, he had “found the rabbit in the foliage”. That is, understanding of concepts or 
ideas may erupt from within us without the need for sequenced logic and rational 
thought. Ideas become visible through embodied gesture and speech gesture as 
thought itself (Hwang & Roth, 2011). I will explain below how Dre’s understanding 
of concepts and ideas was observable. 
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Most importantly, Dre’s discovery was first and foremost, experienced as a 
feeling. This was evident in the utterances following the ‘awh::’ sound. As Dre 
continued with ‘we got some uhm:: whats the word::’ (turn 145), he was making a 
circular hand gesture, as he searched for a word. At this moment Dre’s idea was pre-
conceptual. Dre could feel the idea as evident by his circular hand gesture, and the 
feeling was intense, as evident by his speech gesture ‘awh::’, but he could not enact it 
as a concept through language.  He made the sound of a syllable ‘circ:’ (turn 145), 
but cut this short of a full word. 
 In turns 145-146, fragment 03, the idea Dre was feeling became visible to 
others through his circular hand gesture (turn 146). This circular hand gesture was 
interpreted as the enactment of Dre’s thought about what he saw in the beaker. The 
connection to the beaker was evident via subsequent turns (e.g., turn 152) where Dre 
stated ‘[can see] by the leaves going up’, as Dre explained his thoughts. But at the 
moment of the initial hand gesture this explanation was not available to group 
members. They were making sense of the gestures in the moment.     
 In these moments (turns 145-146), Dre held his hands out away from his 
body, in the space between Shady, Simon, Sam, Dre and me where our observation 
of Dre’s gestures were shared. This enabled the objectification of Dre’s hands as a 
familiar space, in the same way my hands were objectified as a familiar space earlier 
(section 5.2). The objectification of the hand gesture contiguous with the beaker, 
brought the two objects into our shared focus. This made it possible for our 
emotional energy, or respect for the beaker objects, to be transferred to the hand 
gesture. By bringing the beaker and hand gesture together, Dre was superimposing 
his vague idea about the objects upon his objectified, circulating hand. Bringing 
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these objects closer together was evident in his account of the beaker at turn 152 
where he states ‘can see by the leaves going up’ while continuing his hand motion. 
On the first hand gesture occasion (turn 146) Dre’s idea was evident in the 
form of a feeling about the beaker objects, enacted through his hand gesture. The 
transference of this felt idea about the beaker objects to his hands was the first 
example of transference within fragment 03. The feeling Dre experienced by 
focusing on the beaker was now superimposed on his hands as the enactment of 
thought. 
This transference was not felt by Dre alone. The other group members shared 
observations of the same objects in the beaker, and now they shared the same 
observation of Dre’s hand gestures. This experience of shared entrainment upon the 
beaker objects and Dre’s hand gesture as an object, implicated the group in this 
transference.  This became evident as Simon announced the concept circulation to 
describe his observation of the beaker object and Dre’s hands (turn 147).   
Simon’s utterance enacted a new object into the situation in the form of 
circulation, which was an unfamiliar concept at the moment of its introduction to the 
interaction. Simons’ speech gesture displayed objectivity in the way he discarded 
everyday words in thee interactions and found a new concept to unify his 
understanding of the beaker objects and Dre’s hand gestures that had so far been 
used by the group. This new concept was unfamiliar to this situation, and may be 
identified as occupying an unfamiliar space. By enacting the utterance circulation 
Simon was superimposing an unfamiliar space over the familiar spaces occupied by 
the beaker and Dre’s arm gestures. By superimposing these familiar spaces, 
circulation was being used to unify the ideas about the beaker and tea leaves, and 
ideas about the hand gesture, as kindred conceptual objects (i.e. a family of 
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concepts).  In this sense the inclusion of circulation would establish a hierarchy of 
family relations between these different objects under the concept of circulation. In 
this sense, circulation was now proposed by Simon as superordinate to the other 
physical objects within this situation (cf. Glynn, 1994a). 
To avoid exclusion and to achieve a family of concepts, Simon’s concept 
needed to be included within the group. The family of concepts was achieved at turn 
148, as I (the science teacher) confirmed Simons’ utterance where I mimicked the 
word circulation. My act of mimicry retained the emotional energy of the situation 
by including Simon’s concept as the unifying concept of these kindred objects. By 
showing respect for Simon’s utterance, circulation, my speech gesture reinforced the 
emotional energy about the concept. The emotional energy acted as a form of 
transference from the physical objects (beaker and Dre’s hands) to the concept of 
circulation so that we now thought of this group of objects as being similar.  That is, 
Dre’s gestured imitation was similar to the beaker objects, and his hands and the 
beaker were similar to the abstract concept of circulation.  
By including circulation within the group and superimposing it over familiar 
spaces, the experience of transference between the concept circulation, the beaker 
objects, and Dre’s hand gesture, brought the new concept into the family of concepts 
as a familiar space.  That is, the experience of transference about these objects 
transformed circulation from an unfamiliar space to a familiar space.  This became 
evident in the way the group spoke about circulation after turn 148 (fragment 03). 
For example, at turn 148 I stated ‘circulation’ and then asked ‘how do you know 
that’, meaning how did they know these observed phenomenon were circulation.  
Dre responded by pointing at the beaker and describing what he could see at that 
moment at turn 150 and again at turn 152 with ‘can see by the leaves going up’ that 
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was accompanied by more circular hand gestures. In addition, Sam used the term 
circulation to describe the objects at a latter moment as evidenced in turn 165 
(Appendix A). The use of the term circulation in relation to the movement of the 
objects and the motion of Dre’s hands had therefore become established as a familiar 
space, because as a concept it was now being used to explain these phenomena. This 
was achieved through the transference of emotional energy drawing the group 
together with their objects in the sense of a family of related objects. 
The contiguity of objects within this experience of collective emotional 
energy enabled the group to make conceptual leaps uniting their shared ideas about 
the objects being similar.  The similarity between objects was described as 
circulation. Unlike cognitive perspectives of analogical reasoning there were no 
logical links between the beaker objects, Dre’s hand gesture, and the concept of 
circulation. Similarity was established through an emotional connection as a sense of 
respect for conceptual objects within a family. This emotional connection was 
achieved through the enactment of ethnomethods and the transference of emotional 
energy achieving similarity between objects. 
5.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter presents my data analyses in relation to three research questions 
guiding my study of the emotional essence of analogical reasoning in school science 
pedagogy.   
Research question one was addressed in sections 5.1 and 5.2. In section 5.1, 
finding-each-other was the phrase I used to describe enacted ethnomethods where 
group members were seeking to understand the other member’s conceptual locality. 
In these situations uncertainty was a common achievement evident in the form of 
disjuncture. This uncertainty was created by member ethnomethods such as me, as 
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the teacher, refusing to give away my conceptual locality, until I located the student. 
These episodes were characterized by low intensity or sporadic moments of 
emotional energy as group members did not maintain a focus on a shared idea. These 
episodes contribute to my understanding of analogical reasoning by determining a 
unique start point for each situation of enacted analogy as a map-in-use.  
Analogy as a map-in-use was analyzed in section 5.2, where both episodes 
involved analogical reasoning about the same formal curriculum concepts in 
different localized situations. These episodes provided evidence of shared 
understanding about difference between objects and concepts where difference was 
enacted through the use of space. Difference was achieved by the spatialization of 
physical objects, such as hand gestures or ink markings, as familiar objects that were 
objectified publicly. Simultaneously, unfamiliar spaces were superimposed in the 
form of abstract science concepts observable through concurrent speech gestures. An 
essential feature of these situations was the consistent experience of emotional 
energy evident in, the coordination of ethnomethods that I described as physical 
entrainment and conceptual entrainment. Together these sections of analyses 
established evidence to explain how shared understanding about science concepts 
was achieved in localized school science situations involving analogical reasoning. 
 Research question two was addressed in sections 5.3 and 5.4. In section 5.3, I 
explained the enactment of science observation and interpreted this in terms of moral 
force and respect for the worksheet instructions. These enacted ethnomethods and 
experiences of emotional energy in the form of respect were further analyzed in 
relation to physical distancing between bodies and objects, and analytical distancing 
through self-prohibition about the use of language. Physical distancing was also 
identified as having an analytical component as members attempted to know the 
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observed objects. Through their ethnomethods, students treated objects as having the 
capacity for exercising freedom within particular spaces. As the researcher, I 
recognized the enacted ethnomethods and experiences of respect as scientific 
objectivity, where respect was a constituent of the objectivity enacted by the 
students. In sections 5.3 and 5.4 I also explained the transference of emotional 
energy from human (social) beings to objects, and between objects where contiguity 
or superimposition occurred.  
 In section 5.4, I explained how it was possible for objects to become a family 
of concepts over the duration of an interaction in the science classroom.  In section 
5.4.1 group members enacted the boundaries of their group/family in relation to 
concepts and ideas.  This enactment was evident in two consecutive situations where 
ideas were excluded from the group, involving a loss of emotional energy around 
concepts and objects. The data provided evidence of exclusion being associated with 
emotional experiences as a group and at an individual level. In section 5.4.2, I 
explored data where conceptual objects were included as family via the enactment of 
group hierarchy. These situations involved emotional energy and established objects 
within the group social hierarchy. This was evident through the enactment of self-
deprecation and self-prohibition, limiting the freedom of group members, and 
establishing the freedom of objects within individualized spaces.  
Research question three was addressed in section 5.5, with an initial summary 
of how difference between concepts was established through the enactment of space 
between objects. I then analyzed data by applying notions about familiar/unfamiliar 
spaces, and superimposition and transference to explain the achievement of 
similarity.  This was evident in the enactment of an imitative gesture in relation to 
beaker objects. Similarity between objects was established through shared experience 
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of emotional energy and the enactment of circulation as a superordinate concept, 
unifying shared ideas about the objects.  
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Chapter 6 
Understanding Emotion and Analogical Reasoning 
6.0 Introduction and Overview of Contribution 
In chapters 1 and 2, I established the centrality of the cognitive, 
psychological perspective of analogical reasoning in the field of science education 
research (section 2.2). The work of Glynn (Glynn, 1994a, 1994b, 1995, 1996a, 
1996b, 1997, 2007; Glynn, Taasoobshirazi & Fowler, 2007; Glynn & Takahashi, 
1998) is pivotal in this body of literature as it establishes important connections 
between the cognitive sciences (i.e. Chi et al., 1981; Gentner, 1980; 1983) and 
science education. This is evident in the proliferation and influence of Glynn’s 
research in science education that serves to connect cognitive sciences theory, the 
TWA model, and the FAR guide, in theory and in practical contexts (e.g. Aubusson 
et al., 1997; Davis, 2013b; Duit, 1991; Harrison & Coll, 2008; Harrison & 
Treagust, 1993; Treagust et al., 1998). 
As discussed in sections 2.2 and 2.3, my review of the literature revealed a 
range of limitations to this cognitive perspective including an inability to explain 
analogy via everyday conversation, embodied gestures, or the involvement of 
emotion. By addressing these limitations the main contribution of my study was to 
establish a new theoretical perspective whereby analogical reasoning is understood 
as a lived experience involving emotion in enacted, localized practices. These 
practices were interdependent with experiences of emotional energy. This 
interdependence between what I call enacted analogical reasoning and emotional 
energy contributed to a new understanding of the emotional essence of analogical 
reasoning. By establishing this innovative, social perspective of analogical 
reasoning, my study has addressed the major limitations of contemporary theory in 
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science education research that stem from the dominant influence of psychological 
theories about analogy (section 2.3). 
Central to developing my social perspective of analogical reasoning was the 
use of ethnomethodology with its focus upon mundane, everyday reasoning 
(Garfinkel, 1967; Pollner, 1987) (section 3.2). This methodological orientation 
situated my study to address “mundane examples” (Gentner & Markman, 1997, 
p.54) of similarity in everyday situations where “we often take analogy for granted” 
(Gentner & Markman, 1997, p.53). As indicated by Gentner & Markman (1997), 
the theory of structure mapping is limited in its explanatory power concerning 
mundane examples of analogical reasoning, evident in everyday conversation or 
embodied gestures (section 2.3.1). My study addressed such mundane, taken-for-
granted analogies through the application of ethnomethodology, which treats 
everyday conversation and embodied gestures as resources for reasoning 
(Livingston, 2006; Pollner, 1987). 
As discussed in section 2.3.1, Hwang & Roth (2011; 2013) treated 
particular embodied gestures as analogous structures during social interaction in a 
physics class. In addition, Aubusson et al. (1997) also treated embodied gestures as 
the enactment of analogical concepts during role play. Neither of these studies 
comprehensively addressed these gestures as an alternative perspective to the 
cognitive analogical reasoning theories that informed those studies. Analogy was 
not the primary focus of the studies by Hwang and Roth (2011; 2013), and in the 
study by Aubusson et al. (1997), they explicitly retained the TWA model as their 
theoretical foundation. The understanding I establish of enacted analogical 
reasoning in my study situates these analogous structures (embodied gestures), 
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alongside speech gesture as a foundation for understanding enacted analogical 
reasoning as a form of social practice in school science situations. 
On this basis my understanding of enacted analogical reasoning is 
inherently grounded in the emergent and contingent qualities of social interaction. 
My approach may be considered akin to the work of Clements (1993) who 
proposed the possibility for analogical reasoning to be an exploratory social 
experience without the need for a fixed target concept (section 2.3.2). My study 
describes enacted analogical reasoning in a similar sense, but I treat shared 
understanding of ideas or concepts as co-constructed, rather than being 
discoverable.  
Central to my social perspective of analogical reasoning is the essence of 
emotional experience. Understanding how analogical reasoning is interdependent 
with emotional experience has not been the focus of either science education 
research or psychological perspectives on analogical reasoning. The experience of 
empathy as a possible analogous emotion was identified by Holyoak and Thagard 
(1997), however such experiences could not be understood as analogies through the 
perspective of the theory of structure mapping (section 2.3.4). Reasoning with, or 
through, emotion was clearly not addressed by that cognitive theory (cf. Gentner, 
1983). 
This disconnection between analogical reasoning and emotion in the 
literature, led me to draw on a different area of science education research to 
harness the concept of emotional energy, which has not been applied to analogical 
reasoning (Milne & Otieno, 2007; Olitsky, 2007) (section 2.1.3). As indicated by 
Collins (2004) emotional energy is a phenomenon that may be observed 
simultaneously with ethnomethods (section 3.2.2.4). For this reason emotional 
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energy is a useful concept for understanding emotional experiences within 
mundane, embodied examples of analogical reasoning.  
 I commence my discussion in this chapter by revisiting my aim, research 
questions and classroom study situations in section 6.1. I then address my research 
questions in section 6.2, by explaining the emotional essence of enacted analogical 
reasoning. Finally I turn to the major methodological contributions of my study in 
section 6.3. These methodological contributions are associated with the phenomenon 
of undramatic emotional energy, which I have highlighted extensively throughout 
Chapter 5 in the form of conceptual entrainment and objectivity as respect for 
objects. 
6.1 Review of Aim, Research Questions and Situations 
6.1.1 Aim and research questions. 
The aim of this dissertation was to present a study of the emotional essence of 
analogical reasoning in secondary school science. My study was conducted in my 
year 9 and year 10 science classes, where video and audio data were collected to 
capture the lived experiences of teaching and learning interactions. My analyses were 
informed by ethnomethodology and aspects of microsociology related to the concept 
of emotional energy. The influence of ethnomethodology directed my research 
questions to understanding how analogical reasoning was achieved through lived 
experiences of enacted and embodied sounds and motions as ethnomethods. 
Ethnomethods (sounds and motions) formed the resource through which members 
interpreted shared understanding. By addressing these questions my understanding of 
the emotional essence of analogical reasoning as a lived experience of emotional 
energy was developed. My research questions were:  
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1. How is shared understanding about concepts achieved in localized 
situations between students, and students and teacher? 
2. How are conceptual networks in the form of a family of concepts, 
hierarchy, and transference of shared understanding about concepts 
achieved in localized situations of analogical reasoning? 
3. How are conceptual networks in the form of a family of concepts, 
hierarchy, and transference of shared understanding about concepts 
related to the achievement of difference and similarity in localized 
situations of analogical reasoning? 
6.1.2 School science situations. 
The research questions were addressed through an analytical focus on three 
data sets of group interaction leading to analogical reasoning as defined in section 
3.1. Using that definition and the selection criteria in section 4.3, data from three 
groups were identified for detailed analysis, as presented in chapter 5. These 
involved; Chris, Pete and me, and a beta decay sketch map; Tim and me, using hand 
gestures and discussing beta decay; and Dre, Simon, Sam, Shady and me, studying 
an analogical model of ocean currents.  
6.2 The Emotional Essence of Enacted Analogical Reasoning  
Undramatic emotional energy (UEE) defines the emotional essence of 
enacted analogical reasoning.  In the following discussion I present an integrated 
approach to understanding enacted analogical reasoning imbued with undramatic 
emotional energy. I commence by considering the early phase of enacted analogical 
reasoning where the absence or low intensity of emotional energy was a defining 
feature.  This relates to the notion of finding-each-other (section 6.2.1). I then outline 
the relationship between emotion, embodiment and space in the context of coming to 
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know familiar objects, and the formation of conceptual networks and a family of 
concepts within analogical reasoning (section 6.2.2). Section 6.2.2 provides a 
foundation for my discussion of emotion, distance and difference (section 6.2.3) and 
emotion, distance and similarity (section 6.2.4), as defining elements of enacted 
analogical reasoning.   
6.2.1 Finding-each-other 
Finding-each-other is a collection of enacted practices experienced by 
members of a group to define a starting point for analogical reasoning. Practices of 
finding-each-other achieved situations where members established some degree of 
shared understanding making the commencement of analogical reasoning a 
possibility. As the following discussion indicates, it is feasible that enacted 
analogical reasoning may be contingent upon initial practices and emotional 
experiences of finding-each-other. 
In terms of cognitive analogical reasoning, finding-each-other may be 
synonymous with cueing familiar analogue concepts as the necessary starting point 
for analogical reasoning (cf. Glynn, 1994a). However, finding-each-other involves a 
focus on each other in a negotiation-like practice of interaction, rather than a focus 
on objects of science inquiry. That is, group members work toward understanding the 
other person’s conceptual locality, or conceptual understanding, as a way of 
orientating to each the other. The achievement of this negotiation is a shared starting 
point where the enactment of familiar analogue objects becomes a possibility via 
further interaction. 
As the teacher in my study, finding-each-other was not evident to me at the 
time of these lived experiences. The relevance of these situations only became 
evident via my subsequent analyses of data. My understanding of finding-each-other 
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may be defined by three key ideas, explained below as; conceptual locality, member 
generated uncertainty, and low intensity emotional energy.  
6.2.1.1 Conceptual locality, shared ideas and emotion.  
In the context of analogical reasoning, my notion of conceptual locality is a 
way of thinking about each members’ understanding of science concepts that may 
change over time throughout social interaction. By treating analogical reasoning as a 
map-in-use (section 5.1), group members engaged with each other in an analogical 
journey to reach points of shared understanding along an emergent and contingent 
pathway of reasoning.  I use conceptual locality as a way of referring to each 
individual’s understanding of a topic at any moment in time. Conceptual locality is a 
dynamic notion involving movement toward a shared understanding. That is, 
members are looking to confirm what they presume they know in relation to the 
presumed knowledge of others. In terms of emotional energy, members are focused 
on each other, in a reflexive effort to define shared ideas. The confirmation of shared 
ideas may be considered the achievement of shared understanding. This achievement 
may be an intensely emotional experience as shared ideas are an important 
component of emotional energy (section 3.3).  
The notion of ever-changing conceptual localities in relation to each other 
may be understood using the map-in-use as an example. As Liberman (2013) noted, 
we speak and then we analyze, which means we, as members of a group, analyze 
each other’s responses to what we say or do, as a way of confirming our presumed 
shared understanding as a form of shared knowledge. We are constantly revealing 
our conceptual locality and testing its validity in relation to others through the 
reflexivity of our ethnomethods. In the context of a map-in-use this reflexivity is like 
Liberman’s (2013) students interacting to orientate a sketch map in relation to the 
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terrain, as a way of establishing landmarks.  In the situations I describe as enacted 
analogical reasoning, evidenced throughout chapter 5, each group member’s 
understanding of particular concepts forms a possible landmark as interactions 
progress over time. As an idea/concept is confirmed as shared understanding, it 
becomes confirmed as a landmark on the map-in-use of analogical reasoning.  Such 
landmarks may then become points of reference for further enacted reasoning. 
Differences in conceptual locality became evident in section 5.1 as Chris 
asked questions about his topic, and I concealed my conceptual locality by refusing 
to answer Chris directly. Instead, I asked questions of Chris as a way to establish his 
conceptual locality on the topic. Similarly, in section 5.1.2 Tim presented his 
conceptual locality and explicitly asked if his understanding (locality) was correct. In 
this way, Tim was seeking to compare his conceptual locality with my conceptual 
locality as a means for establishing shared understanding. For Tim and I, shared 
understanding, or a shared conceptual locality, was achieved immediately following 
our episode of finding-each-other. Shared conceptual localities as shared 
understanding were therefore an important outcome of each situation of finding-
each-other. 
6.2.1.2  Uncertainty generated by members.   
The ethnomethods I refer to as uncertainty generated by members was 
important to the enactment of finding-each-other because it involved disruptive 
practices. Uncertainty fostered situations where members focused on each other in 
order to repair the social disjuncture. As part of finding-each-other, member 
generated uncertainty focused group members toward seeking out the other’s 
conceptual locality as a way of reaching a shared locality or shared understanding. 
Uncertainty became evident through practices involving emotional responses related 
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to the establishment of initial shared understanding for analogical reasoning to 
proceed.  
To illustrate this with an example, in the situation with Chris (section 5.1.1), 
uncertainty was created in the way I refused to reveal my conceptual locality. 
Instead, I asked questions, referring Chris to his prior learning experiences. Chris’s 
inability to relate to prior lessons also created uncertainty for me as the teacher. 
Hence, Chris also created uncertainty about his conceptual locality. 
Uncertainty was generated further, by me as the teacher, in a different 
situation involving Tim (section 5.1.2). In this situation Tim was presenting his 
accumulated knowledge on the discussion topic, and was actively seeking my 
concurrence. In this instance, I created uncertainty by not commenting on his 
statements. During our exchanges, I made sounds to encourage Tim to continue 
speaking, while I listened, and read his notes. My brief utterances during this episode 
added nothing to the topic Tim was explaining. My utterances merely bought time 
for me to evaluate Tim’s conceptual locality. Unlike Chris, Tim was presenting his 
conceptual locality to me, and asking for me to reveal my locality as confirmation of 
his understanding. This episode ended when I asked a question of Tim, and we 
subsequently confirmed some consensus about our conceptual localities, through 
shared understanding of carbon-14 and beta decay. 
6.2.1.3  Low intensity emotional energy. 
Uncertainty generated by members was an important part of finding-each-
other because these practices influenced the experience of collective emotional 
energy, associated with the positioning of members to engage in analogical 
reasoning. For example, the frustration I experienced with Chris, and the disjuncture 
and speech rate divergence experienced by Tim and I, were evidence of a depletion 
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in emotional energy. Those occasions involved individual emotion, such as my 
frustration, but the collective component evident via synchrony was weak. This may 
be explained by the way uncertainty created situations where we could not focus on 
shared ideas. Instead we were focusing on each other, in a reflexive effort to define 
shared ideas. Uncertainty was therefore important for contributing to a lack of 
synchrony or depleted emotional energy as a feature of finding-each-other.  
The depleted emotional energy was ultimately productive, as it drove us to 
resolve the ongoing disjuncture resulting in a situation with heightened emotional 
energy and consensus through shared understanding of the science concepts. These 
situations of finding-each-other may be thought of as a re-investment of interactional 
effort into establishing a teaching and learning situation involving more intense 
emotional energy (cf. Collins, 2004). As Collins (2004) indicated, people do not exist 
in a constant state of high intensity emotional energy.  We shift between interactions 
and re-establish situations where emotional energy was previously experienced at 
higher intensity. The practices of finding-each-other may be treated as the initial re-
establishment of a teaching and learning ritual. This became evident in the way 
members initiated co-presence and engaged in interaction to define an initial 
conceptual locality from which a teaching and learning experience may be enacted 
further. In this way, finding-each-other determined specific start points for each 
situation of analogical reasoning that followed.  It was not until the end of finding-
each-other where greater consistency and intensity in emotional energy became 
evident. This made the commencement of analogical reasoning a possibility in each 
situation as an emergent teaching and learning experience. In essence, enacted 
analogical reasoning, as a teaching and learning experience, tends to be contingent 
upon finding-each-other. 
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6.2.2 Emotion, embodiment and space.  
A further recurring theme developed throughout my analysis was the use of 
physical space as a way of establishing knowledge about everyday things as 
analogical objects. My ongoing awareness of space may be associated with the 
nature of observing embodied practices. Because each group member was defined 
biologically as a spatial entity, things known through embodied action became 
known in relation to the space occupied by various bodies. In addition, the 
coordination of bodies, the embodied enactment of ideas through gesture, and the 
internal locality of feelings, related emotional experience to the spatial arrangement 
of beings and inanimate things. In the sections that follow, I discuss the relationship 
between emotion, spatial arrangement of things and the formation of knowledge in 
the context of analogical reasoning.  
6.2.2.1  Knowing everyday things as familiar objects.  
In enacted analogical reasoning, knowledge of familiar concepts or objects is 
co-constructed within particular situations, through embodied practices and 
experiences of emotional energy. This section describes how situations of analogical 
reasoning transform our knowledge of everyday things into knowledge of familiar 
objects within an emergent analogical context. Most importantly this same 
transformation involving emotion, embodied practices and space, forms the basis for 
establishing difference between familiar objects as analogical reasoning progresses. 
Each of the situations of enacted analogical reasoning I analyzed in this study 
used everyday things as resources for reasoning, even when they were not planned as 
part of the formal curriculum. For example, in my study I introduced tea leaves, 
water and a hot plate as familiar objects for an analogy about ocean currents. Group 
members added (something) to these materials through their embodied hand gestures 
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(section 5.4). In the situation with Tim (section 5.2.2), hand gestures were 
established as analogue objects enacted as atomic particles. With Chris, ink markings 
and paper also become analogue objects related to beta decay (5.2.1). In a physical 
sense these objects had very little in common with phenomena such as ocean 
currents, carbon-14 or beta decay. They were just everyday things.  
To establish these everyday things as familiar objects within analogical 
reasoning something needed to happen. That something was the shared experience of 
undramatic emotional energy. These experiences involved the re-positioning of 
everyday things at the focal point for mutual entrainment and the development of 
shared understanding. Shared understanding formed over time by the co-construction 
of science concepts around the everyday things at the physical focal point, 
transforming these things into scientific objects. For example, the hand gestures used 
between Tim and me, established the hands as a focal point by locating them in a 
public space between us. As analyzed in section 5.2.2, the hands become the 
analogue object by becoming part of my account of carbon and nitrogen, as the 
teacher. The hands contributed to UEE within the situation by drawing our physical 
gaze into a space of shared focus. It was this re-location of the hands into this public 
space of shared focus that transformed the hands into objects within our shared gaze. 
This transformation involved UEE as we become mutually entrained in a physical 
sense (by directing our gaze at my hands), but also in terms of shared feelings about 
shared ideas. This transformation was made possible with the collective experience 
of undramatic emotional energy.  
Because these objects originated from the localized situation, science 
educators may tend to refer to them as familiar objects. But they were not familiar 
objects in the analogy, until they were relocated into a space where they became 
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objectified, or transformed into objects of shared focus. Achieving a situation where 
everyday things come to be known as familiar analogical objects takes time.  During 
this time it also involves the enactment of embodied practices and the experience of 
emotional energy to develop mutual entrainment around the everyday things. In this 
way science concepts are co-constructed so that everyday things may be eventually 
treated as familiar analogical objects as the analogy is enacted. 
Finally I will consider the tea leaves, water and hotplate, as the most obvious 
analogue objects in my study. Like the hands, the ink and the paper, the tea leaves, 
hotplate and water did not enter the classroom as familiar analogical objects. They 
were simply things located in the classroom. To transform these things into 
analogical objects, group members collected these things together, and arranged 
them onto the workbench. In these moments these things were treated as everyday 
things as members referred to them as ‘a cup of tea’ (section 5.3.3). Once positioned 
on the workbench, the architectural, technological culture of the science classroom 
contributed to the objectification of these things as science objects. The design of the 
workbench physically orientated the group, so that members stood around the bench 
facing toward each other, with a shared focal point at the center of the bench (cf. 
Roth & Hsu, 2014). By locating the tea leaves, water and hotplate on the bench, the 
group were also locating these things at the focal point of their shared physical gaze. 
In this way the shape and structure (architecture) of the workbench contributed to the 
objectification of everyday things placed on it. In effect, the workbench made the 
establishment of emotional energy more efficient by orientating co-present members 
to simultaneously face each other and their shared objects.  
The efficiency of the workbench to elicit coordination and emotional energy 
around the objects was observed by me during analysis. The technology, represented 
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in the workbench, is well established in institutional settings such as schools, military 
barracks, hospitals and prisons (Foucault, 1977). The philosophical underpinnings of 
this technology were established as Bentham’s panopticon in the late eighteenth 
century (cf. Foucault, 1977). I make note of this technology as it was an obvious 
contributor to the efficiency of shared focus around the beaker objects, but I have not 
explored this further as it is beyond the scope of this study. The most important point 
here is that the everyday things, including the tea leaves, water, beaker, and hotplate, 
only became knowable as familiar analogical objects after their placement onto the 
workbench space.  
6.2.2.2  Emotions, family and hierarchy. 
Analogical reasoning involves the formation of shared understanding by 
establishing relations between objects in terms of similarity and difference. These 
relations may be understood through the experience of emotion and enacted 
practices, in terms of conceptual networks in the form of a family of concepts and 
hierarchy. In his description of the TWA model, and analogical reasoning grounded 
in the theory of structure mapping, Glynn (1994a) indicated that knowledge through 
analogy was arranged in conceptual networks. He used the notion of conceptual 
networks to describe the idea of relationships between concepts. As Glynn’s (1994a) 
explanation of conceptual networks became more complex, he referred to the notion 
of a family of concepts to explain the relationships between analogical concepts. This 
notion of a family of concepts included the organization of a hierarchy (Glynn, 
1994a) (cf. 2.3.6 & 5.4.2.1). Glynn (1994a) used the phrase a family of concepts to 
describe how concepts were related, but he did not specifically state what he meant 
by this phrase. I interpreted this as the formation of a conceptual category by Glynn 
to enable his description of conceptual relations, because relations and hierarchy are 
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fundamental to ideas about family within the culture we share as people (Durkheim, 
1912/1915). Both Glynn (1994a) and Durkheim (1912/1915) use the notion of family 
in an epistemological sense to define the relations between ideas or concepts. Unlike 
Glynn (1994a), Durkheim’s (1912/1915) work established the formation of family 
relations between ideas by studying the localized social interactions through which 
ideas originated. The link between a family of ideas and the everyday notion of 
family derives from the fundamental social unit through which people first 
experience knowledge. Durkheim’s (1912/1915) epistemological position is that our 
lived experience of our family forms the basis on which we learn to categorise ideas 
as being related or unrelated. Durkheim (1912/1915) uses the notion of family to 
describe the foundations of his social epistemology, and Glynn (1994a) applies the 
notion of family to describe his cognitive epistemology giving rise to analogies. 
Their use (Durkheim’s & Glynn’s) of the term family to describe a grouping of ideas 
are mutually consistent, and on this basis I identified particular collections of  
enacted practices as exclusions from the family (section 6.2.2.3) and inclusion and 
hierarchy in the family (section 6.2.2.4).  
6.2.2.3  Exclusions from the family.  
In establishing how a family of concepts may be achieved through the 
enactment of analogical reasoning I focused on situations where concepts were 
included or excluded from the group. In section 5.4.1, I focused on the exclusion of 
unfamiliar concepts and ideas, where exclusion of ideas was associated with a 
reduction in the intensity of emotional energy. Exclusion is an important notion as it 
helps define the existence of family boundaries. Through the enactment of these 
family boundaries particular concepts are treated as pertaining to the analogy, and 
others are not. In my analogical situations, exclusion was also easy to identify as it 
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involved a loss of emotional energy, within observable situations, as undramatic 
emotional energy was released.  
For instance, in section 5.4.1 I explained how the concept of neutrons was 
excluded through gestures and laughter as a release of UEE.  I further described the 
loss of emotional energy about the objects of inquiry, after an idea suggested by Dre 
was excluded. The most notable feature of these examples was the lack of a logical 
and rational discussion by members, about why the concept or idea should be 
excluded. Instead the group enacted both instances of the exclusion of concepts 
through glances, short utterances, and the release of emotional energy.    
The observable loss of emotional energy across these two situations involving 
exclusion of concepts/ideas, indicates the importance of emotional energy in enacted 
analogical reasoning. Because emotional energy is always focused on shared 
concepts/ideas, the enactment of a concept/idea involves an experience of emotional 
energy. Conversely the exclusion of a concept/idea tends to involve an experience of 
reduced intensity in emotional energy. In emotional terms, observed in the case of 
Dre, the exclusion of the idea was like the exclusion of Dre himself. This exclusion 
involved a reduction in the intensity of mutual entrainment, evident in subsequent 
interaction (section 5.4.1.2). 
The role of emotional energy in the exclusion of concepts/ideas may also 
explain the example discussed by Duit et al. (2001) as noted in section 2.1.2.  In that 
study of analogical reasoning the enactment of a concept by a student was rejected 
via the teacher’s cool reception of the concept.  The researchers described the idea as 
dying due to a lack of support. As in the situations I described in my study above, 
there was no evidence of a rational, logical argument in terms of conceptual relations 
or analogical properties. Concepts seem to be excluded as a fluctuation in the 
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intensity of emotional energy about the concepts/ideas at the shared focal point of the 
emotional experience.  
6.2.2.4  Inclusion and hierarchy in the family.  
In contrast to situations where concepts were excluded and emotional energy 
reduced, the inclusion of concepts tended to be associated with situations of ongoing 
high intensity experiences of emotional energy. An example of this was the situation 
analyzed in section 5.2.2 related to sub-atomic particles. In that example Tim and I 
shared the floor and exhibited intense emotional energy. Throughout this situation of 
intense emotional energy, concept after concept was enacted and included into the 
emerging family of concepts during the interaction. For instance, my hands occupied 
unfamiliar spaces of sub-atomic particles at turn 25; carbon at turn 33, and nitrogen 
at turn 34 discussed in section 5.2. All of these were included into the family of 
concepts as evident by the disjuncture-free continuity of interactions. 
 My second example of inclusion into the family of concepts also illustrates 
the enactment of a hierarchy of concepts. Hierarchy was a notion used by Glynn 
(1994a) to describe relations within the family of concepts during analogical 
reasoning. As a document designed to explain analogy, Glynn (1994a) states that 
hierarchy was relevant in understanding analogy, and as a document-in-use, Glynn 
(1994a) directs the reader’s focus to understanding hierarchy via the model I 
analyzed in section 5.4.2.1. As a reader of Glynn (1994a) I found myself 
understanding concepts within a family of concepts, in relation to each other. Glynn 
(1994a) directed my attention to an analogue concept and a target concept, each 
defining the boundaries of two families of concepts. Relational concepts were 
situated as subordinate concepts, as family members, below the respective analogue 
and target concepts. The subordination of these concepts illustrated two families-of-
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concepts (analogue and target) with a clearly defined hierarchy of family 
membership (relational concepts). The hierarchy was completed by unifying the two 
families (analogue and target) under a superordinate concept. This was the 
asynchronous experience communicated by Glynn, to me as a reader of Glynn 
(1994a).  In this way I was able to enact my own account of Glynn’s analogy using 
his notion of hierarchy and family, embedded within the diagram of his theory, and 
the language he used to explain it. 
 In my classroom data, hierarchy was also evident in understanding the co-
construction of analogical concepts. I cited several ways in which ethnomethods 
were used by class members to achieve hierarchy in relation to concepts (cf. sections 
5.4.2 & 5.5.2).  The situation described in section 5.5.2 where the concept of 
circulation was enacted by the group was an example of both inclusion and hierarchy 
in the family of concepts. In that example, members were observing movements in 
the tea leaves. Ideas about the tea leaves and water were discussed earlier in the 
situation, providing evidence of the group enacting and experiencing a range of 
vague ideas about these objects. In that situation (section 5.5.2), Dre suddenly made 
an awh sound and began moving his hand in a circular motion. This was an 
enactment by Dre of a specific idea about the objects. The idea was evident through 
his hand gesture, as an imitation of the tea leaves. At the initial moment of the hand 
gesture, a new, unfamiliar idea was being enacted into the family of concepts. The 
emotional energy of this situation was evident by the entrainment of Simon and me 
on Dre’s embodied enactment of the idea. Through this entrainment upon Dre, our 
emotional energy was evident and continuous, and in this moment we accepted Dre’s 
idea that was embodied in his gesture. The circular motion of his hands was 
becoming an analogue object for the motion of the tea leaves observed in the beaker. 
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Our shared focus (Simon, Dre and me) now included two families of ideas. 
Our ideas about the tea leaf (beaker) objects and our ideas about Dre’s gesture. In 
response to this situation Simon then uttered the word circulation. This newly 
enacted unfamiliar concept was being used by Simon to unify the shared ideas about 
the beaker objects and Dre’s gesture. Confirmation of this unfamiliar concept as 
shared understanding was observed when I mimicked Simon by my utterance of 
circulation. This sequence of moments describes how two families of ideas, shared 
by three people, were contributed to the establishment of shared understanding of a 
superordinate concept enacted as circulation. This inclusion of circulation as a 
superordinate concept was treated by group members as a means to unify two 
families of vague ideas about contiguous physical objects (i.e. leaves and hand), and 
provides an illustration of how inclusion and hierarchy may be enacted in a school 
science situation.   
If I were to account for the hierarchical relations between these ideas and 
concepts, in the same way as Glynn (1994a), I might use Glynn’s model of analogy 
at figure 5.5. This would situate the concepts (ideas) about the beaker objects in one 
side of the model, and concepts (ideas) about Dre’s hand gesture in the other side.  
These concepts might include ideas I could call relational features between the 
objects, such as the pattern of their respective motions, or their source of physical 
energy. These would be considered subordinate concepts. Overarching both groups I 
would situate the superordinate concept of circulation. Hence, to rationalize the lived 
experience of analogical reasoning, after the event, I could take the experience and 
represent it through Glynn’s model. This may produce a seemingly logical, rational 
account of the analogy observed through the enactment of members analyzed in this 
situation (section 5.5.2). But as my data show, the enactment of analogical reasoning 
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involved competence in reasoning without the need for logical steps, or rational 
connections between analogue and target concepts involving symbolic 
representations like Glynn’s model. The common ground between my classroom 
situation with Dre, and the explanation of analogical reasoning documented in Glynn 
(1994a) is not found in the theory of structure mapping, but in their common use of a 
family of concepts and hierarchy as social practices. This common ground is further 
evident in my following discussion about difference and similarity.  
 6.2.3  Emotion, distance and difference.  
Throughout section 6.2.2, I have illustrated how emotion, embodiment and 
space are involved in knowing things as related analogical objects. In my examples 
the use of space, location and distance contributed to inclusion/exclusion of objects, 
and also contributed to categorizing things as different during situations of enacted 
analogical reasoning. Next I summarize briefly the role of distance in the 
categorization of objects as different from each other. 
Categorization of things as different from each other was evident in the 
situation involving Tim (section 5.2.2, figure 5.2), where my objectified hands were 
established as different objects (i.e. beta particles or nuclei) by virtue of their 
location. For example, in figure 5.3 (section 5.2.2), I analyzed the different locations 
of my hands at different moments where they were identified as carbon, and then as 
nitrogen. In that situation, my hands, held in the same shape were treated as being 
different objects based on the distance between two physical locations, enacted 
through gesture, over time.  
Use of space, location and distance also was evident in drawing the carbon 
nucleus in figure 5.1 (section 5.2.1). In that example each proton was identified as a 
circle occupying its own space. The distance between these spaces identified each 
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proton as a distinct, unitary object, enabling me to count six of them by virtue of the 
unique space occupied by each one. In these situations, the lived experience of 
physical distance was used to categorize objects as different from other objects. This 
use of physical space to enact reasoning with pen and paper contributed to the 
achievement of understanding difference between abstract science concepts. For 
example, the space of an inked circle treated as a whole, single proton, distinct from 
other protons drawn across the space of a piece of paper. This sense of difference 
may have been vague, but it was sufficient to establish shared understanding of 
particular objects as being different from each other. Based on my analysis I suggest 
that space, location and distance are essential elements determining difference during 
enacted analogical reasoning. 
 6.2.4 Emotion, distance & similarity 
In the preceding discussion I explained how the enactment of different spatial 
localities or distance between objects was important in categorising them as different 
from each other. In the case of similarity, space and distance are used differently to 
re-arrange the family of concepts and sense of hierarchy so that family resemblance 
(similarity) may be established. Similarity involves a reduction of distance, referred 
to as contiguity, or superimposition. Concurrent with this reduction in distance 
between objects to achieve similarity, I have described the emotional experiences of 
these situations in terms of transference. Below, I detail how contiguity (section 
6.2.4.1), superimposition (section 6.2.4.2) and transference (section 6.2.4.3) of 
emotional energy are essential elements to the co-construction of similarity between 
objects, as they become analogical objects.  
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6.2.4.1  Contiguity.   
In section 6.2.3 I noted the relevance of space and distance in the 
determination of difference between objects. In contrast, a precondition for 
transference of emotional energy from familiar objects to unfamiliar objects (section 
3.4.3) is the reduction of distance/time between objects. For example, in the situation 
of Dre, Simon and me, discussed above (section 6.2.2), contiguity was observed via 
the relocation of Dre’s hands into a space between the beaker objects, Simon and me. 
In this familiar space Dre enacted his imitation of the beaker objects. By imitating 
the beaker objects in this immediate, adjacent space, Simon and I did not need words 
to connect these two sets of objects (i.e. beaker and hand). It was their contiguity that 
established the initial idea of a possible relationship. If for example, at that same 
moment, Dre had walked away from the objects to the other side of the room, and 
then made the same gesture, Simon and I would have undoubtedly questioned his 
embodied sounds and motions (ethnomethods). Most likely, we would have 
accounted for Dre’s gestures as an act of comedy, and this would have disrupted our 
emotional energy around the objects of inquiry. But in the context of their location in 
close proximity to the beaker, Simon and I made sense of the hand gestures by 
relating them to the beaker. This was an example of the emotionally driven 
enactment of contiguity as part of the co-construction of a relationship between two 
objects and the ideas associated with these objects. 
Glynn (1994a) also used contiguity by placing words adjacent to one another, 
and connecting them with a bi-directional arrow as a way of directing reader 
attentiveness to the contiguity (section 5.4.2.1). In this way Glynn (1994a) directed 
me as a reader to make a connection due to contiguity between the concepts of books 
and electrons, shelves and energy levels, a floor and a nucleus. This contiguity 
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between these otherwise unrelated conceptual objects situated me as the reader so 
that I needed to make sense out of Glynn’s hierarchy of contiguous objects. This 
need to make sense was based on my presumption of a shared objective reality that 
Glynn was seeking to communicate. My presumption situated me as the reader to 
seek moral cohesion (solidarity) by enacting meaning or making sense of Glynn 
(1994a).  
Most importantly, Glynn was explicitly using contiguity to direct me to enact 
analogical reasoning, in the same way that Dre situated his hand gesture contiguous 
with the beaker in his spontaneous analogical enactment. In this way, observers such 
as Simon and I, presumed Dre’s hand gestures had something to do with the beaker, 
and we worked together to make sense about what that something may have been. 
We were reading Dre’s gestures and attempting to make sense of them based on our 
presumption of a shared objective reality that we assumed Dre was attempting to 
communicate. Similarly, when I read Glynn (1994a) I did so with a similar 
presumption that enabled me to make sense out of Glynn’s article. In that situation 
my sense making as a reader was assisted by the contiguity within Glynn’s 
documented explanation that fostered my transference of emotional energy between 
the ideas proposed by Glynn (1994a) (section 5.4.2.1).  
6.2.4.2  Superimposition. 
Superimposition may be considered a form of contiguity, involving hierarchy. 
Examples of superimposition were noted throughout my analyses in chapter 5, such 
as drawing circles and superimposing the concept of protons or neutrons as each 
circle was enacted. Another example was the concept of carbon superimposed on my 
hands in one location, and nitrogen superimposed on my hands in another location 
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(section 5.2.2). Superimposition was achieved in these situations in the form of 
simultaneous ethnomethods such as speech and physical gestures. 
As indicated in section 5.4.2.1, Glynn (1994a) explicitly used 
superimposition by using the words subordinate and superordinate to describe 
concepts within his hierarchy. In the example shown in figure 5.5 (section 5.4.2.1) 
Glynn also arranged the analogue concept and target concept so that were 
superimposed over feature concepts to form two different families of concepts, 
which he referred to as families. Finally Glynn describe transference of 
understanding from the analogue family to the target family by superimposing a 
superordinate concept. In this way my attentiveness as a reader was directed to 
understanding the analogy by making sense of this superimposition as the connection 
between the two families of concepts. 
In the situation with Dre, Simon and me, we finally established the 
relationship between the beaker and the hand gesture with the simultaneous utterance 
of the word circulation, by Simon (section 5.5.2). This utterance, made 
simultaneously in the presence of both objects (beaker and hand), superimposed 
circulation as an unfamiliar concept through the enactment of Simon’s speech 
gesture. Finally I confirmed this understanding by mimicking this superimposition of 
circulation through my own utterance. In this situation both contiguity and 
superimposition were illustrated as an important element in establishing a 
relationship of similarity within the family of concepts. But transference of 
understanding and the establishment of similarity required something else, other than 
contiguity or superimposition of concepts. It also involved transference of emotional 
energy, as discussed below. 
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6.2.4.3  Transference.  
Glynn’s (1994a) use of contiguity, superimposition and transference as 
ethnomethodological resources was explicitly evident in his explanation of 
analogical reasoning (section 5.4.2.1). For example, Glynn (1994a, p.9) explained 
that “ideally, an analogy effectively drawn between two concepts will help students 
transfer their existing knowledge to the understanding, organizing, and visualizing of 
new knowledge”. He also stated that students “will be more likely to generalize their 
understanding to a superordinate concept” and to “transfer their understanding to 
other instances of the superordinate concept” (Glynn, 1994a, p.9). These 
explanations were in the context of his model, shown at Figure 5.5 (section 5.4.2.1). 
As I have explained through my analysis of that model, Glynn directs the reader’s 
understanding through his use of ethnomethodological resources including contiguity 
and superimposition.  
In contrast to Glynn’s idea of transferring understanding, I use transference 
to describe a shift in emotional energy between objects or concepts (cf. 3.4.3 & 
Durkheim 1912/1915). The difference between our (Glynn and me) 
conceptualizations is that transference of emotional energy includes shared feelings, 
coordinated movement and shared ideas. In contrast, Glynn (1994a) only considered 
transference of ideas. The transference of emotional energy explains how 
transference of ideas may be achieved, as an emotional transformation, in situations 
of enacted analogical reasoning. 
My earlier analysis of transference (section 5.3.4) involved the transference 
of emotional energy as respect for objects. These examples included the transference 
of respect from worksheet to beaker objects (section 5.3.4.1), and from science 
teacher to beaker objects (section 5.3.4.2). Based on these analyses, my 
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understanding of transference in the context of school science, involves a particular 
form of emotional energy I previously described as respect for objects (sections 5.3.4 
& 5.3.5).  In situations of transference in emotional energy there is coordination of 
mutual focus across contiguous/superimposed objects. Such coordinated movement 
engages shared feelings about the objects within the mutual focus, enabling the group 
to make sense, by working together to establish shared understanding of relations 
between their shared objects of inquiry.  
In the situation with Dre, Simon and me, transference was observed in the 
way our mutual focus shifted, and served to unify objects and concepts into a larger 
common family. In section 5.5.2, emotional energy was present in the situation as 
evident by our initial mutual focus on the beaker. As Dre began his hand gesture our 
emotional energy shifted to the gesture as an unfamiliar object. This shift was easy to 
make because the hand was moved closer to the beaker. Transference of our 
emotional energy became evident in the coordination of our shifting physical 
alignment to include Dre’s hand with the beaker. The hand gesture was included into 
the family of concepts (ideas) at this moment, as we made sense of these gestures in 
relation to the adjacent beaker. The physical contiguity of objects, coordinated our 
physical embodied focus, and this situated us to establish respect for the hand 
gestures as knowable objects in the same context as the beaker objects. At this 
moment we had transferred respect to Dre’s hand gesture as a scientifically 
meaningful object. It was the way we treated this hand gesture as a sense making 
object that was important for transference to take place. 
Our mutual focus (emotional energy) then transferred to another concept, as 
Simon made the speech gesture circulation. My interpretation of this utterance 
following the initial transference is that circulation was enacted by Simon, to make 
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sense of our initial transference. The utterance, circulation, was part of the sense 
making about our emotional experience of the contiguous objects.   
As circulation was enacted by Simon a second transference was experienced.  
This transference was not exclusive to circulation, as we remained focused on all 
three objects; the beaker, Dre’s hand, and the word circulation. The superimposition 
of circulation via speech gesture made transference observable. This transference 
between these objects became evident as I (the teacher) confirmed the concept 
circulation, in the context of our shared observations of the physical objects. That is, 
Simon, Dre and I enacted conceptual entrainment with the hand gestures and 
utterances of circulation, and in these moments of entrainment we transferred respect 
(emotional energy) across these objects. In this way they became unified as an 
analogical family of concepts, under the superordinate concept of circulation.   
In my reading of Glynn (1994a) as a document-in-use, transference of respect 
may be interpreted via my context as reader. As a reader of Glynn (1994a) there is a 
level of respect for this document as a long established representation of objective 
knowledge within the science education literature. As a reader of the document I 
expect to make sense out of it as a source of morally sanctioned, peer reviewed 
knowledge. Any reader looking for an account of analogical reasoning in Glynn 
(1994a) as an objective reality is, in effect, treating the document with respect. In this 
sense the reader experiences emotional energy (respect) in a perceived asynchronous 
interaction with Glynn. It is this respect for the document (Glynn, 1994a), as an 
object, that is transferred to the inscribed concepts within the document. On this 
basis, the notions of contiguity, superimposition and transference are relevant to an 
enacted reading of Glynn (1994a) as document-in-use, in the same way they were 
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relevant in the co-construction of analogical reasoning in my science classroom.6.2.5
 Summary of enacted analogical reasoning.  
This study contributes to the field of science education research by 
establishing the connectivity between two fields of inquiry that have not been drawn 
together previously. These include studies of emotional energy (Milne & Otieno, 
2007; Olitsky, 2007) and studies of mundane, everyday analogical reasoning via the 
embodied experiences of social interaction (cf. Aubusson et al., 1997; Gentner & 
Markman, 1997; Holyoak & Thagard, 1997; Hwang & Roth, 21011; 2013). My 
innovative combination of these two areas of previous research has been achieved by 
establishing a social perspective, presented as enacted analogical reasoning imbued 
with undramatic emotional energy. I have found that the experience of emotional 
energy is integral to enacted analogical reasoning, because it is emotional energy that 
gives group members the confidence to make and establish consensus about shared 
ideas. In these localized situations of lived, embodied experiences, science 
knowledge in the form of consensus around shared understanding was not 
established through rational or logical argument. Knowledge about things or 
phenomena as analogical objects was grounded in an emotional consensus. This was 
evident where shared feelings, shared ideas and coordinated embodied movements 
through speech and physical gesture formed the basis for establishing localized 
knowledge as shared understanding.  
On this basis, analogical reasoning was enacted by observing things and 
phenomena, establishing connections through emotional transference, and coming to 
know physical and conceptual objects in new ways. These ways of knowing objects 
involved the co-construction of difference and/or family resemblance (similarity) 
between concepts. These notions of family and family resemblance were explicitly 
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used by Glynn (1994a), synonymous with Durkheim’s (1912/1915) use of kinship 
(sections 3.2.3.2 & 6.2.2.2), wherein both authors were explaining the origin of 
similarity as a fundamental category of knowledge.    
An important part of my major contribution to science education through this 
study was to show how the categorisation of objects may be achieved through 
localized practices of enacted analogical reasoning. In my science classrooms these 
practices involved embodied ethnomethodological resources that enacted distance, 
contiguity, superimposition, hierarchy and transference of emotional energy as 
methods for the co-construction of knowledge as shared understanding. My analysis 
of Glynn (1994a) revealed his use of these same resources, to direct readers to re-
enact and experience his explanation of analogical reasoning and the TWA model. 
On this basis my study has established the operation of ethnomethodological 
resources common to both my science classrooms and science education theory on 
analogy. 
6.3 Methodological Findings Concerning Undramatic Emotional Energy 
The innovative methodological orientation of my study contributes to the way 
we understand undramatic emotional energy in the school science contexts in my 
study. To develop further the notion of enacted analogical reasoning from this study, 
future research will be required around the notion of emotional energy as an 
undramatic emotional experience in the context of school science. To this end, I 
define methodological findings in this section that were useful in my understanding 
of enacted analogical reasoning. These findings represent areas of methodological 
innovation in my study and include the emotion of objectivity as respect for objects 
(6.3.1), the notion of conceptual entrainment (6.3.2) and the intensity of undramatic 
emotional energy (6.3.3). 
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6.3.1 The emotion of objectivity as respect for objects.   
One finding from my analysis was the influence of enacted practices of 
objectivity that were not only evident to me during my analysis, but related directly 
to analogical reasoning. In hindsight this makes sense as both analogical reasoning 
and objectivity are concerned with the production of knowledge about a world we 
presume to be external to ourselves as scientific thinkers. As I have found, analogical 
reasoning involves a particular form of objectivity where objects become known in 
terms of similarity and difference. For this reason I present my findings about 
enacted objectivity as it influenced my understanding of both enacted analogical 
reasoning and its interdependence with undramatic emotional energy. In the sub-
sections that follow, I discuss the common ideology of objectivity in school science 
(section 6.3.1.1), respect for objects (section 6.3.1.2) and the epistemological 
implications (6.3.1.3) of enacted objectivity. 
6.3.1.1  Common ideology of objectivity in school science. 
Objectivity is firmly embedded in contemporary scientific thinking, as part of 
a shared culture, with its foundations dating back to the sixteenth century (cf. Carrier, 
2013; Daston & Galison, 2010). This shared culture involving objectivity was 
evident in my study where group members enacted notions of objectivity without any 
explicit instruction to do so (section 5.3). In school science, objectivity may be 
considered as the way students and teachers treat things in science contexts, in an 
endeavour to capture the nature of things (Carrier, 2013). More broadly, in science 
education there is a common acceptance about objectivity concerning the formation 
of scientific knowledge. This tends to emerge through scientific methods by 
establishing a relationship of distance, emotional detachment and neutrality between 
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the scientist, as an embodied being, and the objects of science inquiry (Carrier, 2013; 
Daston & Galison, 2010). 
The practice of objectivity through scientific methods in school science is 
often portrayed in the form of speculation-free observation (Chalmers, 1982). 
Objective observation enables perceptions to be represented in non-subjective 
language, assigning objectivity as a way of knowing shared phenomena (Sundaram, 
1985). These practices help define spaces occupied by different objects, by 
distancing the observer from things being observed in an externalized reality. In this 
sense practices of objective scientific method in school science may be treated as 
producing or forming scientific objects across time and space (Brown, Heywood, 
Solomon & Zagorianakos, 2013). 
6.3.1.2  Respect for objects. 
As previously indicated in my discussion of enacted analogical reasoning 
(section 6.2), I identified a recurring tendency where ethnomethods established 
distance between objects, and between objects and bodies/beings, in the co-
construction of shared understanding about objects. In the context of situations where 
undramatic emotional energy was evident, the notion of distance is applied in terms 
of inclusion within the family where ideas are situated within the group hierarchy 
(section 6.2.2.2). In this context distance is not exclusive and disruptive to solidarity 
(emotional energy). The establishment of distance is within the boundaries of the 
family. It is enacted through restraint as a form of respect and it is this enactment of 
distance that contributes to solidarity. When I refer to distance in relation to 
undramatic emotional energy and objectivity I am using the term within the context 
of the family and a hierarchical relationship that requires a degree of distance 
between ideas and group members. For this reason I have allocated considerable 
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effort in this study to observe how distance was enacted and used to know objects, 
separate from the subjective sense of self. These situations were evident in; the 
explicit enactment of observation (section 5.3.1), physical distancing between bodies 
and objects (section 5.3.2), and analytical distancing through language and hierarchy 
(sections 5.3.3 & 5.4.2).  
Closely related to these practices of distancing to create a sense of objectivity 
was the presence of undramatic emotional energy. This was evident in my analyses 
in the form of respect for the objects, as the focus of scientific inquiry. As indicated 
in section 5.3.1, practices of observation provided the initial evidence of respect. 
This involved members treating the worksheet instructions with respect by possibly 
applying moral force upon the self, prohibiting speculation, and enacting the 
observation of objects. As a form of emotional experience, self-prohibition was 
established by Durkheim (1912/1915) as a means for identifying respect. Durkheim 
related experiences of respect to moral actions such as self-prohibition, and used 
moral force to describe the link between respect and actions of self-prohibition 
(section 3.4.1). 
The experience of respect, simultaneously with the enactment of objectivity, 
became more evident with the enactment of distancing between bodies and objects 
(section 5.3.1). In section 5.3.1, I established evidence of coordinated control over 
individual bodies via withdrawal from the objects.  This was evident in the actions of 
Simon and Dre who physically withdrew from the objects. Dre also made speech 
gestures establishing a need to give the objects their own space, enabling the objects 
to do what they wanted to do. I interpreted these actions as the coordinated 
distancing of bodies from the objects driven by UEE as respect for the objects.  
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Respect for the objects was further evident through language practices.  For 
example, in section 5.3.3, language about the objects was initially profane, everyday 
language, treating the objects as tea and water. Profane language is everyday 
language as distinct from technical or scientific language. As the group’s inquiry 
developed they restrained their language. This was evident as Dre began to make 
deliberate (selective), tentative speech gestures about the objects, leading eventually 
to the use of scientific language such as circulation, convection and currents. 
Respect, as UEE, became evident through these practices via the restraint from using 
profane language and the deliberate selection of scientific language.  
This link between UEE (respect for the objects) and language was evident on 
one occasion where respect was temporarily lost as analysed in section 5.4.1. In that 
episode the loss of emotional energy, as respect for the objects, was partly evident in 
reversion to profane language. Language practices and respect were then re-
established with transference, as I (the science teacher) approached the group. This 
transference re-orientated the group back around the objects, and Dre immediately 
recommenced his deliberate, scientific language about the objects, by enacting a 
spoken description. 
 In addition to observation, distancing and language, objectivity as respect for 
objects was evident through the enactment of hierarchy. I analyzed evidence 
establishing hierarchy in section 5.4.1. Hierarchy was concerned with the inclusion 
of concepts/objects into a family.  Hierarchy became evident within the group, as a 
family, through the enactment of self-deprecation, denial of expectation and the 
practices of restraint discussed above.  Each of these practices contributed to 
treatment of objects with respect, positioning the objects within the group or family 
hierarchy. By restraining their actions, group members created space for the objects. 
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In this way, group members enacted a hierarchy, creating evidence of their respect 
for the objects. 
 In my study, distance, objectivity and respect as a form of UEE were 
prominent concepts describing my understanding of data.  An important finding from 
this study is my understanding of objectivity as the interdependence between a 
particular set of enacted ethnomethods and an experience of UEE. Because of this 
experience of UEE, the common understanding of objectivity as being free from 
emotion was not valid in the situations I studied. My interpretation of these situations 
indicates how dramatic emotional energy tends to be displaced by undramatic 
emotional energy through restraint and self-prohibition.  In the context of enacted 
analogical reasoning, I therefore describe objectivity as an experience of undramatic 
emotional energy, as respect for objects in school science contexts. 
6.3.1.3  Epistemological implications. 
What I described above as the undramatic emotional experience of objectivity 
also has important epistemological implications. Each feature of objectivity 
identified through the enacted practices of group members involved some form of 
self-prohibition or restraint. This restraint had direct implications on how knowledge 
about the objects was co-constructed by the group.  
For example, by enacting science observation that was free from speculation 
(section 5.3.1), Simon provided evidence of his interpretation of science observation 
as involving restraint from speculation. Simon’s self-prohibition through speculation-
free observation was consistent with Chalmers’s (1982) definition of objectivity in 
science, and was probably reflective of Simon’s ten years of experience in the shared 
culture of school science. In this particular situation, self-prohibition influenced 
enacted practices, which changed what the group could know about the objects, by 
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limiting them to observation only. In this way, objectivity, as both a practice of 
observation and an emotional experience of restraint, shaped the possibilities for 
what may constitute knowledge about the objects. 
Compared with observation, the enactment of distance between members and 
objects had more obvious epistemological implications. This may be understood by 
comparing the way Dre came to know the objects by withdrawing from them, 
compared with Shady’s continued lack of objectivity (section 5.3). My analysis 
suggests that by withdrawing physically from the objects, the distance between Dre 
and the objects may have helped Dre to define the objects separately from his sense 
of self.  This became evident over the course of their science inquiry through Dre’s 
language practices. Earlier Dre had known the objects and treated them in a profane 
way as a ‘cup of tea’.  As a cup of tea, he even suggested drinking it, indicating his 
treatment of the objects as profane (everyday) unscientific things. As the inquiry 
progressed he later spoke of the objects in language such as convection and currents, 
indicating their treatment as scientific objects distinct from his sense of biological 
self. Dre had come to know the objects in an objective way, as scientific objects.   
In contrast, Shady knew the objects as profane things in connection with 
whatever he did to them, with the pen in his hand (section 5.3.2). Throughout the 
inquiry, Shady did not successfully treat the objects with language that indicated a 
sense of objectivity. Thus, Shady and Dre contributed different knowledge about the 
objects. The enactment of distancing by Dre concurrent with his sense of restraint as 
an undramatic emotional experience, formed part of his enactment of objectivity 
constituting his knowledge about the objects in a particular way. 
The epistemological implications of Dre’s sense of objectivity, were also 
evident in the way he established a sense of hierarchy between himself and the 
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objects. This was evident by the freedom Dre gave to the objects by physical 
distancing, and also by Dre’s self-awareness of his subjectivity as an observer of the 
objects. As discussed above, Dre enacted physical distance, restraining his own 
embodied movements in relation to the objects.  He and Simon, also appealed for 
restraint to be enacted by Shady. Hierarchy contributed to how the objects become 
known as the subjugation of member actions gave greater hegemony to the natural 
actions of the objects. In this way Dre and Simon created a perception of upholding 
the ideology of objectivity so that the objects could be observed and known in their 
most natural state of being. 
Dre’s self-awareness of his subjectivity distinct from the objects also became 
evident through both hierarchy and language.  For example, Dre’s enacted self-
deprecation established a hierarchy between Dre and the objects, as Dre had 
indicated his words may not be sufficient to describe these scientific objects. In a 
hierarchical sense, Dre’s denial of self-expectation reduced his sense of self-worth in 
relation to the objects, thereby indicating his respect for them as scientific objects. 
The epistemological implications of this hierarchy were that Dre was indicating self-
doubt about the efficacy of his language as an accurate description of the objects. So 
the hierarchy created by self-deprecation, formed part of Dre’s emotional experience 
of restraint via his selection of words and concepts. The enactment of hierarchy 
produced the experience of emotional energy as respect for the objects that then 
influenced Dre’s choice of language toward scientific terminology as a way of 
explaining the objects of mutual focus. In this way, the emotional energy of respect 
for the objects contributed to co-construction of objective, scientific knowledge by 
the group.  
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6.3.2 Conceptual Entrainment. 
Conceptual entrainment is a particular form of UEE that emphasizes the 
formation of shared ideas. I identified conceptual entrainment as a general 
phenomenon through the analysis of ethnomethods pertaining to analogical reasoning 
(sections 5.2.1 & 5.2.2). Conceptual entrainment is a form of UEE where there is 
evidence of strong mutual focus on shared ideas within an interaction. With 
reference to my definition of emotional energy in section 3.2, conceptual entrainment 
involves a greater emphasis on evidence of shared ideas. This means it may be 
evident during moments of physical stillness, silence, concentration and absorption, 
creating its unremarkable, undramatic, scientific qualities.  
I established the concept of conceptual entrainment in my study by exploring 
three situations.  The initial example involved the lexical entrainment between Chris 
and me, about the half-life of carbon-14.  This was a momentary example of 
conceptual entrainment. In section 5.2.1, I analysed Chris’ stillness, silence and 
continued physical entrainment during a discussion where possible disjuncture could 
have been conducive of a disruption in the flow of our interaction and emotional 
energy. This example was notable for its unremarkable quality where silence and 
continued entrainment by Chris was taken as evidence of conceptual entrainment 
around the ideas being discussed. The final example, involved Tim and me where we 
established convergent pace, rhythm and mutual connectedness in the way we shared 
the floor during our discussion of beta decay (section 5.2.2). Each of these examples 
provided a different form of evidence supporting the notion of conceptual 
entrainment that I have referred to throughout my analysis and discussion. In 
addition to these examples I also discussed a situation involving speech overlap that I 
did not consider to be an example of conceptual entrainment. That example involved 
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Tim and me (section 5.1.2) during finding-each-other where the speech overlap did 
not involve any shared ideas. I cited this situation as an example of depletion in 
emotional energy.  
The notion of conceptual entrainment is important to my analysis of 
analogical reasoning as it contributes to an understanding of the intersection between 
emotion and cognition in relation to objects. Although it appears through different 
forms of ethnomethods, as a general phenomenon it involves mutual focus about a 
shared idea, providing evidence of emotional energy. Simultaneously, conceptual 
entrainment provides evidence of a shared conceptual locality on the analogical map-
in-use. This shared conceptual locality establishes evidence of a point of shared 
understanding around the shared idea. In the context of analogical reasoning as a 
map-in-use, evidence of conceptual entrainment may therefore be considered 
important in establishing conceptual landmarks in the analogical journey. 
6.3.3 Measuring the Intensity of Undramatic Emotional Energy.  
My discussion of objectivity as respect for objects (section 6.3.1) and 
conceptual entrainment (section 6.3.2) outlines two forms of undramatic emotional 
energy evident in my study in relation to practices of analogical reasoning. The 
empirical analysis of undramatic emotional energy is an innovation in this study, and 
for this reason, it is important to consider the implications for measuring the intensity 
of undramatic emotional energy for future research. In the same way that an emotion 
of objectivity may seem paradoxical, thinking about the intensity of undramatic 
emotional energy presents a further apparent contradiction, which may originate 
from our everyday ideas about emotion. Dewey (1894) highlighted this apparent 
contradiction in his commentary about the idea of science being emotion-free despite 
the need for high levels of absorption and concentrated attention required in the 
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work of doing science. On this basis I conceptualize emotional intensity in terms of 
its productivity of shared ideas, rather than the obvious physical and conversational 
drama often associated with emotional intensity. For this reason I refer to the 
intensity of undramatic emotional energy. 
The intensity of UEE is an important concept as indicated by recent research 
that associated discrete emotions with particular activities and learning in the 
classroom (King et al., 2015). Learning in non-science contexts has also been 
associated with peak emotional intensity during learning activities (Kahneman, 
2012). Given the possible links between emotional intensity, learning situations and 
learning outcomes in science education, it is imperative that methodologies are 
developed to measure the intensity of constructs such as undramatic emotional 
energy. 
As I indicated in chapter 2, the approach to measuring intensity of emotion 
varies across the particular constructs of emotion being studied. Bellocchi et al. 
(2013; 2014) aligned micro-social processes with a self-reported ordinal measure for 
emotional climate in pre-service teacher education. One of these studies (Bellocchi et 
al., 2013) suggested an association between high intensity, positive valence 
emotional climate and occasions of laughter. This finding was relevant to my study 
in that my analysis also suggests laughter to be associated with intense UEE 
immediately prior to the laughter.  In the context of my study, and consistent with 
Dewey (1894) and Roth et al. (2011) I interpreted laughter as a release of tension 
from the experience of intense UEE.   
In other studies of emotional intensity, Roth & Hsu (2010) discuss research 
where prosody was applied to measure emotional intensity. Their examples used 
intensity in speech volume and pitch, and convergence or divergence of prosodic 
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properties between group members. In contrast, the examples in my study provide 
evidence that undramatic emotional energy may involve enacted features such as 
silence, stillness and speech overlap, requiring a refinement of methods to identify 
and measure emotional energy.   
One approach that defined emotional intensity from the researcher’s 
analytical perspective was subjective assessment used by Tobin et al. (2013). This 
measure took the form of an ordinal scale to measure the intensity of 
positive/negative valence of emotional climate in science classrooms. The 
application of a subjective ordinal scale would be useful for measuring the intensity 
of UEE. It is important however to exclude valence from such measures of intensity, 
as this is a different construct from intensity that may confuse potential results as 
argued by Bellocchi et al. (2013).   
Table 6.1 below, illustrates a proto-type scale for measuring the intensity of 
undramatic emotional energy developed as an outcome of my study.  
Table 6.1 Prototype Rating Scale: Intensity of Undramatic Emotional Energy 
  1 2 3 4 5 
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Limited conceptual 
entrainment, 
evident by 
conversation with 
some disjuncture. 
  
Limited eye contact 
or facial alignment 
during 
conversation. 
 
 
 
Limited silence or 
pauses associated 
with the continuity 
of conversation or 
the formation of 
shared ideas.  
 Some conceptual 
entrainment. Evident by at 
least one instance of speech 
overlap involving a scientific 
idea. 
 
Some eye contact, glances 
or smiles preceding, 
concurrent with or following 
the establishment of shared 
understanding about 
scientific ideas.  
 
Some silence/pauses where 
some members observe 
objects or contemplate 
concepts with evidence of 
some continuation of 
conversation about scientific 
ideas.  
 Conceptual entrainment. Evident 
by use of complex science 
concepts and sharing-the-floor in 
conversation, over a period of 
time. 
 
Ongoing, eye contact, glances and 
smiles preceding, concurrent with 
or following the establishment of 
shared understanding about 
scientific concepts.  
 
 
Silence/pauses during mutual 
observation of objects or 
contemplation of concepts with 
evidence of contribution to 
ongoing conversation about 
scientific concepts.  
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The items listed in figure 6.1 draw on my data analysis from chapter 5, and highlight 
the inferential nature of evaluating the intensity of undramatic emotional energy in a 
research context. This evaluation is based on inferences invoked from empirical data 
as evidence of emotional experience, as indicated in my suggested, sample criteria, 
presented in table 6.1. 
Inference by the researcher is required because undramatic emotional energy 
is taken-for-granted by group members (Collins, 2004). For this reason emotional 
energy must be inferred from empirical evidence such as the vocalizations, prosody, 
embodied gestures or facial actions observed in my study and in other studies (cf. 
Bellocchi, et al., 2013; 2014; Ritchie et al., 2013; Roth & Tobin, 2010; Tobin, 2006; 
Tobin, et al., 2013). These constituent elements of emotion can only be interpreted 
by researchers as emotional energy by making inferences about their inter-
relatedness within the context of identifying emotional components such as 
coordinated movements and shared feelings about shared ideas.  
The purpose of this scale in figure 6.1 is two-fold.  Firstly it outlines the 
possible direction of future research to establish approaches to the measurement of 
intensity of undramatic emotional energy. Secondly, by using the examples of 
conceptual entrainment, eye contact/glances/smiles, and silence/pauses, I am 
illustrating the undramatic elements of emotional energy that have contributed to the 
development of shared understanding in the situations reported in my study. From 
my study, similar criteria may be developed to measure the intensity of respect 
associated with enacted practices objectivity. These undramatic elements are 
indicative of the direction that future research concerning emotional energy could 
adopt. 
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The suggested development of this scale in table 6.1 reflects the underlying 
construct of undramatic emotional energy I have been describing throughout chapter 
5, and sections 6.3.1 and 6.3.2.  For example, the exclusion of a zero point is based 
on my earlier operational definition of emotional energy (section 3.2.2), which 
excludes the possibility of a living social being from an absolute zero experience of 
emotion. This absence of an absolute zero for emotional experience is consistent with 
lived experiences of school science contexts in my study. One example was the 
evidence of respect via self-prohibition and restraint that gave rise to a sense of 
objectivity as an emotional experience. Another notable feature in table 6.1 is the 
presentation of criteria specifically aimed at identifying intense emotional energy in 
situations of ordinary, unremarkable social interaction. These include a broad range 
of vocalizations, prosodic properties, facial actions and gestures within particular 
school science situations. These may include ethnomethods such as silence, eye 
contact or sustained alignment that may contribute to the measurement of undramatic 
emotional energy.  
In the case of silence we may also develop further categorizations such as 
respectful contemplation with shared focus, or awkward silences that can result in 
failed interactions. Such categorization would be possible by adopting the 
ethnomethodological orientation of my study (section 3.1) that situates researchers to 
explore moments of interaction over time. That is, by measuring categories of silence 
in relation to the interactions following the silence. For these reasons, my prototype 
measurement instrument (table 6.1) is an important area for future research if 
undramatic emotional energy is to be understood fully.  
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6.3.4 Summary of methodological findings. 
This study delivers a key contribution to the development of research 
methodology in science education. This key contribution is evident in my exploration 
of the undramatic quality of emotional energy, explicated in the form of objectivity 
and conceptual entrainment in the context of my science classrooms.  My analysis of 
objectivity in this study is consistent with long-held theoretical views that objectivity 
in science involves some form of emotional experience related to the need for 
restraint and self-prohibition in doing science (cf. Dewey, 1895; Durkheim, 
1912/1915; White, 2009). I have described my understanding of objectivity as the 
emotion of respect focused around the objects of scientific inquiry. I have also 
described the notion of conceptual entrainment as a different form of undramatic 
emotional energy. Like objectivity, conceptual entrainment involves moments of 
enacted practices that are evident of high levels of focus around ideas or conceptual 
objects. I associate this notion of conceptual entrainment with situations that are 
productive of shared ideas involving subtle, unremarkable and undramatic emotional 
energy.  
These notions of respect for objects (objectivity) and conceptual entrainment 
were invoked during my study of enacted analogical reasoning. Similar subtle, taken-
for-granted forms of undramatic emotional energy have been proposed as a 
possibility, but not investigated in detail, in science education research (Olitsky, 
2007). Further work on the topic of undramatic emotional energy in school science 
situations is required if we are to understand fully the role of emotion in learning 
science.   
Recent work in science education research has included the measurement of 
intensity of discrete emotion (Bellocchi & Ritchie, 2015; King et al., 2015; Tomas & 
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Ritchie, 2012) and emotional climate (Bellocchi et al., 2014, Tobin et al., 2013). 
Undramatic emotional energy is a distinctively unique construct of emotion, and for 
this reason I have proposed an alternative approach to measure its intensity. The 
proto-type scale, outlined in figure 6.1, is based on the scales developed for 
emotional climate (Bellocchi et al., 2014; Tobin et al., 2013). The criteria I suggest 
draws from my data analysis and is indicative of the need to develop measures 
around subtle forms of emotional energy evident through silence, pauses, eye contact 
or evidence of conceptual entrainment or objectivity. Understanding the empirical 
basis for these different forms of undramatic emotional energy is therefore 
imperative to the design of meaningful measures of emotional intensity in future 
science education research. 
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Chapter 7 
Study Outcomes and Recommendations 
7.0 Study Summary         
This study contributes to an understanding of analogical reasoning as a 
collection of enacted, embodied practices imbued with lived experiences of 
emotional energy. My contribution to science education analogy research is 
innovative because of its sociological perspective that shifts the unit of analysis away 
from the individual mind (cf. Gentner, 1983; Glynn, 1994a; Harrison & Treagust, 
1993) to episodes of social interaction. In this study I identify two major outcomes. 
The first is my development of a notion of enacted analogical reasoning with an 
emotional essence observable as undramatic emotional energy. This approach to 
understanding analogical reasoning presents an alternative perspective that addresses 
some of the limitations of the contemporary theory on analogy in science education. 
The second important contribution in this study relates to the methodological 
approach to understanding emotional energy as undramatic.  My study builds upon a 
proposition by Collins (2004) that an ethnomethodological research orientation 
would be conducive to the empirical exploration of undramatic emotional energy.  
Olitsky (2007) also indicated that emotional energy in science classrooms may not be 
visible, like the excitement of a football game, but may remain observable in the way 
students engage with scientific objects and ideas. To address the key issues arising 
from these innovations, this chapter presents my study outcomes in terms of the 
study’s strengths (7.1), limitations (7.2), implications (7.3), and recommendations 
(7.4). 
7.1 Strengths: Moving Beyond Cognitive Theories  
This study proposes a major shift in the way science educators may think 
about analogical reasoning in school science contexts. Presently, the contemporary 
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theory of structure mapping may be observable, even in situations of students co-
generating analogy, but being able to observe such structures rests on an a priori 
understanding of analogical reasoning by the researcher. In contrast, my study 
focuses on the particular actions of enacting knowledge in terms of similarity and 
difference, and the lived emotional experiences of those actions to explain how 
analogies are constructed as shared understanding through micro-social interaction. 
My study has required an ontological and epistemological shift through the 
development of some innovative methodological approaches. The strengths of this 
study rest in the methodological innovations I introduced to understanding analogical 
reasoning in school science. These methodological innovations directed my study 
toward new questions about analogical reasoning, shifting the unit of analyses away 
from individual cognition, and illustrating new possibilities for science education 
theory and practice. I address each of these innovations in sections 7.1.1, 7.1.2 and 
7.1.3. 
7.1.1 Questions about how. 
The influence of ethnomethodology in my approach to this study directed me 
toward questions about how knowledge in school science comes to exist through the 
phenomenon of analogical reasoning. As indicated in section 3.2, studies in 
ethnomethodology start by accepting the existence of an objective social reality, 
evident in the accounts of reality that people co-construct. These accounts become 
evident in everyday situations, and as representations of knowledge in places such as 
the science education literature. This is different from the dominant, cognitive 
approaches to studying analogy in science education that focus on the discovery of 
concepts and conceptual relations. In this sense the authors of the cognitive 
perspective present a presumption about the existence of concepts as an objectively 
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knowable reality before the enactment of analogical reasoning. For example, 
defining analogy as a map of the relational features between concepts is an example 
of an account of what analogy is in terms of an objective reality. This was reflected 
in the formal account of analogy described by Glynn (1994a) in relation to the theory 
of structure mapping. However, a feature of Glynn’s explanation was his practical 
use of a diagram (section 5.4.2.1) and concepts with possible links to sociology such 
as family (kinship), hierarchy and transference (contagion). I interpreted these from 
Glynn (1994a) by analyzing his article as a document-in-use.  In this way I was 
asking myself how Glynn’s document was constructed to direct my understanding of 
his account of analogical reasoning. In doing so, Glynn’s ethnomethods for 
constructing his model became evident to me. His ethnomethods were consistent 
with the ethnomethods observed in my study of classroom interactions. 
Moving to my classroom data, I studied in detail, practical situations of 
enacted analogical reasoning, where members accounted for observed objects by 
establishing a superordinate concept called circulation (6.2). The shared 
understanding of circulation became the objective reality for knowing what the 
observed phenomenon was in that particular situation. In contrast, a study informed 
by ethnomethodology tends to focus on how things are accounted for as an objective 
social reality. In this way my study was focused on how conceptual networks in the 
form of a family of concepts, hierarchy and transference come to exist. This focus 
included an understanding of how these categories of enacted thought achieved an 
objective reality of analogical reasoning in terms of similarity and difference. For 
this reason, in my example of circulation in section 6.2.4, I was less interested in 
circulation as a concept, and more interested in how circulation came to be a real, 
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objectively knowable object as the focus of the group’s shared understanding through 
the experience of emotional energy. 
By enabling how-type questions to be addressed, my study illustrates the 
application of ethnomethodology to understanding a different perspective of a 
phenomena such as analogical reasoning in science education. In my study this focus 
was not just on the ethnomethods, but on the experience of ethnomethods as 
emotional energy. This shaped my operational definition of the emotional essence of 
analogical reasoning.  
A notable feature missing from my research questions is any reference to the 
emotional essence or emotional energy associated with analogical reasoning. This is 
because emotional energy was part of the taken-for-granted ethnomethods. That is, 
emotional energy is observable as a resource used by group members as the 
coordination of their enacted and embodied sounds and motions (ethnomethods). As 
a member resource, the emotional essence of analogical reasoning was excluded 
from the topic of my research questions.  It could only be understood by asking how-
type questions as a way to access the emotional essence within the mutual, taken-for-
granted coordination of ethnomethods. For this reason, questions about how 
analogical reasoning occurs, are part of the methodological innovation of this study. 
 7.1.2 Changing the unit of analysis. 
 My unit of analysis in this study was the episode of interaction (cf. section 
4.4.1). This was an innovation in my study compared with the cognitive sciences 
approach to analogy research in science education that retains the individual mind as 
its unit of analysis (cf. Amin, Jeppsson & Haglund, 2015).  Shifting the unit of 
analysis away from the individual, as a cognitive mind, was essential because it 
enabled me to adopt a methodology based on sociological presumptions, as distinct 
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from psychological presumptions. This led to methodological innovations such as 
adopting a fundamental definition of analogical reasoning (section 3.2.1), and 
considering the possibility for a more diverse array of lived phenomena to be 
analyzed such as embodied reasoning and emotional experience. It was also the basis 
for enabling how-type questions which was essential for understanding emotional 
energy in this study. 
 7.1.3 Moving beyond cognitive theories. 
My methodological innovations in this study demonstrate the possibilities for 
something else to be known about phenomena such as analogical reasoning in school 
science. By drawing on ethnomethodology and sociology, asking how-type 
questions, and shifting the unit of analysis to focus on social interaction, I have 
contributed an alternative approach in science education research to understanding 
emotions in analogical reasoning. This achievement is an important strength of this 
study as it foregrounds the possibility for theoretical innovation in how we think 
about analogical reasoning in school science situations. My emphasis on social 
interaction, and my use of enacted embodied reasoning as a resource for 
understanding, situates new theoretical possibilities in a space beyond theories about 
cognitive processes.  
Moving beyond cognitive theories is important for science education, as 
indicated by my analysis of ecological validity in relation to the theory of structure 
mapping (section 2.2.2.1). The recognition of limitations within contemporary 
science education theory is evident in recent attempts to re-theorize analogy and 
conceptual change via theories such as embodied cognition (Amin et al., 2015). In 
contrast to contemporary theory or the emergent science education literature on 
embodied cognition, the approach adopted in my study is focused on lived 
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experiences and incorporates student and teacher perspectives in my findings. This 
approach has enabled me to outline new understandings about analogical reasoning 
in terms of social and emotional perspectives, which remained inaccessible using 
previous theoretical approaches. Therefore this study situates future theory 
development to move beyond cognitive theories as way of understanding analogy in 
school science.  
7.2 Limitations 
7.2.1 The act of writing. 
 As indicated in section 4.6 the act of writing in the context of science 
education research defines a limitation to this study in that it contributes a degree of 
objectivity to the study of lived phenomena (van Manen, 2015). This issue is 
unavoidable, if interpretive research is to be enacted and communicated to others. 
Further, this limitation is consistent with my dissertation that discusses the subjective 
elements (emotional experience) of objectivity in school science classrooms. That is, 
while my study identifies and analyzes the subjective underpinnings of enacting 
objectivity in school science, the enactment of my study through writing also 
illustrates the objective underpinnings of subjectivity in interpretive research. In this 
sense, neither subjectivity nor objectivity may be considered achievable in an 
absolute or ideal form. Both are limited by the enacted practices of our embodied, 
social and biological being. 
7.2.2 The boundaries of ethnomethodology.  
As discussed in section 7.1, some of the strengths of this study include the 
possibility for asking how-type questions and the foundation this study outlines for 
future theory development. These strengths are grounded in my approach informed 
by ethnomethodology.  But these strengths also contribute to one of the limitations in 
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this study, which is the inability to build theory direct from an ethnomethodological 
approach. Liberman (2013) noted that Garfinkel’s (1967) program of 
ethnomethodology avoided the development of theory, because this was viewed as 
the construction of formal accounts of reality. In essence, the study of ethnomethods 
was designed to describe how shared understanding of reality was co-constructed. It 
was not designed for building a new version of reality, through a theory, as a 
replacement of the old version. For readers who are seeking a new theory of 
analogical reasoning, further research that builds on my study is needed. Such 
research would need to adopt a methodology that is amenable to theory generation.  
A further limitation to this study was associated with my approach to 
establishing situations of analogical reasoning that were somewhat spontaneous and 
unstructured from a student perspective. This was an intentional approach as I 
wanted to study practices of analogical reasoning indigenous to my science classes 
with limited influence from the formal science education analogy literature. For this 
reason my study has not addressed the impact of explicitly teaching students a 
structure for analogical reasoning such as the TWA model or the FAR guide.  This 
means that my account of enacted analogical reasoning may present differently if 
students were educated in a particular model of analogical reasoning prior to the 
study of their social interactions. My findings are therefore limited to understanding 
the enactment of analogical reasoning in a context of indigenous student practices, 
where my accounts of analogical reasoning (as teacher/researcher) were not part of 
the formal topic from the student perspective.  
The formal ritualization of different analogical practices is likely to impact on 
the nature of social interaction and experiences of emotional energy (cf. Bellocchi et 
al., 2014). As a science educator I now need to look to a new methodology and a 
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future study, to make use of my new understanding of analogical reasoning, if I am 
to derive a new theory to embrace the social and emotional experiences of school 
science learning.  
7.3 Implications of this Study 
7.3.1 Theory and research.   
This study presents new theoretical understandings about emotion and 
analogical reasoning with important contributions to shaping the future of science 
education research and the development of new theory in this field. The implications 
of this study may be summarized in terms of its contribution to methodology and to a 
new foundation for developing a theory of enacted analogical reasoning.  
7.3.1.1  Contribution to methodology. 
The contribution to methodology in this study is evident in my approach to 
understanding emotional energy, and also in my approach to understanding 
something else about established theory in science education. This study has 
extended science education research around emotional energy (Milne & Otieno, 
2007; Olitsky, 2007), with a specific focus on undramatic emotional energy (UEE) 
by developing and applying a modified operational definition of emotion, drawn 
from the works of Dewey (1894; 1895), Durkheim (1912/1915) and Collins (2004). 
This operational definition enabled the analysis of UEE by studying coordinated 
movements/speech, shared ideas and shared feelings in unremarkable situations 
where emotion was subtle and taken-for-granted. These elements of UEE were 
observed via coordinated, embodied sounds and motions (ethnomethods) during 
localized social interaction. 
In this study I refined my definition of UEE in relation to the concept of 
conceptual entrainment. I also analyzed evidence of UEE during practices of 
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objectivity, indicating that objectivity in the science classroom involves an 
undramatic emotional element related to self-prohibition and restraint. Finally, I 
considered the possibilities for improving measurement of intensity in UEE. I 
suggested a criterion-based ordinal scale to measure UEE similar to a scale applied 
by Tobin et al. (2013) that may be useful for future studies.  
Future research in science education may also benefit from this study in the 
application of ethnomethodology, because this approach facilitates new ways of 
questioning and understanding established science education theory. In this study I 
have focused on analogical reasoning with how-type questions, characteristic of 
studies in ethnomethodology. As an area of science education I considered to be well 
researched and well established, I was surprised by what I learnt about analogical 
reasoning from this study. Ethnomethodology offers a way to rethink established 
ways of thinking in a discipline (Roth, 2013). It offers science education a valuable 
methodology for evaluating our knowledge base and learning something else about 
how students learn within the ecologically valid context of their own science 
classrooms.  
7.3.1.2  Foundation for a theory of enacted analogical reasoning. 
A further important implication of this study is the foundation it establishes 
for a re-theorization of analogical reasoning in school science pedagogy. For ease of 
expression I used the term enacted analogical reasoning throughout this chapter to 
make reference to the lived experience of embodied sounds and motions involved in 
the enactment of analogical reasoning. In developing this perspective I also referred 
to Garfinkel (1996) and Liberman’s (2013) work on the notion of a map-in-use. My 
application of a map-in-use approach positions my view of fundamental analogical 
reasoning as a phenomenon existing through a lived experience, and ceasing to exist 
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when the lived experience ceases. This approach enabled me to make a distinction 
between coming to know analogical reasoning as a map-in-use, compared with the 
structure mapping approach as a representational map of cognitive processes.   
The future development of my notion of enacted analogical reasoning as a 
map-in-use may have important theoretical, and practical pedagogical, implications. 
For example, the analogies I discussed such as a sketch map of beta decay in section 
5.2.1, or Glynn’s (1994a) analogy of atomic shells being like a bookshelf, may not be 
strictly referred to as analogies.  These diagrams may be considered as remnants of 
previous situations of enacted analogical reasoning. They may certainly be re-used in 
future situations, but as a map-in-use they only become an analogy when being 
enacted during moments of social interaction. As indicated in my finding-each-other 
episodes, each member could potentially have a different starting point, co-
constructing knowledge around each remnant in a different way. This is because the 
meaning (concept/idea) about each remnant (analogy), and each part of each 
remnant, is situated in particular lived occasions of enacted analogical reasoning. 
A further development may be the way we think about analogue and target 
concepts. For example, Zook (1991) indicated how students often experienced 
difficulty in mapping to the target concept provided by their teachers.  In a theory of 
enacted analogical reasoning as a map-in-use, the notion of a target concept would 
not exist, as concepts need to be enacted as shared understanding. This removes a 
teacher expectation for students to be able to make conceptual leaps to reach illusory 
target concepts. In removing this expectation, a new way of understanding student 
learning may be developed that accounts for specific students having different 
starting points, different learning pathways and different end points of understanding 
across the life of a science lesson.  
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Innovations to the way we understand student learning may also relate to the 
way we treat the break-down of analogies as a limitation of the analogy (Glynn, 
1994a). As discussed in chapter 2, contemporary theory treats analogy and its related 
concepts as knowable objects. Using cognitive analogical reasoning as a referent, a 
break-down in the analogy is attributed to a misunderstanding of the analogy. In 
contrast, using a referent such as enacted analogical reasoning as a map-in-use, the 
analogy may be understood as being co-constructed via the enactment of 
ethnomethods. A break-down of the analogy is therefore not a misunderstanding of 
the analogy, but rather, a disjuncture within the flow of ethnomethods. As such, it is 
a problem that may be repaired through further effort in social interaction to get back 
on the analogical map-in-use.  
Most importantly, social interaction is a phenomenon that both teacher and 
student have an ability to influence. Ensuring understanding thereby involves the 
repair of disjuncture, and re-establishing the flow of interaction. It is the lack of 
synchrony in social interaction, typically evident in the intensity of emotional energy, 
which requires repair, not the analogy. Each of these possible theoretical 
developments, based on my empirical data, would have implications for science 
pedagogy in the teaching of analogical reasoning and the way science educators 
teach pre-service teachers about student learning. 
7.3.2 Teacher education. 
This study contributes to the current foundational research into emotional 
energy and emotional climate in science education (Bellocchi, 2014; Bellocchi et al., 
2014; Ritchie, et al., 2013; Milne & Otieno, 2007; Olitsky, 2007; Tobin et al., 2013). 
The innovations of this study in terms of my topic and my methodological 
developments illustrate important applications of this study to teacher education.  As 
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an example, the issue of a break-down in analogy is typically treated as a problem 
with a misfit of analogical concepts, leading to misunderstanding. The focus of my 
study upon classroom interaction shifts the problem away from failed concepts, and 
toward disjuncture and lack of synchrony in social interaction (section 7.3.1.2). By 
adopting this shift in focus, a teacher is able to influence classroom interaction in a 
way that concepts are co-constructed with students to maximise emotional energy 
and successful learning outcomes in terms of shared understanding of shared ideas. 
One example would be for a teacher to pay close attention to fluxes in emotional 
energy that may be indicative of disjuncture. By exploring the connections between 
emotion, teaching and the localized epistemology of ideas, this study has illustrated 
the dynamic quality of science concepts and the locality of their origin as co-
constructed objects via experiences of emotional energy in social interaction. 
With further theoretical development, this study may contribute greater detail 
in the way we teach social constructivist approaches in science education. For 
example, explicit teaching of skills in micro-social observation, interpretation and 
analysis for school science contexts would provide future science teachers with a 
greater range of skills to implement fully, social constructivist approaches in 
teaching. This may include units in science education courses where the 
identification and management of emotional energy in science classrooms is 
explicitly taught as a basic skill for science teaching.   
7.3.3 Teaching practice.   
To understand the implications of my study for teaching practice I refer to my 
own teaching practices throughout this study. As a teacher/researcher, this study has 
been a personal pedagogical experience in science teaching. I have not only 
conducted a study, I have studied my own teaching practices and my students’ 
283 
 
learning experiences with a high level of intensity over a prolonged period of time 
(cf. Roth, 2007a). From this study I have come to appreciate the power of social 
interaction in learning, and the autonomy it offers students to get involved in their 
own learning. My increased self-awareness through this teacher/researcher 
experience has not only influenced the way I teach, but the way I have come to 
understand the taken-for-granted methods embedded in pedagogical research and 
theory. 
An important example of taken-for-granted methods embedded in 
pedagogical research was introduced earlier in section 1.1.2.3, where I provided an 
example of data from another practice-based study conducted by Glynn (2007). In 
that example I highlighted the limitations of the cognitive perspective based on the 
taken-for-granted treatment of the teacher’s social practices in the way she spoke to 
the student, and structured her question. My study has addressed this limitation by 
exploring in detail the sociological perspective of analogical reasoning as enacted 
practices and emotional experiences in school science. By studying these fine-
grained interactions of my own student’s learning, and my teaching, I have illustrated 
a collection of teaching practices and explained an understanding of them at a micro-
social level. This was made possible by the contextualized teacher research design of 
my study as discussed in section 1.2.1. 
As the teacher/researcher in my present study I situated my students through 
my teaching practices, by planning my teaching in a way that would elicit the 
possibility for analogical reasoning to be experienced by students, and observed in 
my research. My teaching practices included the routine use of analogical models 
and science inquiry as a way for students to explore phenomena. By engaging 
students in experiences of empirical science inquiry (Valeila, 2001) I tended to use 
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small group interaction and open ended questioning to guide students toward 
scientific understandings of various phenomena (Kawalkar & Vijapurkar, 2012). 
The micro-social understandings developed from my study, contribute detail 
that has enhance my teaching practices, and may enhance the practices of others 
through the dissemination of my research findings. My self-awareness as a teacher 
has been enhanced throughout this study so that I am now able to recognise micro-
social actions and appreciate their possible functions in learning. From the 
perspective I have developed, I recognise that situating students to learn is the 
essential purpose of my teaching practice, enabling them to; interact with and 
observe scientific phenomena; ask questions and be questioned; suggest, exclude and 
include new ideas and language; enact ideas through embodied gesture; and 
experience science emotionally through lived phenomena such as objectivity, 
conceptual entrainment, parody and laughter. Thus, the key implication of this study 
for teaching practice is my illustration of ways in which teachers can situate students 
to learn by co-constructing scientific knowledge, through experiences of social 
interaction and social relations in the spaces of school science.  
7.4 Recommendations for Further Research 
This study opens some important opportunities for further research in the 
areas of theory, research methodology, and pedagogical applications of a future 
theory of enacted analogical reasoning. My recommendations for further research are 
summarized within the topic of contributions to methodology (section 7.4.1) and 
foundations for a theory of enacted analogical reasoning (section 7.4.2), outlined 
below.   
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7.4.1 Methodological research.  
The key methodological finding in this study involves my application of 
ethnomethodology and micro-sociology to describe and explain the notion of 
undramatic emotional energy in school science contexts. My study builds on some 
important ideas generated by Collins (2004), by developing methodological 
approaches to researching undramatic emotional energy. One example from my 
study is the notion of conceptual entrainment as a form of undramatic emotional 
energy. My description and analysis of conceptual entrainment and the measurement 
of its intensity is an innovation in this study with both methodological and theoretical 
implications, indicating areas for future research.  
Another important methodological contribution of my study is the 
identification of respect as a basis for enacting objectivity in school science inquiry. 
This contribution is important as it indicates the presence of undramatic emotional 
energy at the epistemological heart of science.  By establishing an association 
between objectivity and emotional energy as respect, my study establishes an 
imperative for understanding the place of emotional energy in school science 
learning situations. Core notions in science education such as objectivity are 
important areas for further research using ethnomethodological and/or micro-
sociological perspectives. 
These contributions present new areas of research opportunity. This study 
illustrates possibilities for further research using ethnomethodology, and developing 
notions of conceptual entrainment and objectivity as respect for objects.  I anticipate 
future research building on this study will develop the application of Durkheimian 
(1912/1915) notions of respect, moral force, kinship (family) and transference in 
science education settings.  
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7.4.2 A re-theorization of analogical reasoning. 
This study sets out a foundation for a future re-theorization of analogy in the 
form of enacted analogical reasoning, which would have a direct impact on teacher 
education and teaching practices in science education. I anticipate a future re-
theorization may utilise a theoretical framework based on the theory of interaction 
ritual chains (Collins, 2004). It is within that theory where Collins (2004) developed 
his notion of emotional energy. Simultaneously with this approach in a future study, 
the methodological notion of a map-in-use (Garfinkel, 1996; Liberman, 2013) may 
contribute to this re-theorization, if developed outside of an ethnomethodological 
framework.  
To establish a re-theorization of analogy in the form of enacted analogical 
reasoning I anticipate a need for specific research into situations involving various 
forms of analogy across different learning and interactional situations. The impact of 
current pedagogical strategies such as the TWA model or FAR guide should also be 
investigated from these socio-constructivist perspectives I have outlined in this study. 
By studying a broad range of contexts for analogical reasoning via an interaction 
ritual/map-in-use framework it may be possible to develop a comprehensive 
sociological theory of enacted analogical reasoning for school science teaching and 
learning situations.   
In summary, the systematic study of emotion in science education has 
emerged over the past decade to establish an important direction in the evolution of 
our disciplinary knowledgebase. In the context of this broader movement in science 
education, my study has established the relevance of undramatic emotional energy to 
school science inquiry by addressing phenomena that are fundamental to science; 
analogical reasoning and objectivity. My recommendations for future research form 
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the basis for my ongoing interest in contributing to this evolving body of knowledge 
that will enable me to extend the field of research around emotion in science 
education contexts.     
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         Appendix A 
Data Series A 
Turn Speaker Transcript 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
Simon 
 
Dre 
Simon 
 
Dre 
Shady 
Dre 
 
 
Shady 
Dre 
 
 
Mr Davis 
 
Dre 
Mr Davis 
Shady 
Dre 
Simon 
Shady 
Mr Davis 
Shady 
 
Dre 
Shady 
Dre 
 
Sam 
Shady 
Dre 
Simon 
Shady 
Dre 
 Okay activity one(.) prepare a liter beaker of tap water by placing in a pinch of tea leaves 
1.0 
ARE WEˊ cooking ˊtea:  
ˉand ˉtwo ˉfoam ˉbeads ˉin ˉthe ˉwater(.) so we need a liter beaker of water ((Simon 
continued from Dre’s turn)) 
so what is this prac about(.) what are we DOin   
I dunno ((I do not know)) 
does anybody know  ((Dre reads the worksheet again, Simon and Sam go to collect some 
beads, a beaker and tea leaves, and Shady is goes back to setting up the hotplate)) 
9.0 
I don’t think this is working ((setting up the hotplate)) 
so you put a liter of water into the beaker(.) with a pinch of tea leaves and the two foam 
balls (.) are we supposed to heat the tea up ((glances at Mr Davis)) and watch how the 
balls move around in the water  
well starting with cold water, put your beads in ((Mr Davis responds to Dre’s glance by 
approaching the group while talking)) 
wheres the tea 
[tea is here] 
[sir its not working]  ((Mr Davis does not respond to Shady)) 
lets cook some tea ((Mr Davis walks away)) 
that’s about a litre ((Simon and Dre place the beaker on the hotplate)) 
sir this hotplate’s not working 
you need to plug it in(.) an::d turn it on 
yeah its plugged ˊIN ((follows the lead back to the power point, then back to the stove)) 
and I turned it on but I don’t see a light coming on 
that’s because its not plugged in a’wipe ((points to the plug at the stove end)) 
O:h:: there:: ((laughs as he plugs the power lead into the stove)) 
JEEZUZ  CHRist  ((Laughs at Shady))  that’s gunna ((going to)) make this class look smart(.) 
good job  
((Sam is putting some tea into the beaker, concurrent with turn 28-29)) 
SAM put it ALL in 
Sam it’s a pinch a pinch(.) that’s all ya ((you)) need 
do ya ((you)) put these in ((referring to the foam beads)) 
yeah 
I like my tea very weak (.) RIGHT (.) now lets throw it on (0.3) that’s how(.) that’s some 
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36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
 
Shady 
Dre 
 
Simon 
 
Shady 
Dre 
Shady 
 
Dre 
Simon 
Sam 
Simon 
Sam 
Shady 
Dre 
Dre 
Mr Davis 
 
Dre 
Simon 
Mr Davis 
Sam 
Mr Davis 
Shady 
Dre 
 
 
Shady 
Dre 
 
 
 
Shady 
 
 
 
good tea ((smiles as he places the beaker on the hotplate)) 
what(.) do we put it on high(.) MAX ((maximum heat setting)) 
boil the sh*t out of it ((some laughter from Dre and Shady))  
((laughter fades and they stand looking at the beaker)) 
what do you observe about movements in the contents of the beaker ((reading from 
worksheet)) 
well we can't see much at the moment ((looking down into the beaker)) 
wel:l: if we wait its gonna ((going to)) heat up: bubble  ((makes a prediction)) 
and their gunna ((going to)) go to the side eh ((places hand over top of beaker and raises 
hand as he makes a prediction)) 
what do you reckons gonna happen to the balls when it starts boiling 
awh no you have to observe what it is 
its just sitting in the water 
well what 
I'll get a pen 
its sitting at the moment 
Actually are we supposed to put more tea in ::: o:r: 
Sir how much tea do you put in 
just a pinch(.)   what your trying to do is just enough so you can see movement in the 
water we want to see what happens 
the difference between how the balls and the tea move 
the difference between 
yeah as the water heats up, see what you observe, make some observations now 
[nothing much] 
[and watch what happens] 
[o::o:::h::  there’s turbulence here ya know]  ((leans over beaker, looks in, points down)) 
[0I’m gonna move this ball here to the middle0] ((upper body leans forward, using  
hand to move gently the floating ball. Simon is staring at the beaker)) 
Just move him to the middle OY?  ((moves his head back a little))  
OY:A   ((raises head slightly)) 
OY::  it’s  S:TICKin   
((pulls upper body back into upright position, and removes right hand to his side.  
Dre smiles slightly))  
(2.0) 
((looks at Simon)) the balls ar’ stickin  together  
((Simon looks away to his left, then glances back at Dre, then stares momentarily at Shady. 
Simon looks back to the beaker, scratches his nose, glances at Dre.  Dre continuously 
watches the beaker standing upright with hands leaning on the edge of the bench))  
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74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
96 
97 
98 
99 
100 
101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
106 
107 
108 
109 
110 
111 
 
 
Dre 
 
 
 
 
 
Dre 
Sam 
Dre 
Simon 
 
Dre 
Simon 
Shady 
Dre 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dre 
 
 
Shady 
Dre 
Dre 
 
 
 
Dre 
 
 
Sam 
Dre 
Simon 
(7.0) 
((interjection from another group breaks the focus))   
so: uhm: we could note the ba::lls when their close together they stick together, when you 
get close to the edge its stuck to the edge (.)  3.15sps 
((glances at Sam))  
say something like that, I don't know how you would word that(.) thats saying it like a 
ret*rd but 4.10sps 
((Sam is making notes as Dre speaks))  
see watch when they get close together they sort of like 
and then they get 
they magnetically attract 
awh now look what you did ((directed at Shady, who was poking the beads with a  
pen))  
yeah and then they 
eh 
its stickin to the pen too 
well note that they want to stick  ((Shady, Simon & Dre all entrained on the object,  
Sam is taking notes)) 
note that the balls want to be attracted to each other and the edges of the water 
just leave it(.)  Shady leave (.) its what they want to do  
and the tea leaves are slowly uhm starting to sink to the bottom of the beaker 
((Long pause of several minutes. No conversation, scratching, looking around waiting for 
something to happen)) 
why do you (.) why do you reckon the balls are attracted to:: the edges (.) ((points to 
object and glances at Sam)) why that is  ((Shady is glancing at Dre as Dre speaks)) 
(3:00) ((Shady looks down at the beaker)) 
Neutrons ((looks at Dre and smiles. Dre looks back and smiles at Shady)) 
((Dre glances at Sam while continuing his smile))  
((Laughter))  YOU got it  ((points to Shady and laughs strongly)) 
((Shady, Simon and Sam join the laughter. Back and forth body motion by Sam and Dre)) 
 ((Dre leans down to look at the beak through the side angle))  
(6:55) 
do ya reckon its cos::  ((stands up and point to the beaker as he speaks))  you know how::  
does'n the water like; its very sli:ghtly: ((points at the beaker and Sam is looking)) but 
does'n it towards the middle like arc up a little bit  ((makes eye contact with Sam))  
n:eh: it dips down a little in the middle ((makes a slight hand gesture toward the beaker)) 
((Dre closes his eyes, lowers his head, and looks away. Shady  looking at Dre)) 
it dips down its like gone like uhm a greyish tea colour 
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112 
113 
114 
115 
116 
117 
118 
119 
120 
121 
122 
123 
124 
125 
126 
127 
128 
129 
130 
131 
132 
133 
134 
135 
136 
137 
138 
 
139 
140 
141 
142 
143 
144 
145 
146 
147 
148 
 
Sam 
Dre 
 
 
Dre 
Sam 
Dre 
Mr Davis 
Dre 
Mr Davis 
 
 
Dre 
Mr Davis 
Dre 
Mr Davis 
Simon 
Dre 
 
Simon 
Dre 
Simon 
Dre 
Mr Davis 
Dre 
Mr Davis 
 
Sam 
Dre 
Simon 
Mr Davis 
Shady 
Mr Davis 
Dre 
 
Simon 
Mr Davis 
LINE SKIPPED IN TRANSCRIPTION SERIES 
0everybody else is like put the [whole tea bag in]0   ((Sam, Simon & Dre look away))  
                                                       [yeah do:n’t] (.)       
do:n't use them as the example they put the whole tea bag in   
((Dre points as he speaks, Sam, Simon and Shady aligned bodies at an adjacent group)) 
they tea bagged the sh*t out of it 
big cup of tea 
we like our tea ah: weak 
so: so what can you see here ((leaning down looking through the beaker side angle)) 
notice the(.) the balls are 
whats happening here at the moment ((Mr Davis makes this statement while leaning  
down looking into the side of the beaker. As he finishes this statement Sam and Simon 
immediately and concurrently lean down to look into the side of the beaker)) 
the balls are attracted to the edge ((points to the beaker, looks at Mr Davis)) 
yep 
and if they’re not towards the edge they’re towards each other 
yeah ok (.)  that’s interesting isn’t  it 
[the tea is]  ((sitting at eye level to the beaker))  
[the tea is]  ((points to the beaker with open vertical hand, Mr Davis bends slightly to look 
at beaker)) 
like floating around ((sitting at eye level to side of beaker)) 
yeah  
its going up  
its goin’ a little bit to  
ok the tea at the bottom is starting to float a bit 
yeah 
what else can you see there ((stands back with hands on hips, Dre leans on bench closer to 
beaker)) 
0bubbles starting to float0 
its beginning to boil 
its starting to yeah like 
how do you know it’s starting to boil 
bubbles  
bubbles  
awh:: we got some uhm:: whats the word:: circ:  ((stands face orientates to Mr Davis and 
Dre moves his right hand in a vertical circular gesture))   
circulation 
Circulation how do you know that 
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149 
150 
151 
152 
153 
154 
155 
156 
157 
158 
159 
160 
161 
162 
163 
164 
165 
166 
167 
168 
169 
170 
171 
172 
173 
174 
175 
176 
177 
178 
179 
180 
 
 
250 
251 
252 
Dre 
 
Mr Davis 
Dre 
Mr Davis 
Dre 
 
 
 
Mr Davis 
Dre 
Mr Davis 
Dre 
Mr Davis 
Dre 
Mr Davis 
Sam 
Mr Davis 
Dre 
Mr Davis 
 
 
Dre 
 
Mr Davis 
Dre 
Mr Davis 
 
 
Dre 
 
 
 
 
Mr Davis 
Dre 
Mr Davis 
the bottoms heating up it rises to the top an cools and goes back down to heat up  
((points to the beak with left hand and Mr Davis bends down to look at the beaker)) 
ok so [how] 
          [can see] by the leaves going up ((moves his left hand in a vertical circular motion)) 
write what you have observed there, write what you can see there ok try an’ [write] 
                                                                                                                                           [yeah] whats:  
isnt there (.) theres a word for that right ((Looks at the Mr Davis and clicks his fingers)) like 
(0.2) how the water at the bottom, is heating up cos its kinda ((kind of)) like closer to the 
plate so it rises up  
Yep 
and when it reaches the top it cools so goes back to the bottom  
yep 
it heats up again ((pointing to the beaker)) 
yep 
and so the ((rolls both hands and arms in a vertical circular motion)) and what do ya call 
that 
circulation  
ye circulation yeah 
mhh:: 
yep, and why do you think that’s happening(.) when you've written your observation 
down over this side ((points to the worksheet on the bench)) you want to write why you 
think that might be happening ((backs away as a student in another group is calling)) 
its hotter at the bottom when it rises it gets away from the heat cools down and  
 ((Mr Davis steps back towards Dre as Dre continues to re-state his explanation)) 
it’s a possibility  
hot air rises ((right hand rises)) cold air falls ((right hand falls)) 
or water in this case yeah (.) so write all this down.   
((Mr Davis walks off to another student who is calling)) 
((the group observe the objects for a short time)) 
so by putting the tea bag into the beaker the water has been tinted ah goldish teaish 
colour and ya can see and it shows the convection and the um the um movements of the 
water:: currents: currents as the currents of the water as it goes around 
 
((Very Late in the lesson)) 
work out, what is this like? ((pointing to the task sheet)) 
would it be like currents in the ocean and like currents in the atmosphere 
yep yep thats pretty good 
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Appendix B 
Data Series B 
 
Turn Speaker Transcript 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
 
13 
14 
15 
 
 
 
16 
 
 
17 
 
 
18 
19 
Tim 
 
 
Mr Davis 
Tim 
Mr Davis 
Tim 
Mr Davis 
Tim 
Mr Davis 
Tim 
Mr Davis 
 
Tim 
Mr Davis 
Tim 
 
 
 
Mr Davis 
 
 
Tim 
 
 
Mr Davis 
Tim 
so:: when that ((Mr Davis pulls out his chair at ‘so’)) by emitted electrons ((Mr Davis sits 
and adjusted his glasses at ‘electrons’)) it affects one of the neutrons and carbon fourteen 
decays into (.) uhm   ((2.70 SPS)) 
yep [yep]                              ((1.00 SPS)   
        [nitr]ogen fourteen (.)  ((5.00 SPS) 
so::: (1.5) ((2.00 SPS)) 
would that be the process ((3.00 SPS) 
ˊsorry ((3.33 SPS)) 
would that be the process ((3.00 SPS))  
absolutely because that’s describing the beta the beta decay process isn’t it 
yeah and I’ve already got stuff about the beta decay 
yeah so that electron that its talking about which is [emitted] yeah so that electron that 
its talking about which is [emitted] 
                                                      [and them uhm::] 
is the beta decay 
the primary natural source of carbon fourteen on earth is the cosmotic ray upon nitrogen 
in the atmosphere therefore a cosmogenic nuclei  ((Tim reads from his notes. Mr Davis 
places hand on top of his own head as he follows Tim’s notes)) 
 
uh::m:: yeah: 
((places finger on notebook and reads notes, mouths words)) uh::m:: yeah: 
((places finger on notebook and reads notes, mouths words)) 
the different types of carbon have different properties 
((stares at Mr Davis, then looks down at book)) 
1.5 
yep:: 
used in chemical and bio (.) used in chemical and biochemical  
((unclear audio)) used in chemical and bio (.) used in chemical and biochemical  
((unclear audio)) 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
Mr Davis 
Tim 
 
Mr Davis 
Tim 
so what’s happening there ((glances at notebook)) in that last bit ((3.33SPS)) 
is beta decay (.) in beta decay the electron decays and then the beta decay .hhh ((shakes 
head slightly)) no(.) so it breaks down the neutron ((3.73SPS)) 
yeah well what happens is one of the neutrons [breaks up] ((4.00SPS)) 
                                                                                     [becomes unstable] ((6.67)) 
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25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
Mr Davis 
Tim 
Mr Davis 
Tim 
Mr Davis 
Tim 
Mr Davis 
Tim 
Mr Davis 
 
Tim 
Mr Davis 
 part of it becomes the [electron] that goes away the decay ((Figure 5.2))  ((5.00SPS)) 
                                          [yeah]           ((nods head and licks lips))                    ((4.00SPS)) 
and then whats left if your neutral and you lose a negative charge             ((3.05SPS)) 
[and then you]                                                                                                        ((5.00SPS)) 
[what does the charge] become  ((continues with hand gestures))              ((6.49SPS)) 
POSITIVE   ((Looks at me, points index finger  towards me))                          ((4.82sps))                                                                   
positive and that’s why it becomes a proton so                                                ((6.00sps)) 
and that’s why it becomes nitrogen                                                                    ((4.92sps)) 
yeah so as soon as you change the number of protons from  
[six to seven you’ve created nitrogen]            ((Figure 5.3))                           ((3.23SPS))                 
[yeah so like (.) so that’s how many (.) oh ok so]                                              ((2.50SPS)) 
by that beta decay happening its creating nitrogen                                          ((3.09SPS)) 
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Appendix C 
Data Series C 
 
Turn Speaker Transcript 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Chris 
 
Mr Davis 
 
Pete 
Mr Davis 
Chris 
((reading from task sheet)) Explain the half-life process (.) what do they mean by that 
((points at task sheet)) 
Okay_(.) so′: half′ life′(.) remember we did that thing with the uhm:: 
((positions his hand like he’s holding something)) 
Xs ((shakes his hand from side to side)) 
the Xs ((shakes his hand up and down)) when you were shaking that thing 
((Nodding)) 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
Mr Davis 
Chris 
Mr Davis 
 
 
 
Chris 
Mr Davis 
and you drew a graph, and every time you threw the things you lost about half of them 
((Nods)) 
The same thing happens with these things(.) ((open palm hand pointing to the task sheet)) So 
when you break down carbon-14(.) when half of it is broken down that’s one half-life so if 
you’ve got a hundred atoms and then there’s only fifty left that’s a half-life so the actual half-
life of carbon is 13 [about] 
                                       [about] 5600 years 
about that 5730 okay(.) so: that’s what half-life is:  ((3.39SPS)) 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
Chris 
Mr Davis 
Chris 
Mr Davis 
 
 
Chris 
Mr Davis 
 
Chris 
Mr Davis 
Chris 
0I don’t understand0 ((3.33 SPS)) 
 ˉdon’t ˉunderstand ˉwhat ((5.75 SPS)) 
This bit here ((points to the research question on the task sheet)) ((2.72SPS)) 
okay‛ ((pulls up a chair and sits beside Chris)) okay (5.00) so what its really asking you identify 
the half-life is basically what is the half-life number (.) we already know = and then describe 
it= so explain what it is = so the idea is =  
yeah 
and that’s all you have to explain for half-life (.) you don’t have to actually explain what beta 
decay is in this section 
so what about this ((points to the section on Beta Decay)) 
so this is actually where you need to explain Beta Decay okay ((pointing at the task sheet)) 
alright ((nods)) 
28 
29 
 
30 
31 
32 
33 
Mr Davis 
Chris 
 
Chris 
Pete 
 
 
so: do you understand what Beta Decay is ((sits back in chair, looking at Chris)) 
sorta:: ((sort of; leans forward and starts searching on the computer))  
4.0 
Pete do you know what beta decay is 
ah: beta decay I KNOW what that is (.) its uhm ((faces computer and conducts searches on 
the internet)) (.) uhm 
6.5 
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34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
Mr Davis 
Chris 
Mr Davis 
 
 
 
Chris 
Mr Davis 
Chris 
Mr Davis 
 
Chris 
Mr Davis 
 
 
 
Chris 
Mr Davis 
 
 
 
 
Chris 
Mr Davis 
Chris 
Mr Davis 
Chris 
Lets lets have a think about it (.) draw a picture (.) that might be easier 
how do I do that 
so I’ll show you ((stands up and takes the pen from Chris)) I’ll draw a little diagram for you 
here (.) so in the nucleus of this carbon we’ve got one two three four five SIX we got six 
protons there okay ((I draw each as a small circle.  Chris watches closely, his elbow on the 
desk, his hand holding his head)) and:: we’ve got(.) how many neutrons have we got 
fourteen 
well(.) we’ve got a MASS of 14(.) so if its fourteen minus six 
eight 
eight(.)  we’ve got one two three four five six seven EIGHT neutrons okay ((draws 8 N’s  
near the protons)) 
yeah 
NOW what happens in beta decay is that one of the neutrons loses an electron ((points & 
draws an electron)) and what happens is when it loses an electron ((points to neutron)) 
that’s already a neutral charge and the electron ((points to the electron)) is negatively 
charged so what happens to the neutron  
becomes positive  
yeah, it loses a negative charge and becomes positive (.) so it turns into a proton okay 
((draws the new proton. Chris nods)) 
((points to the electron)) that goes off into the atmosphere and ((points to protons)) you  
end up with one two three four five six seven (.) SEVEN protons then ((Chris nods)) and 
seven neutrons which has turned that into nitrogen ((points to nucleus)) 
yeah ((nods))  
((points to the electron)) that is the beta decay that is the beta particle 
yeah ((Nods)) 
so that’s what the process is ((Chris nodding)) so any more questions on that 
no that’s fine sir 
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Appendix D 
Water Movement Observation Activity 
Activity 1 
1. Prepare a 1 litre beaker of tap water by placing a pinch tea leaves and two 
foam beads in the water. 
2. What do you observe about movements in the content of the beaker?  
3. Place the beaker of tap water on an electric heat plate, and slowly bring to the 
boil  
4. What do you observe about movements in the content of the beaker?  
5. Make ongoing observations. 
Ongoing Observations Explain what is happening to in the beaker 
to cause movement 
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Activity 2 
1. A large beaker of tap water has been prepared 
2. A small bottle of salt water and food dye is placed in the bottom of the large 
beaker 
3. Make ongoing observations 
Ongoing Observations Explain what is happening to in the beaker 
to cause movement 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Activity 3 
Thinking about your observations in Activities 1 and 2, what could this be compared 
to in nature? 
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Appendix E 
Quantitative Analysis Speech Rate 
Episodes B01 & B02 
Data Collation 
Transcripts for Episodes B01 and B02 were analyzed by measuring the 
duration of each conversational turn in seconds. The number of syllables uttered in 
each term was measured using an online software tool at http://www.wordcalc.com 
(2010). The speech rate was then calculated for each turn, measured in sps. Data 
were then summarized into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet showing the data for Tim 
and Mr Davis on a paired turn basis.  For example, the first item of data for Tim was 
the rate at turn B064.  This was paired with Mr Davis’s rate at turn B065. This 
pairing produced 16 pairs of pace records, nine from Episode B02 and seven from 
Episode B03. 
Data Analysis 
Data were summarized by calculating the mean and standard deviation of 
speech rates for each of Tim and Mr Davis in Episodes B01 and B02. These four sets 
of data are summarized in Table 1, below.  The mean and standard deviations for 
Tim and Mr Davis were compared within each episode using the t-test (p<0.05) and 
also for each individual between the episodes.  This enabled an evaluation of 
statistically significant differences in rate between Tim-Mr Davis and from each 
member between episodes. 
The three data assumptions for t-tests were addressed by the data.  Firstly, the 
level of measurement was at a ratio level which is a higher level of measurement 
than the minimum requirement of interval level data (Coolican, 2009; Stevens, 
1946).  Secondly, the data were tested for normality using the Shapiro-Wilk tests and 
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this indicated that the data were consistent with data that may be drawn from a 
normal distribution (Shapiro & Wilk, 1965). The Shapiro-Wilk test was used as it is 
considered to be well suited to small sample sizes with n < 10 (Shapiro & Wilk, 
1965). Finally, the data were tested for homogeneity of variance that revealed a range 
of variances across the four samples from 1.67 to 2.97 which meets the requirement 
for homogeneity (Coolican, 2009).  
Pearson’s product moment correlation co-efficient (r) was also applied to the 
data to tests for correlation of conversational pace between Tim and Mr Davis within 
each episode. The data met the assumptions for this test by the ratio level of 
measurement and the related pairs of data (Coolican, 2009).  
Results 
 Results are summarized in Table 1 and Figure 5.20, below.  The graph in 
Figure 5.20 shows the speech rate for both Tim and Mr Davis in sps.  The vertical 
dotted line shows the separation point between the episodes. In Episode B01 Tim’s 
pace of conversation appears to be consistently higher than Mr Davis’s pace.  In 
addition the correlation between changes in pace does not appear strong. In Episode 
B02, the Mr Davis’s pace appears to have increased and is better correlated with 
Tim’s pace as both rise and fall at similar moments. 
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 The visual appearance of the graph is strongly supported by the statistical 
analysis summarized in Table 5.1. During Episode B01 Tim’s conversational pace 
was significantly faster than Mr Davis’s pace (4.25 ± 1.72 vs. 2.67 ± 1.37, p = 
0.0429).  Not only did Mr Davis speak slower but changes in his pace did not follow 
closely with changes in Tim’s pace indicated by a weak correlation co-efficient (r = 
0.22). 
As the conversation changed 0in Episode B02, Mr Davis’s pace increased 
and became more strongly correlated with Tims’ pace (4.52 ± 1.30 vs. 4.41 ± 1.43, p 
= 0.8310, r =0.53).  There were no statistically significant differences between the 
paces in Episode B02, and there was also a moderate level of correlation.  This 
suggests that the conversation of Tim and Mr Davis had established a rhythm where 
both were impacting one another’s interaction. This change in Mr Davis’s 
conversational pace is further confirmed by the t-test comparisons of Tim and Mr 
Davis between episodes that shows Tims’ pace did not change throughout either 
episode.  All of the change involved Mr Davis increasing his pace and improving his 
correlation with the conversational rhythm established by Tim. 
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Table E.1. Pace of Conversation Episodes B01 and B02 
  Tim Mr Davis   
 n   Mean ± Standard Deviation P value* Correlation† 
Finding-each-other Episode 
B01 
9 4.25 ± 1.72 2.67 ± 1.37 0.0429
#
 0.22 
Hand Gestures Episode B02 7 4.52 ± 1.30 4.41 ± 1.43 0.8310
#
 0.53 
P value*  0.7220
^
 0.0268
^
   
* P values calculated using the t-test for related values (p < 0.05). 
#  
Comparison of Tim and Mr Davis within each episode. 
^  
Comparison of individuals between each episode. 
† Pearson’s product moment correlation co-efficient (r) comparing Tim and Mr 
Davis within each episode. 
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Appendix F 
Quantitative Analysis Speech Rate 
Episodes C01 & C02 
Data Collation 
  Transcripts for Episodes C01 and C02 were analyzed by measuring the 
duration of each conversational turn in seconds. The number of syllables uttered in 
each term was measured using an online software tool at http://www.wordcalc.com 
(2010). The speech rate was then calculated for each turn, measured in sps. Data 
were then re-organized into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet showing the data for Chris 
and Mr Davis on a paired turn basis.  For example, the first item of data for Chris 
was the pace at turn C001.  This was paired with Mr Davis’s pace at turn C002. In 
this episode there was some interaction from Pete who was sitting beside Mr Davis. 
Pete’s contributions are also shown in the graphical presentation.  Four long silences 
ranging from 4.0 to 6.5 seconds also occurred.  These were included in the graphical 
presentation in Figure 5.22, below.  
Data Analysis 
  Data were summarized by calculating the mean and standard deviation of 
speech rate for each of Chris and Mr Davis in Episodes C01 and C02. These four sets 
of data are summarized in Table 2 below.  The mean and standard deviations for 
Chris and Mr Davis were compared within each episode using the t-test (p<0.05) and 
also for each member between the episodes.  This enabled an evaluation of 
statistically significant differences in speech rate between Chris-Mr Davis and for 
members between episodes. 
  The three data assumptions for t-tests were addressed by the data.  Firstly, the 
level of measurement was at a ratio level which is a higher level of measurement 
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than the minimum requirement of interval level data (Coolican, 2009; Stevens, 
1946).  Secondly, the data were tested for normality using the Shapiro-Wilk test 
(http://sdittami.altervista.org/shapirotest/ShapiroTest.html). 
This test indicated that most of the data were consistent with data that may be drawn 
from a normal distribution (Shapiro & Wilk, 1965). The only exception to this was 
the data related to Chris in Episode C02. The Shapiro-Wilk test was used as it is 
considered to be well suited to small sample sizes with n < 10 (Shapiro & Wilk, 
1965). Finally, the data were tested for homogeneity of variance that revealed a range 
of variances across the four samples from 1.30 to 3.22 which meets the requirement 
for homogeneity (Coolican, 2009).  
  Pearson’s product moment correlation co-efficient (r) was also applied to the 
data to tests for correlation of conversational pace between Chris and Mr Davis 
within each episode. The data met the assumptions for this test by the ratio level of 
measurement and the related pairs of data (Coolican, 2009).  
Results 
  Results are summarized in Table 1 and Figure 5.22, below.  The graph in 
Figure 5.22 shows the speech rate for both Chris and Mr Davis in sps.  The vertical 
dotted line shows the separation point between the episodes. Across both episodes 
there is no significant difference between Chris and Mr Davis’s rate of speech.  
However, both rates of speech decrease during the second episode, with Mr Davis’s 
rate close to being statistically significant.  The rate of Mr Davis’s speech may be 
associated with the stepwise explanation using the diagram.  It is possible that Chris’ 
speech was affected by Mr Davis’s slower rate. 
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Table G.1. Pace of Conversation Episodes C01 and C02 
  Chris Mr Davis   
 n   Mean ± Standard Deviation P value* Correlation† 
Finding-each-other Episode C01 20 3.48 ± 1.80 4.24 ± 1.33 0.2055
#
 0.34 
Sketch Drawing Episode C02 16 2.99 ± 1.65 3.44 ± 1.14 0.3868
#
 0.25 
P value*  0.4528^ 0.0810^   
* P values calculated using the t-test for related values (p < 0.05). 
#  Comparison of Chris and Mr Davis within each episode. 
^  Comparison of individuals between each episode. 
† Pearson’s product moment correlation co-efficient (r) comparing Chris and Mr Davis 
within each episode. 
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Appendix G 
Transcription Conventions 
Adapted from Roth & Hsu (2010) and Ten Have (2007) 
Symbol Use/Indication Example 
(.) A brief pause less than 0.2 
seconds. 
John: did you (.) get that 
underline Speaker is emphasizing or 
stressing speech 
Joel: did you hear that 
::: Prolongation of sound where 
each : indicates 0.1 seconds 
A:   [u:h::m:::] 
[text] Brackets show the start and 
end of overlapping speech 
A:   [u:h::m:::] 
B:   [
0
what is::
0
]  
 
0
 
Degrees symbol  indicates 
quiet speech or reduced 
volume 
 
B:   [
0
what is::
0
] 
 
; 
. 
- 
, 
? 
Movement of pitch 
Semicolon is down 
Period is strongly down 
Hyphen is flat 
Comma is up 
Question mark is strongly up 
 
 
B:   [
0
what is::
0
] it? 
 
= 
A break and subsequent 
continuation of a single 
utterance. One at the end of a 
line and beginning of the next 
indicates latching, or no gap 
 
A:  So:::= 
B:  =lets just a:h::= 
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Appendix G 
Transcription Conventions (Continued) 
Adapted from Hsu & Roth (2010) and Ten Have (2007) 
Symbol Use/Indication Example 
(0.36) Time in seconds of a pause in 
speech 
A:  so what have you seen 
(0.36)   
B: I:: thin:k: 
.hhh Audible inhalation where each 
h is 0.1 seconds 
 
B: I:: thin:k: .hhh 
((text)) Text in double parentheses 
indicates description of non-
verbal activity 
A:  watch this (0.6) ((squints 
eyes, looking at the chemical 
reaction)) 
mEAn Capital letters shows emphasis 
of a syllable 
A: what do you mEAn? 
<<f>    > Forte, louder than usual <<f> WOW> 
<<dim>   > Diminuendo, lower intensity <<dim>whats that say> 
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Appendix H 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION FOR QUT RESEARCH PROJECT 
– Classroom Audio/Video Observation, Interview & Survey – 
Exploring Emotional Dimensions of Analogical Reasoning in Secondary School, Science Pedagogy 
QUT Ethics Approval Number 1300000525 
RESEARCH TEAM  
Principal Researcher: Mr James Davis, QUT PhD student  and  Science Teacher, Warwick State High School 
(SHS) 
Associate Researchers: Dr Alberto Bellocchi  and  Prof Stephen Ritchie 
 Faculty of Education – Queensland University of Technology (QUT) 
DESCRIPTION 
This project is being undertaken as part of a Doctor of Philosophy degree study by Mr James Davis, QUT 
student and science/mathematics teacher at Warwick SHS. 
As your teacher, I want to improve my practice and knowledge about how science should be taught in 
schools to improve student learning. Many students tend to lose interest in science as they move from 
primary to secondary school.  Research suggests that student emotions are important in maintaining 
student interest and enjoyment of school science, and yet there is only limited, practical, classroom based 
research to show this.  By doing this project I want to contribute to knowledge and improve classroom 
teaching of science by better understanding how student emotions relate to learning in science.  
I would like to invite you to be a part of my project because you are a secondary school student studying 
science at Warwick State High School in my class, where I will be doing this project. 
PARTICIPATION 
Your part in this study is to get on with your normal classroom activities. I wish to capture your normal 
activities on video to help this study.  
Classroom Audio/Video Observation.  
I plan to run this project in your classroom throughout Semester 2, 2013, and/or both semesters of 2014.  
Your participation will involve audio and video recordings to observe your classroom activities during some 
of your normal science classes. It is anticipated that up to 8 lessons per term may be recorded, plus up to 8 
interviews of 2 to 15 minutes each. 
Interview.  NOTE: Interviews were not conducted upon reflection on my EM approach to data analysis.         
In addition you may be asked to participate in a short individual or group interview to confirm audio and 
video information. These interviews may be held at the end of class, during breaks, and will take 
approximately 2 to 15 minutes of your time, with a maximum of 8 interviews per term. Questions will 
depend on the situation recorded but may be similar to the following: 
a. “I would like you to think back to this point in the video (show video section). At this point where you 
were nodding your head, how did you feel about the conversation you were having?”  
b. “I would like you to think back to this point in the audio (play audio section). At this point, you 
stopped speaking as student X interrupted your explanation.  How did this interruption make you 
feel?” 
Survey.  NOTE: Surveys were not conducted upon reflection on my EM approach to data analysis. 
Your participation may also involve completing a short survey requiring answers on an emotion diary, at the 
end of a lesson.  Each survey will take approximately 5 to 15 minutes of your time and may be repeated, at 
different times, up to 8 times per term. Questions will be similar to the following: 
a. “Please circle one or more (or none) of the emotions you experienced in class today; Happiness…” 
b. “During today’s science lesson, to what extent did you feel ‘Happy’: (circle one score) 
Slightly or not at all ←   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10  →  Extremely” 
c. “Please write briefly, in your own words, what you were doing, and what happened, when you 
experienced the emotion.” 
Your participation in this project is entirely voluntary. If you do agree to participate, you can withdraw from 
the project without comment or penalty. If you withdraw, on request, any identifiable information already 
obtained from you will be destroyed. Your decision to participate or not participate will in no way impact 
upon your current or future relationship  
with QUT, Education Queensland, or Warwick State High School. For example, and there will be no impact 
on your grades or reports. 
EXPECTED BENEFITS 
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It is expected that you may benefit directly from this project as I will be conducting research that will 
improve my own classroom teaching. This project may also benefit students in the future by improving the 
ways in which other teachers understand student emotions, thinking and learning in classroom situations.  
To recognise your contribution should you choose to participate, I will arrange for you to receive a 
certificate of participation from QUT.  This will be provided after full participation at the end of term 4 in 
2013 or 2014 depending on your year of participation.   
RISKS 
There are no risks beyond normal day-to-day living associated with your participation in this project.  
PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY 
All comments and responses will be treated confidentially. The names of individual persons will not be 
recorded in the data and except for video images, all data will be de-identified. 
Audio/Video Data 
You may remain identifiable on audio/video recordings. This can’t be avoided as this project relies on the 
reading of facial expression, body language and analysis of conversation to determine emotional 
interactions. You may be asked to confirm or verify comments and responses about this data during the 
interviews, but this may not occur at the end of every audio/video capture. If any images are used in 
publications, any information that links to you, or your school, will be removed.  
Your confidentiality will be maintained by the following procedures: 
• Access to audio/video recordings will be limited to me, and my QUT supervisors.  
• The audio recording may be transcribed into a written document by me, and this transcription will be 
de-identified. 
• Black and white still images may be extracted from video recordings for the purpose of demonstrating 
instances of emotion for publication in a thesis, or in academic/professional education journals. 
References to these still shots in publications will not refer to your real name, and will identify you by 
the visual image only.   
• The audio and video recordings will be destroyed in accordance with QUT policies, 5 years after the 
completion of the study. 
• Any still images from video footage may only be used in journal publications if you consent in a 
separate release of image consent form. 
Please note that non-identifiable data collected in this project may be used as comparative data in future 
projects that may involve collaboration with other researchers.  
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE 
We would like to ask you to sign a written consent form (enclosed) to confirm your agreement to 
participate. 
QUESTIONS / FURTHER INFORMATION ABOUT THE PROJECT 
If have any questions or require any further information please contact one of the research team members 
below. 
James Davis Dr Alberto Bellocchi 
07 4666 9222          jp.davis@student.qut.edu.au 07 3138 3237          alberto.bellocchi@qut.edu.au 
 
CONCERNS / COMPLAINTS REGARDING THE CONDUCT OF THE PROJECT 
QUT is committed to research integrity and the ethical conduct of research projects.  However, if you do 
have any concerns or complaints about the ethical conduct of the project you may contact the QUT 
Research Ethics Unit on 07 3138 5123 or email ethicscontact@qut.edu.au. The QUT Research Ethics Unit is 
not connected with the research project and can facilitate a resolution to your concern in an impartial 
manner. 
Thank you for helping with this research project.  Please keep this sheet for your information. 
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CONSENT FORM FOR QUT RESEARCH PROJECT 
– Classroom Audio/Video Observation, Interview & Survey – 
Exploring Emotional Dimensions of Analogical Reasoning in 
Secondary School, Science Pedagogy 
QUT Ethics Approval Number 1300000525 
RESEARCH TEAM CONTACTS 
Mr James Davis Dr Alberto Bellocchi Professor Stephen Ritchie 
07 4666 9222 07 3138 3237 07 3138 3332 
jp.davis@student.qut.edu.au alberto.bellocchi@qut.edu.au s.ritchie@qut.edu.au 
PARENT/GUARDIAN STATEMENT OF CONSENT 
By signing below, you are indicating that you: 
● Have read and understood the information document regarding this project. 
● Have had any questions answered to your satisfaction. 
● Understand that if you have any additional questions you can contact the research team. 
● Understand that you are free to withdraw at any time, without comment or penalty. 
● Understand that you can contact the Research Ethics Unit on 07 3138 5123 or email 
ethicscontact@qut.edu.au if you have concerns about the ethical conduct of the project. 
● Have discussed the project with your child and what is required of them if participating.  
● Understand that the project will include audio and/or video recording. 
● Understand that non-identifiable data collected in this project may be used as comparative 
data in future projects. 
● Agree to participate in the project. 
Name of Parent/Guardian  
Signature of Parent/Guardian  
Date   
 
STATEMENT OF CHILD CONSENT 
Your parent or guardian has given their permission for you to be involved in this research project.   
This form is to seek your consent to participate in the research.   
By signing below, you are indicating that you: 
● Have read and understood the information about this project. 
● Have discussed the project with your parent/guardian.  
● Have had any questions answered to your satisfaction. 
● Understand that if you have any additional questions you can contact the research team. 
● Understand that you are free to withdraw at any time, without comment or penalty. 
● Understand that you can contact the Research Ethics Unit on 07 3138 5123 or email 
ethicscontact@qut.edu.au if you have concerns about the ethical conduct of the project. 
● Understand that the project will include audio / video recording. 
● Agree to participate in the project. 
Name of Student  
Signature of Student  
Date   
IMAGE RELEASE: RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS 
This study may result in the publication of still images of students taken from video footage. These still images 
may be published in professional or academic journals to explain the results of this study to other teachers, 
educators or researchers.  Consent to release these images must be given on a separate consent form, available 
from the principle investigator, Mr James Davis. 
Please return this sheet to the investigator. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
324 
 
Appendix I 
Image Release:  Research 
Participants 
A photographic image (including a video recording) which is sufficiently clear to enable you to be 
identified as an individual is personal information.  Queensland University of Technology (QUT) seeks 
to comply with the Information Privacy Principles as set out in the Information Privacy Act 2009. QUT 
shall, from time to time, endorse a privacy policy (see www.mopp.qut.edu.au ) to ensure that 
personal information is used and disclosed only in ways which are consistent with privacy principles 
and will otherwise comply with QUT’s privacy obligations under statute.  In general, personal 
information is not disclosed or published except where an individual’s consent has been obtained. 
● QUT is seeking your consent to use an image of you in research publications in a thesis or 
report, professional/academic education journals and/or conferences. 
● Participation in this release is voluntary. 
● Your decision to participate or to not participate will in no way impact upon your current or 
future relationship with Mr James Davis or with QUT.  
If you have any questions please ensure you have discussed them and are comfortable with the 
response before providing consent.  You may choose to discuss participation with the following 
people: 
● Mr James Davis or 
● Family or friends. 
What is the release about? The images we are recording during our research form part of the 
data that contributes to this study. For explanatory purposes in our research publications we may 
need to publish images of you.  These images will be de-identified as much as possible by covering 
name tags or school logos, but your face image may be published. You will be referred to in any 
publication using a fake name or pseudonym. 
Why do you want to include me?   In this study we are trying to describe student emotion and 
these are often obvious from gestures and facial expressions.  We may want to include you in an 
image release so that we can show readers of our publication what we are talking about when 
explaining emotions and facial expressions.    
What will you ask me to do?  This image release will be taken from the video recording we make 
as part of our study.  This recording will be taken in your science class during your normal activity.  
You will not be required to do anything extra, other than attending class as normal. 
Are there any benefits for me in taking part? While the video recording and publication of this 
video is not expected to provide benefits to participants, the video is not expected to be of 
detriment to participants either.  The research team seeks to benefit from this video by raising 
awareness of the research being undertaken by the research team. 
Are there any risks for me in taking part?  We believe there are minimal risks with your 
participation in this video, which you should consider: 
● Your image may be published in international professional or academic journals, and read 
by teachers, educators and researchers; 
Confidentiality The faces of all participants may be included in the still images for publication.  
Images will be released without personal identifying features such as your name or school. QUT will 
only identify you in the images on the basis of your association with the researcher, or via a fake 
name.  
Who will see the video? I will, and my QUT supervisors may, see the original video, but all images 
for release will be seen by teachers, educators or researchers who read the publications or see 
conference presentations.  
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Can I change my mind?  You can change your mind at any time without penalty, by withdrawing 
your consent to release images. This does not exclude you from the study, it just excludes the 
release of your image. 
I am interested – what should I do next?  All persons appearing in this image release will be 
required to sign the attached Consent Form, acknowledging that they have read and understood the 
Image Release Information Sheet, and agree to allow the use of their image in international 
professional or academic journals. 
If you have any questions about this video, please do not hesitate to contact: 
Mr James Davis 
Thank you for helping with this research project.  Please keep this sheet for your 
information. 
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Image Release:  Research Participants 
PLEASE RETURN THIS COMPLETED FORM TO MR JAMES DAVIS 
A COPY WILL BE PROVIDED FOR YOUR RECORDS 
If you agree to give consent regarding the use of your image in journal publications, please read and 
complete the consent below.   
Consent 
● I agree to the University using, reproducing and disclosing photographic or video images of 
me as explained in this Image Release: Research Participants Information Sheet and 
Consent Form. 
 
● I agree that I will make no claim against QUT for any payment or fee for appearing in 
promotional material or advertisements and release QUT from any other claims arising out 
of the University’s use of the images of me. 
 
● I understand that the anonymity afforded me as a participant in the research project 
“Exploring emotional Dimensions of Analogical Reasoning in Secondary School, Science 
Pedagogy” will be rescinded if I appear in journal publications. 
 
For involvement of children 
Name of Child  
Signature of Child  
By signing below, you are indicating that you have discussed participation in journal 
publications with your child and you are the legal guardian to provide consent to 
participate. 
Name of 
Parent/Guardian 
 
Signature of 
Parent/Guardian 
 
Date   
Please return this sheet to the investigator. 
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Appendix J 
DETE Approval 
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Appendix K 
QUT Ethics Approval 
 
 
 
 
 
